BAP
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 1st Circuit
- In re Ck Liquidation Corp., 408 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir., 2009)
In August 2008, Mintz Levin filed a final fee application ("Final Fee Application") seeking final approval of fees and expenses totaling $314,108.54, comprised of the following: (1) $140,332.98,for fees and expenses allowed by the First Fee Order; (2) $134,277.50 for fees and expenses not awarded in the First Fee Order; (3) $38,038.00 for fees and expenses incurred after the period
covered by the First Fee Order; and (4) an estimated $2,500 for anticipated fees associated with the...
- In re Withrow, 405 B.R. 505 (B.A.P. 1st Cir., 2009)
Thereafter, Attorney Lafayette filed an interim application for compensation (the "Fee Application"), requesting professional fees of $1,195.00. 2 The Trustee objected. After repeating the concerns set forth in his Rebuttal Response, the Trustee asserted that because the Debtor testified at the § 341 meeting that he had "fully and truthfully" informed Attorney Lafayette of the facts and circumstances related to the schedules, statement of financial affairs, and the...
- In re Lopez, BAP No. PR 08-068 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 5/7/2009) (B.A.P. 1st Cir., 2009)
Debtor's counsel also observed that "[o]pponents of statutory fee petitions frequently attempt to diminish the value of consumer attorney's fees by citing the relatively modest amount of a typical settlement viz-a-viz the attorney fees and costs expended to reach a satisfactory result." He indicated that the remedial nature of § 362(h), 5 and fee-shifting statutes generally, counsel
against the award of fees based only on the amount of damages awarded in the underlying litigation...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 8th Circuit
- In re Ceresota Mill Ltd. Partnership, 211 B.R. 315 (Bankr.8 th Cir., 1997)
Finally, Agate Holdings asserts that the Court abused its discretion in failing to separately analyze the fee application. There is no indication before this panel that the bankruptcy court failed to analyze the merits of the fee application. Rather, the bankruptcy court declined to reach the merits
of Agate Holding's objection based upon the untimeliness of thatobjection. The bankruptcy court's order makes the appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 9th Circuit
- In re Thomas, BAP No. CC-08-1307-HMoPa (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 7/6/2009) (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2009)
On September 12, 2008, Farmer filed an Amended and Supplemented Fifth and Final Fee Application ("Amended Fee Application"). The Amended Fee Application sought approval of $247,340.50 in total fees and $21,630.32 in total expenses. The Amended Fee Application incorporated the De-lumped Fee Statement along with a supplemental request for authorization of fees from the billing period since the submission of the Final Fee Application, which included $13,132.50 in fees associated with...
- In re Dick Cepek, Inc., 339 B.R. 730 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2006)
On November 24, 1999, Appellant filed its first interim fee application ("First Fee Application")requesting compensation in the amount of $100,904.50 and costs in the amount of $31,914.86. In paragraph D of the First Fee Application, Debtor noted that it had withdrawn the Retainer from its client trust account, but requested the court to authorize deduction of its allowed fees and costs
"from the retainer funds on hand, to the extent such retainer funds are available or become...
- In re Garcia, 335 B.R. 717 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2005)
In June of 2004, Appellant filed its only fee application for services and expenses, covering September 29, 2003, through July 16, 2004. The Firm sought a total of $10,679.50 in fees and cost reimbursement of $273.15. The Firm also sought a "clean up" fee of $750.00 to deal with matters occurring after filing of the application or after the July 16, 2004, hearing...
- In re Eliapo, 298 B.R. 392 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2003)
We leave for another day the issue of whether the bankruptcy court can apply the "normal and customary" approach to a conventional fee application filed in the first instance. See Pedersen, 229 B.R. at 449 (stating that filing a detailed fee application, with time records and descriptions of services, is the only way to obtain court approval of attorneys' fees outside of the chapter 13 fee...
