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U.S. Supreme Court | BAP | Circuit Court of Appeals | District Court | Bankruptcy Courts



District Court



U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Arkansas


  1. Keasler v. United States, 585 F.Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark., 1984) March 13, 1984
    a rather absurd way of proceeding we interpret the government's concession to mean that, for purposes of getting an award of fees for appellate work, "final judgment" means the final decision of the appellate court. This shows that "final judgment" indeed does not have one meaning and also that under the government's view Mrs. McDonald would have had to file a second fee application, for any appellate work (if the government had pursued its appeal), after the end of the...



U.S. District Court for the Central District of California


  1. Dease v. City of Anaheim, 838 F.Supp. 1381 (C.D. Cal., 1993) November 4, 1993
    Plaintiff's counsel seeks recovery for 244.49 attorney hours (at an average of $241.81 per hour) and 25.3 law clerk hours (at $50 per hour) spent litigating the present case. In addition, counsel seeks compensation for costs of $2,230.55, and 13.3 attorney hours and 52.3 law clerk hours for the preparation of its fee application. Plaintiff's counsel has submitted its billing...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California


  1. Golden Gate Audobon Soc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng., 732 F.Supp. 1014 (N.D. Cal., 1989) July 31,1989
    Here, we conclude that the number of hours requested by plaintiffs for litigating the fee issues falls well within the rule of reason. First, we note that this interim fee application against multiple defendants is not a simple, garden variety fee application. Cf. Farris v. Cox, 508 F.Supp. 222, 227 (N.D.Cal.1981) (denying "grossly inflated" 76.1 hour request for preparing a short "boiler plate" fee application and routine declarations). Rather, plaintiffs' and defendants'...

  2. Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 643 F.Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal., 1986) September 2, 1986
    This figure, however, includes 47 hours expended in reviewing the previously prepared fee application and in preparing plaintiff's reply brief on attorney's fees. While attorney's fees are ordinarily awarded for hours expended in preparing the attorney's fee application, see Serrano v. Unruh (Serrano IV), 32 Cal.3d 621, 626-39, 652 P.2d 985, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754 (1982); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 519 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir.1975), these hours must be "reasonably expended." ...

  3. Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 649 F.Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal., 1986) July 10, 1986
    In particular, the Special Master, as directed by the Court, has carefully scrutinized the Fee Application and the Declaration of Paul F. Bennett ("Bennett Declaration") and the Declaration of John E. Grasberger ("Grasberger Declaration") in support of the Fee Application, giving particular attention to the record of time entries included in and forming a part of each...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California


  1. Fair Housing Council v. Penasquitos Casablanca, 523 F.Supp.2d 1164 (S.D. Cal., 2007) November 26, 2007
    Judge Bencivengo took the second step to apply equitable discretion to adjust the lodestar amount "on the basis of other considerations." R & R 4:8-9, citing Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.2004). The R & R substantiates the Brancart & Brancart firm itself deducted from its fees request 52.4 hours ($3,826.00) of the paralegal and litigation support time from the total hours expended on the litigation. With that deduction, as charted in the R & R, for the 29-months duration...

  2. U.S. v. Guess, 425 F.Supp.2d 1143 (S.D. Cal., 2006) February 23, 2006
    The government argues no deviation from the statutory hourly rate cap is warranted for any of the activities of the Foundation's attorneys and disputes the reasonableness of the claimed time to prepare the fee application. The issues presented are: (1) whether the Foundation justifies a fee recovery at a rate in excess of the statutory maximum based on the "special factor" that it required counsel with expertise in tax and complex litigation; (2) the meaning of the availability of...



U.S. District Court for Connecticut


  1. Bristol Technology v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 3:98-CV-1657 (JCH) (D. Conn. 11/3/2000) (D. Conn., 2000) November 3, 2000
    The court will therefore review the entire fee application and eliminate those entries which relate solely to Bristol's antitrust claims, which types of entries Bristol agrees are not sufficiently related under a Hensley analysis to be included in a CUTPA fee award. The court will then consider Microsoft's specific objections to various entries in Bristol's fee application. Finally, based on the court's review of the fee application and familiarity with the entire case, the court will determine...

  2. Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 64 (D. Conn., 2000) November 3, 2000
    The court will therefore review the entire fee application and eliminate those entries which relate solely to Bristol's antitrust claims, which types of entries Bristol agrees are not sufficiently related under a Hensley analysis to be included in a CUTPA fee award. The court will then consider Microsoft's specific objections to various entries in Bristol's fee application. Finally, based on the court's review of the fee application and familiarity with the entire case, the court will...

  3. Mr. and Mrs. B. ex rel. W.B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F.Supp.2d 777 (D. Conn., 1999) January 11, 1999
    The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings was denied without prejudice to refiling with the appropriate fee application (Doc. 27). Now pending is plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees and costs (Doc.29) pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and this court's prior ruling (Doc. 27) (denying, without prejudice, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment). Plaintiffs now make the appropriate motion for attorney's fees, yet fail to renew their motion...

  4. Smart Smw of Ny v. Zoning Com'n, Town of Stratford, 9 F.Supp.2d 143 (D. Conn., 1998) June 17, 1998
    As part of its attorneys' fee request, plaintiff is seeking $2,000.00 for the time spent preparing the fee application. Generally, prevailing parties are entitled to reimbursement for the amount of time spent by their lawyers in preparing fee applications. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). Here, however, we find find that Nextel did not sustain its burden of establishing its entitlement to an award for the fee...



U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia


  1. Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F.Supp.2d 2 (D.D.C., 2008) August 12, 2008
    In re Cisneros (Finkelstein Fee Application), 454 F.3d 342, 350 (D.C.Cir.Spec.Div.2006) (citations omitted). Accord In re Cisneros (Needle Fee Application), 454 F.3d 334, 341-42 (D.C.Cir.Spec.Div.2006); In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Marceca Fee Application ), 366 F.3d 922, 929 (D.C.Cir.Spec.Div.2004) (per...

  2. Cobell v. Norton, 407 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.D.C., 2005) December 19, 2005
    Plaintiffs' fee application for 1,708.94 hours for time spent drafting and editing the Interim Fee Petition is similarly excessive - particularly Gingold's request for 455.9 for "review[ing], segregate[ing], prepar[ing] relevant time re Trial 1 EAJA petition fee..

  3. Cobell v. Norton, 2002 DDC 332 (DDC, 2002) November 12, 2002
    Moreover, a much less drastic remedy will suffice. The Court will exclude from plaintiffs' fee application all expenses unrelated to opposing the E-Mail Motion and Trade Secrets Motion. The Court will also deduct a portion of the hours spent by plaintiffs in preparing their fee application, to represent the fact that a portion of these hours were spent enumerating expenses for which plaintiffs will not be compensated. Finally, this Court will take this opportunity to caution plaintiffs that, in...

  4. Cobell v. Norton, 2002 DDC 334 (DDC, 2002) November 12, 2002
    This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 [9], which alleged that plaintiffs' attorney Dennis Gingold submitted a false or misleading affidavit in support of a fee application submitted by plaintiffs. Instead of filing an opposition brief, plaintiffs moved for a stay of the Rule 11 motion [10] until this Court had ruled on their fee application. Having issued this date an opinion and order on the fee application, the Court now turns to defendants' Rule...



U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware


  1. In re Northwestern Corp., 344 B.R. 40 (D. Del., 2006) May 22, 2006
    The Bankruptcy Court initially approved the Engagement Letter terms as reasonable, including the $5.5 million Restructuring Fee, subject to final review under 11 U.S.C. §§ 328 and 330. NorthWestern subsequently filed an amended reorganization plan and disclosure statement which the Bankruptcy Court confirmed. Once the conditions contained in the Engagement Letter were fulfilled, Lazard requested final approval of its Restructuring Fee. The court-appointed fee auditor analyzed the fee...

  2. In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 304 B.R. 85 (D. Del., 2003) December 23, 2003
    Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP ("PwC"), forensic accountants for the Board of Directors of the Debtors, filed a fee application requesting approximately $1.25 million. The UST objected and argued that the fee application contained vague time entries and that the amount requested was in excess of the amount PwC had estimated in their Retention Application ($500,000). On October 14, 2003, PwC filed a Supplement to their First Quarterly fee application. In the Supplement, PwC revised time...

  3. Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 835 (D. Del., 1984) October 2, 1984
    While Moore does not challenge the "reasonableness" of the amount of time and rates presented in the fee application by Scott's outside counsel, it does object to six aspects of the fee application, i.e. (1) in-house attorney fees, (2) expenses as fees, (3) attorney fees in connection with the reissue proceedings, (4) fees in preparing the fee application, (5) fees generated by the Scott/Davis dispute, and (6) interest upon attorney fees. (D.I....



