U.S. Supreme Court
- Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. U.S., No. 08-1119 (U.S. 3/8/2010) (2010)
Under our reading of the statute, of course, the prohibited advice is not defined in terms of abusive prefiling conduct but rather the incurrence of additional debt when the impelling reason is the anticipation of bankruptcy. Even if the test depended upon the notion of abuse, however, Milavetz's claim would be fatally undermined by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, to which that
concept is no stranger. As discussed above, the Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to decline to discharge...
- The Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bailey, No. 08-295 (U.S. 6/18/2009) (2009)
We should not lightly assume that the Bankruptcy Court entered an order that exceeded its authority. When a bankruptcy proceeding is commenced, the bankruptcy court acquires control of the debtor's assets and the power to discharge its debts. A bankruptcy court has no authority,however, to adjudicate, settle, or enjoin claims against nondebtors that do not affect the debtor's estate. Because Travelers' insurance policies were a significant asset of the Manville bankruptcy
estate, the...
- Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, No. 05-1429 (U.S. 3/20/2007) (2007)
After respondent (PG&E) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, petitioner (Travelers), which had previously issued a surety bond to guarantee PG&E's payment of state workers' compensation benefits, asserted a claim in the bankruptcy action to protect itself should PG&E default on the benefits. With the Bankruptcy Court's approval, PG&E agreed to insert language into its reorganization plan and disclosure statement to protect Travelers in case of such a default. Additional litigation over the...
- Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass, No. 05-996 (U.S. 2/21/2007) (2007)
In filing his petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, petitioner Marrama misrepresented the value of his Maine property and that he had not transferred it during the preceding year. Respondent DeGiacomo, the trustee of Marrama's estate, stated his intention to recover the Maine property as an estate asset. Thereafter, Marrama sought to convert the proceeding to Chapter 13,but the trustee and respondent bank, Marrama's principal creditor, objected, contending that the request to...
- Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) May 3, 2004
Petitioner Scarborough prevailed before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) in an action for disability benefits against respondent Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Scarborough's counsel filed a timely application for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to § 2412(d), showing that Scarborough was the prevailing party in the underlying litigation and was eligible to receive an award. Counsel also stated the total amount sought, and itemized hours and rates of work. But counsel...
- Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)
Before 1994, § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorized a court to "award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 . . ., or to the debtor's attorney " "(1) reasonable compensation for . . . services rendered by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney. . . ." (Emphasis added to highlight text later deleted.) In 1994 Congress amended the Code with a reform Act. The Act altered § 330(a) by deleting "or to...
- MELKONYAN V. SULLIVAN, 501 U.S. 89 (1991) June 10, 1991
The EAJA's plain language makes clear that a "final judgment" for purposes of § 2412(d)(1)(B) is a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil action for which EAJA fees may be received. Subsections (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B) work in tandem, and subsection (d)(1)(B)'s requirement that the fee application be filed within 30 days of "final judgment in the action " (emphasis added) plainly refers back to the "civil action . . . in any court" in subsection (d)(1)(A). This reading...
- Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990) June 4, 1990
The language Congress chose in describing the fee application procedure in § 2412(d)(1)(B) corroborates the statute's other references to a single finding. A fee application must contain an allegation "that the position of the United States was not substantially justified." Ibid. Again, the reference is to only one position, and it is to a position that the Government took in the past. There is no reference to the position the Government may take in response to the fee application. ...
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* Cases reported were found by using the term "Fee Application" in Boolean Search. This listing of cases is not meant to constitute the top cases within each jurisdiction but, the most recent cases in accordance with the search term. (5/17/09)
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