- In re Stinson, 295 B.R. 109 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2003)
On appeal, Debtor contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not afforded a full and adequate hearing on the amended fee application. The Record, however, is clear that there was an actual hearing that was continued in order to afford Debtor an additional opportunity to present an adequate fee application and that, in connection with that continuance, Debtor received
explicit notice that a further hearing would be held...
- In re Atwood, 293 B.R. 227 (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2003)
As framed by the appellants, this appeal raises a narrow question: whether a secured creditor's claim for attorney's fees requires a fee application under Rule 2016, with notice to all creditors. Debtors assert that, although only $450 is at stake in this appeal, this is a "test case" for curing a "substantially flawed and abusive process that costs consumers millions of dollars." Appellants' Brief, at 7, note...
- In re Mednet, 251 B.R. 103 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 2000)
As to the latter services, our examination of the record reveals that in its interim fee application, RSK sought compensation for reviewing the Debtors' files and working with the Debtors' staff in order "to collect the remaining receivable from Managing Underwriters in the amount of $95,589.40." In its final fee application RSK, purportedly citing new work, states that after January
1, 1998, "in order to collect the remaining receivable from Managing Underwriters in the amount of...
- In re Auto Parts Club, Inc., 211 B.R. 29 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1997)
Lobel filed its first and final fee application on January 4, 1996, requesting $137,033.50 in fees and $11,134.94 in costs. Lobel had already received $93,514.55 pursuant to an interim fee order. No party objected to the fee application. At a hearing on the fee application held February 1, 1996, the court expressed concern over the amount of fees incurred by the Committee in a case
which "probably was D.O.A." and where unsecured creditors received no distribution. Lobel responded that...
- In re Music Merchants, Inc., 208 B.R. 944 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1997)
Malpass was initially employed to represent the creditors' committee on May 13, 1988. He filed an initial fee application on February 6, 1989, which sought fees of approximately $24,000 and expenses of approximately $300 for the period from February to November, 1988. Following a hearing, the trial court allowed no fees or expenses to be paid. Malpass moved for reconsideration and resubmitted the first interim fee...
- In re Negrete, 183 B.R. 195 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1995)
In addition, the reconsideration motion revisited the same issues ruled upon by the court in its fee order. The motion presented the same issues and arguments that were presented in the second fee application. It also contained a memorandum of points and authorities that was virtually identical to the memorandum included in the second fee application. While Alexander supplied additional and more specific supporting facts (and voluntarily reduced his fee request) in his reconsideration motion,...
- In re Weibel, Inc., 176 B.R. 209 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1994)
The bankruptcy court denied the Motion. Within a month substitute counsel was brought into the case with court approval. On August 18, 1993, McCutchen filed its Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses ("Fee Application") requesting $127,699 in fees and $9,877.74 in costs. Both Pacific and the Committee opposed the Fee...
- In re Dutta, 175 B.R. 41 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1994)
Following confirmation of the plan, MPS filed its first and final fee application (the "fee application"). The fee application requested payment of MPS' attorneys' fees in the amount of $25,046 and expenses in the amount of $655.70. MPS provided written notice of the hearing on the fee application to the Office of the United States Trustee, all creditors and other interested parties. No objections to the fee application were filed with the bankruptcy...
- In re Larson, 174 B.R. 797 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1994)
The former counsel for the Chapter 12 1 debtors and debtors in possession filed his first and final fee application following his withdrawal as the debtors' counsel. The debtors objected to the fee application. Following a hearing on the fee application and objection, the bankruptcy court entered an order which awarded fees and costs to the debtors' former counsel. The debtors appeal.
We...
- In re Xebec, 147 B.R. 518 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1992)
The court reduced Xebec's expenses by $625.50 for word processing costs and $1,544 for a private investigator hired by the debtor's attorney to do a background check on the Chapter 11 trustee. The court correctly subtracted the investigator's fees from the final expense calculation. The debtor's attorney should not be permitted to expend estate funds in an effort to discredit the Chapter 11 trustee. Similarly, we affirm the bankruptcy court's expense deduction for word processing costs,...