U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida


  1. George v. Gte Directories Corp., 114 F.Supp.2d 1281 (M.D. Fla., 2000) August 28, 2000
    Plaintiff filed an application for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The fee application seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $139,932.50 and related costs in the amount of $7,629.47. 2 The Defendant filed an opposing brief and affidavits in opposition to the application, claiming that the requested fees are excessive, redundant and unnecessary and should be reduced accordingly. On June 27, 2000, the Court heard oral...

  2. U.S. ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 882 F.Supp. 166 (M.D. Fla., 1995) March 23, 1995
    The Relator's fee application requests over $700,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs representing the payment of fees for twenty-nine attorneys, paralegals, and assistants. More importantly, however, these fees are for compensation for over four thousand billing hours. Of course, the parties dispute the requested fees and have requested additional discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the fee application. The Relator seeks discovery from BCBSF as to the number of hours and amount of fees...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida


  1. Godoy v. New River Pizza, Inc., 565 F.Supp.2d 1345 (S.D. Fla., 2008) July 10, 2008
    In addition to the inexplicable and sanctionable discrepancies in the billing statements submitted by Plaintiffs already noted, the Court's fee award is also informed by the lackadaisical manner that their attorneys, at times, prosecuted this action. To be fair, many of Plaintiffs' filings were adequate and demonstrated a quality work product. However, with respect to several filings, Plaintiffs' attorneys did not file the appropriate motions or documents within the time prescribed by the...

  2. Orenshteyn v. Citrix Systems, Inc., 558 F.Supp.2d 1251 (S.D. Fla., 2008) April 28, 2008
    Third, the Court's review of the time entries revealed other problems with the fee application. For instance, some of the paralegals in this case billed for secretarial work, which is not recoverable under an attorney's fee application. As one example, Andrea N. Boivin billed 10.5 hours for "Page-check 7 copies of appendice of exhibits; make edits to affidavits; insert cites; create appendix cover sheets," 6 hours for "Assist Gary Grossman with preparation of materials for hearing;...

  3. Brother v. Miami Hotel Investments, Ltd., 341 F.Supp.2d 1230 (S.D. Fla., 2004) August 9, 2004
    Plaintiff's unsolicited barrage of supplements to his motion were filed in violation of Local Rule 7.1C, which requires permission of the Court to file any such matter beyond the reply memorandum. Again, the Court finds that much of Mr. Charouhis' work on his own fee application was excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Spending 20 to 25 hours to justify having spent 50 or so hours on the case-in-chief (and to a lesser extent the 50 hours spent by Ms. Barkus) is totally out of...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia


  1. Blackwell by Blackwell v. Bd. of Offender Rehab., 609 F.Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga., 1985) May 22, 1985
    All that remains in this case is the fall-out from the plaintiffs' November 14, 1983, motion for attorney fees. That motion was denied on February 12, 1985. Now before the Court for disposition is the defendants' motion to recover from plaintiffs' attorney, David Roberson, the $10,969.83 in attorney fees, costs and expenses which the defendants expended in resisting the fee application. The Court is of the opinion that sanctions against Roberson for violating Fed.R. Civ.P. 11 are appropriate...



U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii


  1. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 703 F.Supp. 1412 (D. Hawaii, 1989) January 18, 1989
    In Baird, supra, the plaintiff filed a fee application in 1982 seeking fees for a case commenced in 1974 and finally decided in 1979, i.e., a fee application was filed 30 months after the Supreme Court had denied rehearing. In Baird, supra, Judge Aldrich held that a 30-month delay was "plainly unreasonable." However, there was a finality of judgment in Baird that has never been present in this case. Even as late as this court's 1987 hearing on remand, the State Officials argued...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois


  1. Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Co., 421 F.Supp.2d 1117 (N.D.Ill., 2006) March 10, 2006
    to an attempt to persuade us that Smith was entitled to 100% reimbursement for Pattishall's fees and 50% reimbursement for the fees of McAndrews and Scott Hillstrom. Smith was only partially successful. There is no rule that a fee applicant must receive 100% of its fees incurred in presenting an application that is only partially successful. Rather, just as the fees themselves are apportioned as between successful and unsuccessful claims, the fees for presenting a partially successful fee...

  2. Turner v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 405 F.Supp.2d 929 (N.D. Ill., 2005) December 15, 2005
    Before the court is the application of Daniel Harris for attorney's fees in connection with his representation of DeCarlo Turner, individually, in her case against Beneficial National Bank and Beneficial Tax Masters, Inc. ("Beneficial"). In February of 2005 the parties advised me that the matter had been settled. I dismissed the complaint but reserved jurisdiction over the question of attorney's fees. Mr. Harris now seeks total fees of $185,124 for services rendered by him personally...

  3. Petrie v. Sullivan, 800 F.Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill., 1992) September 30, 1992
    The court must therefore address the timeliness of plaintiff's fee application. To be timely, the party seeking an EAJA fee award must file its application "within 30 days of the final judgment in the action...." § 2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This court's September 4, 1990 order (the "Remand Order") adopted Magistrate Judge Bobrick's recommendation that the case be remanded to the defendant for additional findings. Defendant therefore asserts that September 4, 1990...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa


  1. Weishaar v. Barnhart, No. C 01-3048-MWB (N.D. Iowa 9/17/2002) (N.D. Iowa, 2002) September 17, 2002
    One further matter must be addressed at this time. The plaintiff's counsel has applied for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and the Commissioner has resisted that application as untimely. In her resistance, the Commissioner contends that her motion "to alter or amend" tolled the time for appeal, and consequently, tolled the time for any fee application. Therefore, the Commissioner contends that the fee application is premature. On...

  2. Lowe v. Apfel, 65 F.Supp.2d 989 (N.D. Iowa, 1999) October 5, 1999
    Application For Attorney Fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act. This fee application follows reversal of the ALJ's denial of Title II disability benefits and remand of this case to the Commissioner for the purpose of calculating and awarding benefits. Plaintiff's attorney has submitted a fee claim for 23.2 hours at $125 per hour, or a total fee of $2,900. On October 1, 1999, the defendant filed a response to the fee application, indicating that he did...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa


  1. McDannel v. Apfel, 78 F.Supp.2d 944 (S.D. Iowa, 1999) December 20, 1999
    Mr. Peterson has also neglected to include, in his EAJA fee application, the time spent (if any) preparing his fee application for submission to the District Court. It has been the law in this circuit for well over ten years that time spent before the District Court preparing and submitting an EAJA application is recoverable by a Plaintiff. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1334 (8th...

  2. Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 828 F.Supp. 631 (S.D. Iowa, 1993) July 8, 1993
    The problems created by the block billing style of record keeping was recognized in Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 795 F.Supp. 1379, 1387 (W.D.N.C.1992). There, the court permitted plaintiff to claim 21 hours for time spent on the fee application commencing March 24, 1992. Plaintiff's fee application, however, contained block billing entries for before March 24, 1992, which "mingled" charges for different matters including time spent on attorney fees. Id. As a result, the court could not...



U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas


  1. Birnell v. Apfel, 76 F.Supp.2d 1195 (D. Kan., 1999) November 24, 1999
    The Tenth Circuit has only found one situation which justified the consideration of an untimely EAJA application. In Pettyjohn v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1572 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit found that a Supreme Court decision required it to change the way in which it applied the EAJA provisions and thereby put the plaintiff, "through no fault of his own," in a "no-win situation." Pettyjohn, 23 F.3d at 1575. In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled that an order of remand under...

  2. Phelps v. Hamilton, 845 F.Supp. 1465 (D. Kan., 1994) February 28, 1994
    On October 4, 1993, the plaintiffs filed their application for an award of attorney's fees stating that the parties could not agree on a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. The plaintiffs' memorandum addresses the twelve factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), that typically are considered in an attorney's fee award. As exhibits, the plaintiffs submit their counsels' fee itemization and the correspondence exchanged during fee...

  3. In re Cascade Oil Co., Inc., 126 B.R. 99 (D. Kan., 1991) April 2, 1991
    [T]here is a great deal lacking in description and there appears to be much overlap in work performed. The fee request will be reduced twenty-five percent (25%) to $157,371.19. A retainer of $25,000.00 has been previously paid, leaving $132,371.19 payable. Added to this amount are expenses in the amount of $17.40. Any interim fees already paid should be taken into account. The Court notes that the debtor's counsel have requested the sum of $2,295.00 in connection with the application for...



U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky


  1. Schilling v. Moore, 286 B.R. 846 (W.D. Ky., 2002) November 13, 2002
    Of the remaining time which Schilling spent on his fee application, the court allowed 2.1 hours. The court found that 2.1 hours Shilling spent from April 20, 1998 to May 1, 1998 on his application for fees was reasonable. However, the court concluded that Schilling had failed to carry his burden of proof that the remaining hours were "reasonable given the complexity, importance and nature of the task." The opinion noted that "the Trustee (Schilling) failed to carry his burden of...

  2. In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 284 B.R. 580 (W.D. Ky., 2002) August 13, 2002
    The Examiner incorporates herein, by reference, his pleadings entitled Request For Payment Of An Administrative Expense (herein Examiner's Fee Request ), Examiner's Preliminary Pleading Regarding Application For Allowance of Compensation And Allowance Of Expenses (herein Examiner's Preliminary Pleading ) and the Examiner's Memorandum In Support Of His Final Fee Application For Period From October 18, 1996 Through October 12, 1998 (herein Examiner's Memorandum ), in support of this...



U.S. District Court for the District of Maine


  1. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., Civil No. 00-183-P-C (D. Me. 2/26/2003) (D. Me., 2003) February 26, 2003
    Local Rule 54.2 (effective December 1, 2001). Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he language of the local rule governing this dispute is that a fee application must be filed `within 30 days of the expiration of the time for filing a timely appeal.'" Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Attorneys' Fee Application at 1. To explain her position on the fee application filing deadline, Plaintiff states that "the deadline for filing a timely appeal to the United States Supreme...

  2. In re Dn Associates, 160 B.R. 20 (D. Me., 1993) March 10, 1993
    in attorney's fees and expenses incurred from September 3, 1991 to April 17, 1992. The final fee application followed the bankruptcy court's earlier award, subject to final court approval, of slightly more than $35,000 in requested fees. Casco had objected to the earlier award and it also objected to the Debtor's final fee application. Casco seeks disgorgement of the fees already paid and disallowance of the fees and expenses requested in the final fee...

  3. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 639 F.Supp. 1216 (D. Me., 1986) July 16, 1986
    Number of Hours. The affidavits and timesheets attached to plaintiff's fee application in Sierra I detail the number of hours expended by the three attorneys and two law clerks who worked on the case. The application includes only hours spent on the NEPA issues presented in Count I of the complaint and excludes time spent on unsuccessful claims such as those asserted in Counts II, III, IV and...



U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland


  1. In re Vu, 366 B.R. 511 (D. Md., 2007) April 17, 2007
    Creditors argue that Ms. Regenhardt's fee application should be denied in its entirety for failure to exercise billing judgment. They contend that billing judgment is a requirement of any attorney fee award, and that proper billing judgment always requires an attorney to exclude from a fee application some percentage of the time spent on that case. The Supreme Court of the United States, in considering attorney's fee awards in other contexts has explained...

  2. In re Maxine's, Inc., 304 B.R. 245 (D. Md., 2003) September 30, 2003
    The burden of proof is always borne by the applicant regarding the award of fees in a bankruptcy case. A sufficiently detailed fee application containing a lodestar analysis which is supported by accurate, well-documented records is an absolute requirement. An itemized list of out-of-pocket expenses for which reimbursement is sought and the justification for charging the bankruptcy estate for them must be set forth in the fee application. The fee application must indicate the exercise of...



U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts


  1. Rolland v. Cellucci, 151 F.Supp.2d 145 (D. Mass., 2001) July 23, 2001
    Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs' right to seek fees incurred in successfully pursuing their first fee application. See Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1978). Nor do Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs necessary to monitor and successfully enforce the settlement agreement. The approximately $200,000 difference between the parties' positions is explained by other disputes derived from the above standard of review: (1) whether the hourly...

  2. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 932 F.Supp. 382 (D. Mass., 1996) July 19, 1996
    Following a trial leading to judgment for the plaintiff on April 5, 1991, an appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, a further review by the United States Supreme Court with remand, reconsideration by a panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, rehearing by the First Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc and a second trial on a portion of the original case before this court, plaintiff now seeks judgment on the attorneys' fees and costs award made to him following the original...

  3. In re Malmart Mortg. Co., Inc., 166 B.R. 499 (D. Mass., 1994) April 27, 1994
    On January 31, 1992, the trustee filed his Final Account, his Application for Final Allowance of Compensation as Trustee ("trustee fee application") for $150,000 and the Final Application of Cullen & Resnick for Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to Trustee ("counsel fee application") in the amount of $394,518.94. On February 11, 1992, the Trustee filed a Motion for Authority to Remove and Destroy Estate Books and Records ("motion to destroy...

  4. In re Bank of New England Corp., 142 B.R. 584 (D. Mass., 1992) June 30, 1992
    Coopers argues that the bankruptcy court made factual findings that were clearly erroneous. In support of this argument, Coopers alleges that the bankruptcy court inappropriately based its 42% reduction in fees upon a review of less than 2% of the time entries contained in Coopers' fee application. This argument is misplaced. The bankruptcy court examined the entire fee application and offered examples of nine specific time entries that it felt were overstated because they did not correspond...



U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan


  1. Stephen A. Thomas, Plc v. Estate of Jones, 360 B.R. 624 (E.D. Mich., 2007) January 25, 2007
    Thereafter, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the fee application. The relevant portion of that transcript indicates that only the Appellant and the U.S. Trustee discussed Appellant's fee application, and the Trustee's position was as...



U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota


  1. Rajender v. University of Minnesota, 546 F.Supp. 158 (D. Minn., 1982) July 24, 1982
    The final items in the petition are the base fees for fee application time and the expenses incurred in the preparation thereof. The Sprenger firm requests $133,343.75 as a base fee (1,066.75 hours at $125. per hour) and $36,099.53 for expenses. Johnson, Sands asks $19,560.00 as a base fee (244.50 hours at $80. per hour) and a total of $17,531.52 for expenses. Although the defendants argue that the wording of the Consent Decree precludes an award to class counsel for time spent and expenses...

  2. Vickerman v. Hennepin County Probate Court, 543 F.Supp. 165 (D. Minn., 1982) May 26, 1982
    The fee application request totals $23,706.46. This figure is derived from $22,839.00 in attorneys' fees and $867.46 in expenses. Of the $22,839.00 in attorneys' fees, Mr. Dayton claims $8,295.00 (82.95 hours x $100), Mr. Messinger claims $10,701.00 (118.9 hours x $90), and Ms. Balos claims $3,843.00 (54.9 hours x $70). As mentioned above Ms. Balos' rate of $70 per hour is excessive and is reduced to $55 per hour. This reduction lowers Ms. Balos' award for fee application...

  3. Jorstad v. Ids Realty Trust, 489 F.Supp. 1180 (D. Minn., 1980) March 12, 1980
    Before the Court in this securities class action is a joint application for attorneys' fees and expenses following approval of a settlement in behalf of debentureholders of IDS Realty Trust ("Trust"). Due to the nature of the settlement, which will be discussed later, the Court has had the benefit of a full adversary hearing on this fee application. The parties to this fee application have provided the Court with exhaustive legal memoranda. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing...

  4. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 410 F.Supp. 680 (D. Minn., 1975) May 1, 1975
    There is one other fee application which the Court wishes to discuss. The widow of J. Lewis Parks, Beverly Parks, filed a fee application in the Doughboy class on behalf of his estate. J. Lewis Parks was an attorney who was early in the cases, helped set up the Plaintiffs National Steering Committee and the Farm Committee. During the course of these cases, Mr. Parks died. His widow is requesting a fee of $200,000 for work done to benefit the class. The Court is familiar with the early work...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi


  1. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, NO. 4:92CV121-S (N.D. Miss. 12/__/1999) (N.D. Miss., 1999) December 1, 1999
    In this case, the government sets forth several grounds for denying Coker's fee request, but only two will be discussed: (1) the issue of timeliness, and (2) the issue of substantial justification. As noted above, a prevailing party, which Coker most certainly was in this case, must file his fee application within thirty days of the final judgment. The government argues that because Coker filed his fee application prematurely, i.e., before the judgment was "final" as defined in the...

  2. Love v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 970 F.Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss., 1997) July 21, 1997
    This cause comes before the court upon the defendant's verified fee application. On June 6, 1997, this court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and awarded the defendant reasonable attorney's fees and case expenses. Pursuant to the court's order, the defendant's attorney submitted a fee application detailing the fees and expenses incurred in presenting the defendant's motion to dismiss. The plaintiff has failed to...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi


  1. Riley v. City of Jackson, Miss., 2 F.Supp.2d 864 (S.D. Miss., 1997) September 26, 1997
    Prevailing parties are entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988 for time spent establishing and litigating a fee claim as well as for time spent prosecuting the merits of the civil rights action. Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir.1979). Originally, the plaintiffs' attorneys asked $9,500.00 for performing this task with no supporting documentation to justify what this court viewed as an exorbitant amount. The plaintiffs now have submitted documentation which...