- In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 298 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1990)
At issue in this case is not the propriety of fees incurred in the preparation of the fee application or in successfully defending appeals of or challenges to the fees. In its final application, E & H requested compensation for approximately 25 hours of time spent in preparing the application. Similarly E & H requested compensation for estimated time to be spent on preparing for and attending the hearing on the final fee application, and for preparing the order on the fee
application. All...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 1st Circuit
- In re Narragansett Clothing Co., 210 B.R. 493 (Bankr. 1st Cir., 1997) June 20, 1997
On June 20, 1996, the Trustee filed a "Post-Confirmation Trustee's Final Report and Account Before Distribution, Request for Compensation and Report on Claims/Proposed Distribution" (the "Final Fee Application") and an "Affidavit of Joseph B. Garb in Support of the Final Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Chapter 11 Trustee and Post-Confirmation Trustee" (the "Affidavit"), through which he sought total compensation of $555,175. The...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 6th Circuit
- In re Williams, 357 B.R. 434 (B.A.P. 6th Cir., 2007) January 9, 2007
William P. Bringman ("Appellant"), counsel for the chapter 7 debtors, appeals the bankruptcy court's order denying his motion for reconsideration of his fee application, and reducing his requested attorney's fees to the presumptive, or "no look," fee far chapter 7 cases filed in the Northern District of Ohio prior to October 17, 2005. 1 For the reasons that follow, the bankruptcy court's order is REVERSED and...
- In re Airspect Air, Inc., 288 B.R. 464 (B.A.P. 6th Cir., 2003) February 6, 2003
CMC appealed that decision and this Panel found that the bankruptcy court had erred in determining that the contingency set out in the fee agreement had not been met. The Panel reversed and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions for it to review the fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 328 rather than § 330 and to award the appropriate contingent fee unless it determined that its initial approval of the fee arrangement was improvident in light of subsequent...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 8th Circuit
- Bachman v. Pelofsky (B.A.P. 8th Cir., 2000) August 7, 2000
In the meantime, Bachman filed his first request for fees with the Bankruptcy Court in December 1997. In that application, he indicated that he had already been paid $943.75 and requested an additional $1,241.96 in fees and expenses. He further requested that the fees be paid prior to plan confirmation. The Chapter 13 Trustee opposed the application, asserting, among other things, that the circumstances did not warrant payment prior to plan confirmation. The Bankruptcy Court approved the fees...
- In re Peterson, 251 B.R. 359 (Bankr.8 th Cir., 2000) August 7, 2000
In the meantime, Bachman filed his first request for fees with the Bankruptcy Court in December 1997. In that application, he indicated that he had already been paid $943.75 and requested an additional $1,241.96 in fees and expenses. He further requested that the fees be paid prior to plan confirmation. The Chapter 13 Trustee opposed the application, asserting, among other things, that the circumstances did not warrant payment prior to plan confirmation. The Bankruptcy Court approved the fees...
- McKeeman v. Laughlin (B.A.P. 8th Cir., 1999) August 3, 1999
Appellant, James Edward Bachman, filed a Chapter 13 petition for Mr. and Mr. McKeeman on January 15, 1998. The court confirmed debtors' second amended Chapter 13 plan on January 6, 1999. During the case, counsel filed three fee applications seeking approval of fees in the total amount of $3,595.00 for legal services rendered and $205.30 for reimbursement of expenses.2 In the first fee application, counsel requested fees of $2,260.00 for 17 hours of attorney time billed at $125.000 per hour, and...
- In re McKeeman, 236 B.R. 667 (Bankr.8 th Cir., 1999) August 3, 1999
expenses. 2 In the first fee application, counsel requested fees of $2,260.00 for 17 hours of attorney time billed at $125.000 per hour, and three hours of legal assistant time billed at $45.00 per hour. This application covered the time period from January 13, 1998 through June 11, 1998. The second application, covering the...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 9th Circuit
- In re First Magnus Financial Corporation, BAP No. AZ-08-1160-PaDMo (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2/24/2009) (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2009)
MCA filed its Second Interim and Final 10 Fee Application on March 28, 2008. MCA sought final approval of $481,192.00 in compensation and $9,015.10 in expenses. This application included the $150,000 in fees approved in the First Fee Order, plus $172,593.00 in the second fee application period, plus $158,599.00 the court had previously not allowed under fee caps. Once again, MCA argued that the services it provided were necessary...