  2. Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 545 F.Supp. 252 (S.D. Miss., 1982) July 31, 1982
    We conclude that the 1092.15 hours expended by the Loyalists in this lawsuit is certainly reasonable. The Court has scrutinized the fee application and concludes that the time devoted to each matter is not unreasonable on its face. See, e.g., Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. 1337 (S.D.Miss.1981) (1269.25 hours approved for fifteen-year reapportionment case). For instance, counsel claims only fifty-five hours for the research, writing and preparation of a ninety-page brief to the Fifth Circuit...



U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska


  1. Weaver v. Clarke, 933 F.Supp. 831 (D. Neb., 1996) June 18, 1996
    With the adoption of the smoking ban, I concluded Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's claim because Defendants had rectified any Eighth Amendment violations (filing 108). At the time I granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment I invited the parties to address whether Plaintiff may still be a prevailing party for purposes of an attorney's fee award. The parties have briefed the question and Plaintiff has submitted a fee application (filing 111). I will...

  2. Hatley v. Store Kraft Mfg. Co., 859 F.Supp. 1257 (D. Neb., 1994) August 3, 1994
    Finally, Store Kraft argues that Hatley's counsel is not entitled to compensation for time spent preparing the fee application. The time it takes to prepare a fee application is appropriately included in a claim for attorney fees, and the time claimed here (approximately four hours) is well within the acceptable range for the tedious and time-consuming task of preparing such applications. See, e.g., Smith v. Casmer (D.Neb. Mar. 27, 1991) (No. CV89-0-194) (approving claim for time charged for...



U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada


  1. In re Virissimo, 354 B.R. 284 (Bankr.Nev., 2006) October 2, 2006
    James Lisowski is the trustee in this chapter 7 case and his firm, Lisowski Law Firm, Chtd. Also serves as attorney for the trustee. The Lisowski firm has filed a fee application requesting $24,835 for attorney's fees and $419.43 as costs. The debtors have objected. 1 The court requested that Lisowski supplement the record by filing his trustee billing statements. 2 The court then issued a tentative ruling, denying the Lisowski firm compensation for certain services that the court determined...

  2. In re N & T Associates, Inc., 134 B.R. 17 (D. Nev., 1991) September 4, 1991
    The court indicated repeatedly that it was "thoroughly offended" by the Stutman fee application because of the high hourly rates and the amount sought for preparation of the fee application. # 407, at 43, 44. However, the court did not reject the fee application on the basis of any of the factors set forth in section 330; the court made no findings on those issues. Instead, it appears the court completely disallowed the application in order to lower the overall hourly rate charged for...

  3. In re Ginji Corp., 117 B.R. 983 (Bankr.Nev., 1990) August 22, 1990
    Accordingly, for work done after the entry of this order in which the application is expected to exceed $10,000, the Court will require task summaries. 2 Such summaries should include the task; e.g. Leasetec motion; a short description of the task; the work done by all those working on the matter; the time spent by each and a total of the fees charged; and a status of the results, e.g., settlement reached; evidentiary hearing set; motion won or lost. While, as noted, the time spent in...



U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire


  1. Morin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 835 F.Supp. 1431 (D.N.H., 1993) February 3, 1993
    Thus, eligibility for a fee award in any civil action requires: (1) that the claimant be a `prevailing party'; (2) that the Government's position was not `substantially justified'; (3) that no `special circumstances make an award unjust'; and, (4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), that any fee application be submitted to the court within 30 days of final judgment in the action and be supported by an itemized...



U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey


  1. In re Buccolo, Case No. 05-30789 (RTL) (D.N.J. 5/14/2008) (D.N.J., 2008) May 14, 2008
    The Law Firm had filed a first fee application covering the period from January 31, 2005, to January 20, 2006, in the amount of $16,477 for fees and expenses of $221.56. It was allowed without objection less a retainer of $2,194 previously paid. This second and final fee application covers nearly two and a half years from January 2006 until the Law Firm withdrew in June 2008. The fees sought are $32,260.50 and expenses of $215.76. Of this amount, $13,627 is for services after the case was...

  2. Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Intern., 336 F.Supp.2d 370 (D.N.J., 2004) August 26, 2004
    On July 18, 2003, ICO filed Plaintiff's Application for an Award of Litigation Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and Expert Witness' Fees ("ICO Fee Application"). The ICO Fee Application sought reimbursement of $4,706,506.09 in attorneys fees and expenses. On November 13, 2003, ICO filed Plaintiff's Reply Brief in Support of Their Application for an Award of Litigation Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and Expert Witness' Fees ("ICO Reply"), reducing ICO's request from...

  3. Garden State Auto Park Pontiac v. Electronic Data, 31 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.N.J., 1998) December 15, 1998
    From June 1996 to August 1996, G & C worked 18.25 hours preparing EDS's first motion for attorney's fees and costs. G & C billed EDS $2,901.25 for fees charged in connection with the 1996 fee application before this Court. We denied the first fee application without prejudice because of the pending appeal to the Third Circuit. (Order dated...

  4. B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F.Supp. 462 (D.N.J., 1998) March 30, 1998
    Plaintiff next argues that she is entitled not only to attorneys' fees, but also expert fees, interest accrued on her credit card for payment of the experts, and remuneration for her time spent at the Walnut Street School as D.K.'s aide. ( Id. at 9.) In support of her application for attorneys' fees, plaintiff provides her own affidavit setting forth the amount that she was billed for the efforts of her attorney, John Capasso, Esq. ( Id. at 10.) It appears that Mr. Capasso has not responded...



U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York


  1. Garland v. Astrue, 492 F.Supp.2d 216 (E.D.N.Y., 2007) July 5, 2007
    In deciding whether the instant application is timely, the court also considers the effect of the delay on plaintiff. Given that the Commissioner withheld 25 percent of plaintiff's benefits pending the disposition of any attorneys' fee application, the delay by plaintiff's attorney in seeking an award of fees has direct relevance to plaintiff. Plaintiff will receive any sum remaining after the fee award is deducted, so he has an economic stake in the outcome of this proceeding. Thus, after...

  2. Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 157 (E.D.N.Y., 2006) September 29, 2006
    Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not trim some of the fat from Brady's fee application in light of the clear excessiveness of the billing for its preparation. I will reduce by half the lodestar hours for this task. See Murray, 354 F.Supp.2d at 241 (citations omitted) (noting that even, in a complex case a fee application should only take about 30 hours); Levy, 2005 WL 1719972, at *8 (justifying an across-the-board 35 percent reduction in part on the 101.3 hours billed for the fee...

  3. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 311 F.Supp.2d 363 (E.D.N.Y., 2004) March 31, 2004
    Mr. Dubbin's fee request is based on an extraordinarily inflated view of the importance of his contribution to the resolution of this case. In his original fee application, Mr. Dubbin wrote: "Counsel's clients' objections led to the preservation of the world-wide class of Holocaust Survivors' claims against Swiss insurers, with a minimum value of $100 million." Verified Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, filed March 15, 2002, at 1 (hereafter "Fees Motion"). Notwithstanding...

  4. New York State Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 898 F.Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y., 1995) September 9, 1995
    The plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees in the amount of $77,510.00 and costs and disbursements in the amount of $3,686.27, together with post judgment interest. The plaintiffs' fee application represents compensation to its attorneys, the Law Offices of Michael T. Wallender, for a total of 399.1 attorney hours and 10.5 paralegal hours expended in litigating this case. The fee application encompasses the three and one half year period from May, 1991 until November, 1994. The litigation in this case...



U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina


  1. Spell v. McDaniel, 616 F.Supp. 1069 (E.D.N.C., 1985) July 10, 1985
    "Although it is not necessary to know `the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted,' the fee application must contain sufficient detail to permit both the Court and opposing counsel to conduct an informed appraisal of the merits of the application." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. at 361 quoting National Association for Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327. See also United Slate, Tile & Composition v. G & M Roofing, 732...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York


  1. Luessenhop v. Clinton County, N.Y., 558 F.Supp.2d 247 (N.D. N.Y., 2008) March 28, 2008
    I would be remiss if [I] did not trim some of the fat from [the] fee application in light of the clear excessiveness of the billing for its preparations. I will reduce by half the lodestar hours for this task. See Murray v. Mills, 354 F.Supp.2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (citations omitted) (noting that even in a complex case a fee application should only tax 30 hours); Levy v. Powell, 2005 WL 1719972, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2005) (justifying an across-the-board 35% percent reduction in part...

  2. I.B.E.W. Local No. 910 v. Dexelectrics, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 265 (N.D. N.Y., 2000) May 16, 2000
    In their fee application, Plaintiffs' counsel alleges that the attorney hours incurred in this action were due to: "(1) the defendant's failure to timely remit fringe benefit contributions and deductions; and (2) the defendant's refusal to cooperate with the plaintiffs in connection with the satisfaction of this debt." Jones Aff. at 10. Moreover, in their Memorandum of Law, Plaintiffs argue that a fee award is justified based on the merits of Plaintiffs' motion, the deterrence...

  3. Marshall v. State of New York Div. Of State Police, 31 F.Supp.2d 100 (N.D. N.Y., 1998) December 11, 1998
    The Ruberti Firm has claimed 37.8 hours solely with respect to preparation its present fee application. Notably, the Higgins Firm, whose fee application covers significantly higher hours, seeks only 15 hours relating to the preparation of its fee application. See Higgins Firm Mem. of Law at 15. Accordingly, the Court finds this amount excessive and believes that 12 hours is a more reasonable reflection of the time necessary for the Ruberti Firm to complete its fee application. The Court...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York


  1. S.E.C. v. Byers, 590 F.Supp.2d 637 (S.D.N.Y., 2008) December 30, 2008
    [O]verall, the fees and expenses detailed in the August Fee Application are fair and reasonable considering that the Receiver and his counsel were thrust into a complex and unpredictable situation with little time to prepare in advance. The August Fee Application complies with the SEC's draft guidelines, and incorporates substantial public service discounts that would not have been available outside of the receivership context. Specifically, the Receiver agreed to reduce his hourly rate from...

  2. In re Flag Telecom Holdings Limited, Case No. 02-11732 (ALG). Jointly Administered (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 7/16/2007) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2007) July 16, 2007
    Plaintiff Bank of New York ("BNY") has moved for summary judgment on its fee application, seeking $472,032.45 in fees and $32,831 in costs and expenses incurred from February 2005 through November 2006 in connection with an adversary proceeding, FLAG Telecom Holdings, Ltd. v. Kensington International, Ltd., No. 03-6712. That proceeding recently concluded with the District Court's affirmance of this Court's grant of summary judgment to FLAG as against the claims actively pursued by...

  3. In re Elan Securities Litigation, 385 F.Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y., 2005) April 20, 2005
    From December 31, 2004 through February 18, 2005, the Court received written objections ("Objections") from Class Members ("Objectors") to the Settlement and/or Class Counsel's Fee Application. ( See Memorandum of Class Member Doyle Barnes In Opposition to Class Counsel's Fee Application, dated Jan. 10, 2005 ("Barnes Mem."); Barnes Amended Report on Class Counsel's Lodestar and Costs, dated Jan. 24, 2005 ("Barnes Report").) On or about January 21, 2005,...

  4. Baird v. Boies, Schiller & Flexner Llp, 219 F.Supp.2d 510 (S.D.N.Y., 2002) August 28, 2002
    Although plaintiffs have, again, excluded hours that they concede are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" and voluntarily imposed an overall 5% discount, the total amount of the supplemental request is still $66,675.75. (Richard Suppl. Aff. 18). While I again accept the requested hourly rates, the number of hours expended on this application is unreasonably excessive: plaintiffs expended more than 215 hours in roughly six weeks on this fee application - and...

  5. Sugarman v. Village of Chester, 213 F.Supp.2d 304 (S.D.N.Y., 2002) July 15, 2002
    Finally, New Windsor argues that plaintiff's claim for 30.08 hours spent compiling the list of hours expended on the case and preparing the fee application should be disallowed. It is well-settled law that a prevailing party is entitled to reimbursement for the time expended in the preparation of the fee application. See Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 343-44 (2d Cir.1979); Knoeffler, 126 F.Supp.2d at 316. "The fee application is a necessary part of the award of attorney's fees. If the...



U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York


  1. Jackson v. Cassellas, 959 F.Supp. 164 (W.D. N.Y., 1997) February 26, 1997
    Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b) and 633(a), plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees and expenses in connection with his efforts in this case. Unfortunately, in spite of strenuous efforts by United States Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio and the court to settle, the fee application has turned into a second round of litigation. Plaintiff has filed five affidavits, a number of exhibits, and three memoranda in...

  2. Ward v. Brown, 899 F.Supp. 123 (W.D. N.Y., 1995) August 22, 1995
    Plaintiff contends that the District of Columbia Circuit did not have a rigid contemporaneous-record requirement while this case was pending. While perhaps not as strict as the Second Circuit's requirement, however, the District of Columbia Circuit has stressed the importance of keeping contemporaneous records. For example, in National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982), the court stated that "casual after-the-fact estimates of time...

  3. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 848 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. N.Y., 1994) March 15, 1994
    Defendants Walker, Behn and Rainero Goss filed papers in opposition to the applications for attorneys' fees and costs relative to their contempts. See Item Nos. 246, 312. With respect to the Paul Schenck, Robert Schenck and Project Rescue contempt, no opposing papers were filed by the November 6, 1992 deadline set by this Court. See Item No. 250. However, on January 19, 1993, William J. Ostrowski, Esq. wrote a letter to Magistrate Judge Heckman on behalf of Paul and Robert Schenck stating...

  4. Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc., 748 F.Supp. 1011 (W.D. N.Y., 1990) September 24, 1990
    In the case at bar, plaintiffs' counsel (Pottle) seeks compensation for 50.9 hours of work he performed following settlement of the case and prior to his retention of Mitchell T. Williams, Esq., to represent him on the fee application. In addition, Pottle seeks fees for himself after he retained Williams for a total of 65 hours relating to time spent in connection with the fee application. All time charged subsequent to the settlement is based on a $200 per hour rate for total fees incurred...



Court of Appeals for Federal D.C. Circuit


  1. In re Cisneros, 454 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir., 2006) July 21, 2006
    Finkelstein goes on to argue that although he was granted use immunity the next day, that grant did not "alter [his] status." He first cites Dutton, 11 F.3d at 1078-79, for the proposition that a subject granted use immunity "does not automatically lose" his subject status upon the immunity grant. He then cites two additional fee application cases in the North investigation in which the court determined that a grant of immunity did not change the fee applicant's subject...

  2. In re Cisneros (Needle Fee Application), 454 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir., 2006) July 18, 2006
    In re Mullins (Mullins Fee Application), 84 F.3d 459, 463 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1996) (per curiam) (quoting In re North (Cave Fee Application), 57 F.3d 1117, 1119 (D.C.Cir., Spec.Div., 1995) (per curiam)). As to each of these necessary requirements, the petitioner bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., In re North (Reagan Fee Application), 94 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C.Cir., Spec.Div., 1996) (per curiam). There is apparently no dispute that Needle incurred his attorneys' fees "during" the...

  3. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Thomasson Fee), 438 F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir., 2006) March 3, 2006
    Thomasson's argument that she fulfills the "but for" test because the IC's investigation duplicated prior inquiries is not supported by this court's prior decisions. Although in the past we have awarded fees when the independent counsel's investigation constituted a substantial duplication of the preliminary investigation of the DOJ, see In re Olson ( Olson Fee Application), 884 F.2d 1415, 1420 (D.C.Cir., Spec.Div., 1989) (per curiam) (IC's investigation "necessarily duplicated...

  4. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan, 440 F.3d 465 (D.C. Cir., 2006) February 21, 2006
    We further agree with the OIC and the DOJ that Stonnington has not fulfilled the "but for" requirement of the Act. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that "officials who are investigated by independent counsels will be subject only to paying those attorneys' fees that would normally be paid by private citizens being investigated for the same offense by" federal executive officials such as the United States Attorney. Stonnington's argument in this regard is apparently...



Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit


  1. In re Dewey, 1999 C10 43669 (USCA10, 1999) August 24, 1999
    Georg Jensen ("Jensen"), former counsel to Curtis D. Dewey, the Chapter 13 debtor, appeals three orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Wyoming: (1) an order continuing a hearing on his fee application ("Continuation Order"); (2) an order denying his fee application without prejudice ("Fee Order"); and (3) an order denying his motion to alter or amend the Fee Order ("Reconsideration Order"). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy...

  2. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275 (C.A.10 (Okla.), 1998) November 6, 1998
    Even assuming, arguendo, this case was complex, the district court did not err in classifying plaintiffs' fee application as unreasonable. Defendants liken plaintiffs' litigation strategy to "using an atom bomb to kill a fly." Appellees' Br. at 9. I agree. Plaintiffs' attorney appears to have exercised no billing judgment in his fee application. See Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553 (court must distinguish "raw" time from "billable" time because "it does not follow that the amount of time actually...

  3. Goatcher v. Chater, 57 F.3d 980 (C.A.10 (Okla.), 1995) June 14, 1995
    This matter is before the court on appellant's motion for attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412. For the reasons that follow, we deny the motion as premature, without prejudice to refiling. In doing so, we clarify the events that trigger a timely EAJA fee...