- In re Keahey, BAP No. WW-08-1151-PaJuKa (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 11/3/2008) (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2008) November 3, 2008
adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court took notice of the fees and costs Keahey had incurred in his three bankruptcy cases, including "any amounts already paid or to be paid." Trial Tr. 36:15-16. Specifically noting that Jared could be charged with the attorney's fees of Tax Attorneys, the court observed: "In addition, there is currently a fee application pending for nearly $20,000 in [Tax Attorneys' fees in the main bankruptcy case]. . .. A hearing on that fee application will...
- In re Stewart, BAP No. CC-07-1328-MoDMk (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 3/14/2008)(B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2008) March 14, 2008
Kathleen P. March, Esq. ("March") and her law firm, appellant The Bankruptcy Law Firm, P.C. (the "March Firm"), represented debtor Hunsdon Cary Stewart ("Debtor") in his chapter 13 case. 2 To date, the bankruptcy court has awarded the March Firm a total of $40,537.67, but it has disallowed an additional $7,422.18. The bankruptcy court disallowed those fees because the revised fee application at issue did not conform to local requirements and this "significantly...
- In re Song, BAP Nos. CC-07-1137-DMoPa CC-07-1160-DMoPa (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2/12/2008) (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2008) February 12, 2008
On April 12, 2007, the bankruptcy court entered its order approving the Fee Application ("Fee Application Order") to the extent of 50% of the monies collected plus costs for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Decision. The bankruptcy court also authorized the Trustee to make payment upon entry of the Fee Application...
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 10th Circuit
- In re Matney, BAP No. CO-08-058 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 3/11/2009) (B.A.P. 10th Cir., 2009) March 11, 2009
Attorney filed his Chapter 13 fee application ("Fee Application") on September 20, 2007, seeking total fees of $13,750, inclusive of the $4,750 already received from Debtors. Attorney attributed the additional $9,000 in fees to his work in the adversary proceeding. The Fee Application was filed almost three months out of time. Under Colorado local bankruptcy rules, Attorney was required to file his fee application in this case no later than "15 days after the date of the entry of...
- In re Rogers, BAP No. NO-08-075 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2/24/2009) (B.A.P. 10th Cir., 2009) February 24, 2009
allow presumptive fees have merely set a maximum allowable fee without the submission of a fee application. See In re Yates, 217 B.R. 296, 301 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) ("Courts which permit `flat' or `customary' fees to be awarded without a detailed fee application are quick to note that the flat fee is designed to be the maximum fee which will be allowed without the submission of the detailed statements of time and rate contemplated by Bankruptcy Rule 2016, and not a minimum fee to...
- In re Pappan, 334 B.R. 678 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., 2005) December 5, 2005
The debtors filed an application under § 523(d), alleging that CFB's § 523(a)(2) complaint was not "substantially justified," and requesting that CFB be required to pay their attorney's fees and costs (Fee Application). CFB objected to the Fee Application, maintaining that its complaint was substantially justified and that special circumstances existed to make a fee award...
- In re Tahah, 330 B.R. 777 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., 2005) September 13, 2005
Both the 2003 case and the 2004 case were assigned to the same bankruptcy court judge, who has issued "Chapter 13 Guidelines." In the Guidelines, which were applicable during both of the Debtors' cases, the following relevant fees were "presumed to be reasonable": (1) $1,500 for pre-confirmation services rendered in a case where a Chapter 13 plan is confirmed; and (2) $800 for services rendered in cases dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 prior to the confirmation of a Chapter...
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* Cases reported were found by using the term "Fee Application" in Boolean Search. This listing of cases is not meant to constitute the top cases within each jurisdiction but, the most recent cases in accordance with the search term. (5/17/09)
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