  4. Pettyjohn v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1572 (C.A.10 (Okl.), 1994) May 4, 1994
    Nevertheless, through no fault of his own, plaintiff is in a no-win situation. Had plaintiff filed his EAJA fee application when the district court's remand order became final, it would have beendenied as premature because plaintiff was not yet a prevailing party. See Hudson, 490 U.S. at 886-87, 109 S.Ct. at 2254-56; Gutierrez, 953 F.2d at 583 (indicating that Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Hudson was that prevailing party status was not achieved, and therefore EAJA fee application could...



Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit


  1. Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir., 2003) October 10, 2003
    The fee application was unopposed. In the ordinary course, the application would have been approved by this Court, and fees would have been awarded as requested. See 11th Cir. R. 39-2 (permitting party opposing fees to file an objection and requiring such objections to be filed within ten days after service of the fee application); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir.1999) ("Those opposing fee applications have obligations, too."). The majority finds that this case...

  2. McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir., 2002) November 6, 2002
    MBM and McMahan contend the district court's award of any attorney's fees beyond the $152,268.71 incurred as of December 21, 1999 was in error because Toto's counsel voluntarily limited the fee application to those incurred by that date. Toto's attorney's affidavit, submitted as part of the fee application, stated that he "cut off the claimed time immediately following the entry of the summary judgment [on December 21, 1999], even though the client has incurred fees to pursue the issue of...

  3. Singleton v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 853 (11th Cir., 2000) October 26, 2000
    On May 6, 1998, Singleton filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). See 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Commissioner objected to the motion on several grounds. First, he argued that Singleton's motion failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 2412(d) (1)(B), which sets forth the pleading requirements of an EAJA fee application. Second, the Commissioner contended that Singleton was ineligible for an award of fees because she was not a...

  4. American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423 (C.A.11 (Ga.), 1999) February 23, 1999
    We conclude that the district court's award of attorney fees and expenses in that amount was an abuse of discretion, because: a) excessive hours were claimed for drafting the complaint and the briefs; b) excessive hours were claimed in connection with a status conference and a demonstration conducted for the court; c) hours were claimed for time that was not expended on the litigation; d) non-local rates were claimed for some New York attorneys when local attorneys were available to do the...



Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit


  1. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22 (1st Cir., 2004) March 17, 2004
    As the parties now seem to agree, the first paragraph of Local Rule 54.2 does not apply to Crowley's fee application, as this is not a case in which fees were contracted for or in which no notice of appeal was filed. 4 Rather, the timeliness is governed by the second paragraph, which states, "An application for fees in all other cases shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the appellate mandate providing for final disposition of any appeal." L.R....

  2. In re: P. Iannochino, 242 F.3d 36 (1st Cir., 2000) September 11, 2000
    Of course, this substantial overlap between the proof required for each claim would not matter for the purposes of res judicata if the Iannochinos could not have brought their malpractice claim in opposition to Aframe's fee application. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1167 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that res judicata cannot bar a claim that could not have been raised in the first action). Though the Aframe fee application was a contested matter in bankruptcy, this does not...

  3. In re Narragansett Clothing Co., 1997 C01 42025 (USCA1, 1997) June 20, 1997
    On June 20, 1996, the Trustee filed a "Post-Confirmation Trustee's Final Report and Account Before Distribution, Request for Compensation and Report on Claims/Proposed Distribution" (the "Final Fee Application") and an "Affidavit of Joseph B. Garb in Support of the Final Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Chapter 11 Trustee and Post-Confirmation Trustee" (the "Affidavit"), through which he sought total compensation of $555,175. The Trustee noted in his Affidavit that,.

  4. Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (C.A.1 (Mass.), 1995) November 8, 1995
    The United States nonetheless contends that Nowd is not entitled to an attorney fee award under the EAJA, since the fee application is deficient. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984) (noting potential adverse consequences of counsel's failure to maintain contemporaneous time records). As the district court has yet to decide whether to exercise its discretion in this case, it should be afforded an opportunity to consider the Nowd application in the first...



Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit


  1. Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218 (2nd Cir., 2009) January 5, 2009
    Steven F. Goldman appeals from the district court order denying his application for attorneys' fees. On appeal, Goldman argues that the record does not support the district court's conclusions that Goldman engaged in misconduct with respect to the fees and expenses in the case and that Goldman failed to represent his client adequately with respect to the post-settlement proceedings in the district court. Goldman also argues that Judge Korman's bias against him influenced the district court's...

  2. Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218 (2nd Cir., 2009) January 5, 2009
    Steven F. Goldman appeals from the district court order denying his application for attorneys' fees. On appeal, Goldman argues that the record does not support the district court's conclusions that Goldman engaged in misconduct with respect to the fees and expenses in the case and that Goldman failed to represent his client adequately with respect to the post-settlement proceedings in the district court. Goldman also argues that Judge Korman's bias against him influenced the district court's...

  3. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens v. County of Albany, 369 F.3d 91 (2nd Cir., 2004) May 20, 2004
    rates is the `district in which the reviewing court sits.'" (Plaintiffs' Fee Application at 7; see also Reply in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that since their application for fees in connection with the appeal had to be filed with this Court, see Smith v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.1989), "and this Court sits in the Southern District of New York, the Southern District of New York is the relevant community...

  4. Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 311 (2nd Cir., 1998) August 1, 1998
    In the present case, the question is the timeliness of Larry's October fee application. Although a final judgment was entered in April 1998, Okst timely filed motions pursuant to Rules 50(b), 59(a), and 59(e) for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or an alteration of the judgment by way of remittitur. Those motions operated to suspend the April Judgment's finality, and thus Larry was not required to file his fee application before their October 1998 resolution. Accordingly, the...



Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit


  1. Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell, 426 F.3d 694 (Fed. 3rd Cir., 2005) October 19, 2005
    In its opinion granting injunctive relief, the District Court also granted ICO attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e), which provides that, in actions brought under RCRA, the court "may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." 2 ICO then filed a Fee Application seeking reimbursement of $4,706,506.09 in fees; in a...

  2. Welch & Forbes Inc. v. Cendant Corp., 243 F.3d 722 (3rd Cir., 2001) March 21, 2001
    In reviewing the district court's fee award in Gunter, we stated that "[w]e give [a] great deal of deference to a district court's decision to set fees." 223 F.3d at 195. However, we noted, "[n]otwithstanding our deferential standard of review, it is incumbent upon a district court to make its reasoning and application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so that we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion." 223 F.3d at 196. Therefore,...

  3. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir., 2000) May 23, 2000
    Counsel's original fee application included all of the information necessary to do this crosschecking analysis and to determine how much time Counsel devoted to their clients' case. As is customary in these cases, Counsel submitted extensive briefing and affidavits detailing the hours they spent on the instant litigation, see App. at 91-150, listing the number of hours each lawyer, paralegal, and law clerk worked on the case, see id. at 134-35, 148, and providing documentation supporting the...

  4. Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, Inc., In re, 19 F.3d 833 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1993) May 13, 1993
    The evidentiary hearing persuaded the bankruptcy court that many of the disallowed services at issue require the exercise of professional judgment, but it nevertheless refused to grant K & L its requested fees for two reasons. First, the court concluded that K & L had not provided sufficient information in its fee application for the court to reach that conclusion earlier (before the evidentiary hearing). The court explained pointedly that it would require fee applicants to comply with the...



Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit


  1. Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467 (4th Cir., 2003) March 6, 2003
    involved in the earlier [fee] proceeding." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315. Our court recognizes that "[n]o simple test exists to determine whether [claims are based on the same cause of action] for claim preclusion purposes." Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir.1999). Generally, we say...

  2. Grausz v. Englander, 2003 C04 537 (USCA4, 2003) March 6, 2003
    We turn to the third element in the res judicata analysis, whether "the claim[] in the second matter," the malpractice action, is "based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier [fee] proceeding." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315. Our court recognizes that "[n]o simple test exists to determine whether [claims are based on the same cause of action] for claim preclusion purposes." Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999). Generally, we say that "claims are part of the...

  3. Child v. Spillane, 866 F.2d 691 (C.A.4 (Va.), 1989) March 20, 1989
    Unlike the majority, I give little weight to affidavits from Superintendent Spillane and the School Board's vice-chairperson stating that they agreed to the Child's readmission solely because of the advice of the medical review committee and that the lawsuit had nothing to do with their decision. Few plaintiffs would recover attorneys fees if defendants could defeat a fee application merely by filing affidavits denying that the lawsuit had an impact on their behavior. "[D]efendants, on the...



Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit


  1. In the Matter of Texas Securities Inc., 218 F.3d 443 (5th Cir., 2000) July 7, 2000
    The Modified Employment Order states that the employment agreement was being modified "to (i) affirm the contingency fee arrangement with regard to completed work; (ii) pay for work-in-progress on a contingency/hourly fee basis, plus expenses; and (iii) pay for future work performed on behalf of the estate utilizing the lodestar approach, plus expenses." (emphasis added). The lodestar approach refers to a formula involving the multiplication of the number of hours reasonably expended in...

  2. Osherow v. Ernst & Young, 200 F.3d 382 (5th Cir., 2000) January 25, 2000
    We begin by recognizing that a fee application hearing is a contested matter in the bankruptcy context; however, the nature of the proceeding does not automatically determine whether this action is barred by res judicata. See In re Howe, 913 F.2d at 1146 n.28. Although the fee hearing was a contested matter, Ernst & Young's fee application was a claim against IT. See 11 U.S.C. 101(5). Had IT objected to the fee application and included with its objection a claim for affirmative relief on...

  3. Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447 (C.A.5 (La.), 1994) October 27, 1994
    On November 24, counsel for the Bells filed an attorney's fee application under Sec. 1988, seeking $19,991 in fees. ...

  4. Luna v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 948 F.2d 169 (C.A.5 (Tex.), 1991) November 25, 1991
    Luna contends that his fee application was timely in that it was filed within thirty days of what he claims is the operative "final judgment" in this case, i.e., the district court's purported final judgment entered on October 1. Based upon a recent decision of this court, we disagree and conclude that the "final judgment," for EAJA purposes, is the district court's April 18, 1991, order of remand. Nevertheless, we entertain and approve Luna's fee application because we also conclude, under...



Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit


  1. Townsend v. Social Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 127 (6th Cir., 2007) May 4, 2007
    The district court analyzed separately Townsend's application for attorney fees and expenses related to litigation in the district court and Townsend's application for attorney fees and expenses related to the first appeal in this case. The district court relied on different grounds in denying the two applications, rejecting Townsend's initial fee application because it was untimely and rejecting her fee application related to the first appeal because she was not a prevailing party in her...

  2. Townsend v. Commissioner of Social Security, 415 F.3d 578 (Fed. 6th Cir.,2005) July 20,2005
    The district court determined that Townsend's fee application was untimely by using the following calculations: The district court determined that its August 7, 2002 judgment became final for EAJA purposes when that judgment was no longer appealable by the Commissioner. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) establishes that, in a civil case to which a federal officer is a party, the time for appeal ends sixty days after entry of judgment. The district court's August 7, 2002 judgment...

  3. Miltimore Sales v. International Rectifier, Inc., 412 F.3d 685 (Fed. 6th Cir., 2005) June 23, 2005
    We write further to discuss the effect of the Federal Rules for those in practice. As the Advisory Committee Notes discuss, one of the reasons the fourteen-day limit was adopted, as opposed to no time limit was, theoretically, for increased efficiency in processing motions for fees. The practical effect, however, is decreased efficiency and increased uncertainty-not to mention more paperwork. In nearly every case where attorney fees are available, the prevailing party will now need to...

  4. In re Airspect Air, Inc., 385 F.3d 915 (6th Cir., 2004) October 4, 2004
    In 2000, Nischwitz filed a fee application in the bankruptcy court. Nischwitz requested $189,750 per the contingency fee agreement. Airspect's sole interest-holder, Spasoje Miskovic, filed objections to Nischwitz's fee application. The trustee had no objection to Nischwitz's...



Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit


  1. Matter of Sheldon Bond, 254 F.3d 669 (7th Cir., 2001) June 20, 2001
    However, in spite of Dempsey's failure to obtain the fees she requested, we note that she has set forth several reasonable arguments regarding the manner in which her fee requests were handled. For example, the bankruptcy court never provided her with an opportunity to address its concerns with her billing methods prior to ruling on her request, choosing instead to surprise her with these concerns in its final opinion (by which time Dempsey could no longer rebut the bankruptcy court). In its...

  2. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co., In Matter of, 841 F.2d 789 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1988) March 16, 1988
    The trustee filed an affidavit in support of Shearson's fee application. The affidavit described Shearson's participation in the sale negotiations and supported an award to Shearson of compensation in excess of that allowed by the 1982 agreement. 5 The special master heard testimony with respect to Shearson's application for six days. During the hearings, CMC objected to the fee application, arguing that Shearson already had been adequately compensated for its services. CMC argued...

  3. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311 (C.A.7 (Ind.), 1984) March 15, 1984
    The practical consequences of the government's interpretation persuade us that it is wrong. One such consequence is the cost to the applicant of having to file multiple fee applications. United States v. 329.73 Acres, 704 F.2d 800, 810-11 (5th Cir.1983), holds, and the government does not question, that the Equal Access to Justice Act, like other attorney-fee statutes, allows a prevailing party in appropriate cases to obtain an award of fees for time spent prosecuting or defending an appeal...



Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit


  1. Kohl, In re, 95 F.3d 713 (C.A.8 (Minn.), 1996) September 12, 1996
    Keate filed an application for compensation on August 24, 1994, seeking $14,041.32 in fees for services rendered in the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 proceedings. On October 17, 1994, following a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying Keate's fee application except for the $500.00 retainer received by Keate prior to the commencement of the Chapter 7 proceeding. The court reasoned that most of Keate's services provided no benefit to the estate. The district court affirmed the...

  2. Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333 (C.A.8 (Ark.), 1988) December 14, 1988
    The case law is divided over whether the reasonable attorney's fee that an attorney is entitled to recover under the EAJA should include the reasonable time spent by counsel preparing the EAJA fee application. Compare Trichilo v. Secretary of HHS, 823 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.1987) (allowing EAJA fees for preparation of EAJA fee application) (citing cases); Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31, 39 (3d Cir.1986); Volpe v. Heckler, 610 F.Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.Fla.1985), with Continental Web Press, Inc. v...

  3. Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305 (C.A.8 (Minn.), 1981) March 10, 1981
    The Stipulation of Settlement was approved by order of the district court on June 26, 1978. The fee application was submitted by class counsel on July 28, 1978, requesting $3,161,132 in fees and $56,342.71 for expenses. On February 8, 1979, after months of discovery, an amended complaint was filed. Affidavits which were submitted subsequent to that date revised the final request to $4,161,132 in fees on the settlement and $722,900 for prosecuting the fee application (bonuses for risk and...



Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit


  1. In re Wind N' Wave, 509 F.3d 938 (9th Cir., 2007) November 1, 2007
    The Petitioning Creditors appealed to the Ninth Circuit BAP. The BAP, reversing the Bankruptcy Court's decision, held that Sedona was controlling and that "an independent allowable expense claim under § 503](b)(3) is not a prerequisite to an award of reasonable fees under § 503(b)(4)." In re Wind N' Wave, 328 B.R. at 183 (quoting Sedona, 220 B.R. at 81). The BAP remanded to the lower court to determine appropriate fees. Id. at 180-83. In a motion decided a month...

  2. In re Veritas Software Corp. Securities Litigation, 496 F.3d 962 (9th Cir.,2007) July 25,2007
    In the end, this is a decision committed to the discretion of the district court. While the district court would not have abused its discretion in granting Malone's fee application, it did not abuse its discretion in denying it. The district court's decision denying Malone's fee application on the grounds of untimeliness is affirmed. Because the application was untimely we need not reach the question of whether it was proper for the district court to decline consideration of the time Malone's...

  3. Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600 (9th Cir., 2007) February 26, 2007
    remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") consented to a judgment enforcing the agency's determination in favor of Van, the judgment became "final and not appealable" immediately, requiring Van to file her fee application within 30 days after entry of judgment, rather than 30 days after expiration of the 60-day appeal period provided for in Rule 4(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because Van...

  4. In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir., 2006) November 13, 2006
    This appeal concerns the appropriate standards and procedures for awarding attorney's fees in connection with Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California has established three means by which a debtor's attorney may obtain a fee award in a Chapter 13 case. The attorney may (1) submit a fee application under "no-look" guidelines that establish presumptive fees for a "basic case" and specified variations thereon, (2) submit a...



Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit


  1. Maxwell v. Angel-Etts of California, Inc., 2002 CFC 575 (USCAF, 2002) December 13, 2002
    We are troubled, however, by the factual record underlying the fee award, as we find the exhibits supporting the fee application to be confusing and potentially misleading. In particular, Exhibit A to Maxwell's fee application supports the district court's findings that Maxwell incurred $942,980.46 in attorney fees prior to transfer of the case from Minnesota to California and $140,330.00 after the transfer but is seemingly inconsistent with Exhibits B, B-2, and E. Maxwell argues that the...

  2. Fritz v. Principi, 264 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir., 2001) September 6, 2001
    The Supreme Court found further support for an interpretation of the statute that would permit recovery of fees incurred in the course of litigating the fee dispute in the language of Section 2412(d)(1)(B) describing the fee application procedure. Id. at 160. The Supreme Court also found that section's similar requirement, that an application include an allegation that "the position of the United States was not substantially justified," corroborated the statute's other references to...

  3. J-I-J Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 829 F.2d 26 (C.A.Fed., 1987) September 11, 1987
    Shortly after receiving the Board's order holding that it had jurisdiction over the $75,000 issue, the contractor, asserting it was the "prevailing party," forwarded to the Board its fee application under the EAJA. The EngBCA dismissed that application as untimely. The Board's holding (on July 7, 1986) was that its order sustaining the appeal on the parties' stipulation as to quantum (issued April 16, 1985) was the Board's final decision from which J-I-J...

  4. Covington v. Department of Health and Human Services, 818 F.2d 838 (C.A.Fed., 1987) April 17, 1987
    The government also argues that this fee application was not timely filed. The fee application was submitted within thirty days after expiration of the time for appeal of the final decision of the Board after remand; this is in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(B), which provides that the fee application shall be filed "within thirty days of final judgment in the action", i.e., the action in which the applicant became a prevailing party. See Brewer, at 1569-1570. See also H.R.Rep...



U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota


  1. Copper v. City of Fargo, Civil No. A3-93-130 (D. N.D. 3/29/2002) (D.N.D.,2002) March 29, 2002
    Some of this amount is more appropriately categorized as time spent in preparing the supplement to the fee application, but in light of this court's finding that plaintiff's are entitled to all of their time spent preparing the fee application, this crossover is of no consequence. The time counted toward the Rule 60(b) motion response is not counted in the award for the post remand fee...

  2. Wisnewski v. Champion Healthcare Corporation, Civil No. A3-96-72 (D. N.D. 1/16/2001) (D.N.D., 2001) January 16, 2001
    In light of these circumstances, and finding the case-law from the Seventh Circuit persuasive, the Court reduces the hours for the fee application to 3.69 hours. The Court has already determined that no more than 230.67 hours could have reasonably been devoted to the merits of the issue upon which plaintiffs prevailed. Adopting the approach of 1.6 hours fee time per 100 hours merit time, see Uphoff , 176 F.3d at 411, the Court calculates a reasonable amount of time for preparation of a fee...

  3. Lane v. United States Department of Agriculture, A2-95-148 (D. N.D. 3/24/1999) (D.N.D., 1999) March 24, 1999
    At the time plaintiffs' counsel services were commencing, 1995, the cost of living adjustment to the $75 cap was practically equivalent to the 1996 amended statutory amount of $125. The cap, when adjusted for cost of living increases, has apparently risen slightly for 1997 and 1998. See e.g. , Pl. Br. in Support of Fee Application at 36-37 (advising September 1997 rate at $129.44); and Letter of September 3, 1998, from Elness to Webb (advising July, 1998, rate cap at approximately $ 131.00)...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio


  1. Morley v. Brown, 605 F.Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio, 1985) April 5, 1985
    The issue was raised in the hearings as one in need of clarification.... This is sue is important since the thirty-day deadline for filing the fee application is jurisdictional and cannot be...

  2. Akron C. for Reproductive H. v. City of Akron, 604 F.Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ohio, 1985) February 8, 1985
    The applications of Landsman, Hawley, Leitzer, and Roberts for services rendered before the District Court request compensation for a total of 1734.4 hours. A review of the docket entries and the transcript of proceedings indicates a lengthy, time consuming proceeding. The complaint was filed on April 19, 1978, eleven days before the challenged ordinance was to become effective on May 1, 1978. By the time Judge Leroy J. Contie, Jr., of the District Court filed his lengthy opinion ( see 479...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio


  1. Welton v. Osborn, 124 F.Supp.2d 1114 (S.D. Ohio, 2000) August 15, 2000
    related to this case. Welton also recognized that if attorney's fees were recovered in this case for work that was relevant to both cases, then any such work could not, and would not, be included in a subsequent fee application in Canary. Finally, Welton disputed Osborn's assertion that a significant portion of the hours set forth in counsel's fee application in this case related solely to the Canary case. To the contrary, Welton contended that only a tiny fraction of the work billed in...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma


  1. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Apache Corp., 355 F.Supp.2d 1246 (N.D.Okla., 2004) December 9, 2004
    briefing, an evidentiary hearing was held August 10, 2004. 2 In addition to the testimony of Gable & Gotwals attorney Thomas Kirby ("Kirby"), supporting and explaining the fee application, testimony of two expert witnesses was offered to the Court: David Riggs ("Riggs"), a Tulsa attorney with more than 35 years experience practicing law, testified in support of ONG's fee application. Michael Burrage ("Burrage"), a long-time Oklahoma attorney and a former U.S. District...



U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma


  1. Pettyjohn v. Sullivan, 801 F.Supp. 503 (W.D. Okl., 1992) September 22, 1992
    A post-trial attorney fee application does not appear to be, by definition, a pretrial matter. See Paris v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 795 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.R.I.1992) (attorney fee application made after conclusion of litigation "cannot be described as a pretrial matter"). Except for fee applications related to discovery disputes or rule violation matters, see Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1465 (10th Cir.1988), attorney fee questions are...



U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania


  1. In re Olick, Civil Action No. 01-1606 (E.D. Pa. 3/19/2002) (E.D. Pa., 2002) March 19, 2002
    A request for payment is the appropriate mechanism in which a claim for an administrative expense may be made after commencement of a bankruptcy case. In re First Century Corp ., 166 B.R. 47, 48 (M.D.Pa. 1994). House made his request for payment by filing a fee application with the bankruptcy court on January 20, 1999. (01-1606, Doc. 15, Ex. A). House's fee application is in full compliance with the Bankruptcy Rules, as it lists the services rendered, time expended and amounts requested by...

  2. Weis-Buy Services, Inc. v. Storey's Fruit & Produce, Inc., Civil Action No. 98-6078 (E.D. Pa. 7/13/2000) (E.D. Pa., 2000) July 13, 2000
    The parties agreed that a motion for summary judgment would not be filed until after arbitration. Respondent's Objections to Complainant's Fee Application, Exhibit E. However, preparing motion was beneficial to Weis-Buy. Local counsel stated in his supplemental declaration that preparing the motion helped him by organizing the facts and exhibits in the case - work that was required to prepare for the arbitration. Therefore, some of this work is justifiable. However, early arbitration is..

  3. Santiago v. Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa., 1992) January 24, 1992
    Under the Third Circuit rule prior to Melkonyan, plaintiff was not required to file a fee application until thirty days after the district court entered final judgment and the appeal period had run. However, the period for plaintiff to file her fee application under Melkonyan has expired. Plaintiff argues that Melkonyan must be applied prospectively only, or she will be unfairly barred from recovering attorney's fees. Defendant maintains that Melkonyan must be applied retroactively,...

  4. Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 755 F.Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa., 1991) January 10, 1991
    Presently before the court is plaintiffs' Application For Attorneys' Fees and costs. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties in their § 1983 civil rights action, are entitled to their attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek reasonable attorneys' fees, an upward adjustment of the fees (contingency enhancer), costs, expert fees, attorneys' fees for the fee application and immediate payment of these fees. After careful consideration of plaintiffs'...



U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania


  1. In re Younger, 360 B.R. 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa., 2006) December 14, 2006
    We also note that a similar "no-look" presumptive fee based on guidelines for a basic chapter 13 case and requiring a fee application for additional fees based on hours expended was approved by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently in In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir.2006). The Eliapo court cited several cases to the same effect. 468 F.3d at 598 (the "lodestar" approach). In a chapter 12 or 13 case "the court may allow reasonable compensation to the...

  2. E.E.O.C. v. Federal Express Corp., 537 F.Supp.2d 700 (M.D. Pa., 2005) January 18, 2005
    Defendant objects to the hourly rates claimed by Intervenor's counsel, and suggests that the Community Legal Services, Inc. ("CLS") survey of attorneys' fees in the Philadelphia area dictates lower rates than those sought in the fee application and are presumptively reasonable. Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.2001)(noting reasonableness of CLS fees). Although it may have been appropriate to focus exclusively on the prevailing market rates in the Harrisburg area,...

  3. In re Green Valley Beer, 281 B.R. 253 (Bankr. W.D. Pa., 2002) July 29, 2002
    Debtor objects that Applicant's request is not reasonable and that the "Fee Application represents Applicant's attempt to pass excessive legal fees and costs on to the Debtor without any corresponding benefit to the estate." 3 Debtor also asserts that the bank was more than adequately protected by its equity in Debtor's assets and by adequate protection payments throughout the administration of the estate. 4 On the other hand, the bank argues 5 that the work was substantial,...

  4. In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 162 (Bankr. W.D. Pa., 2000) November 10, 2000
    In In re Dandy Lion Inns of America, 120 B.R. 1015 (D.Neb.1990), the bankruptcy court authorized the debtor to employ accountants and to pay them upon receipt of monthly itemized bills. There was no requirement for filing a fee application or for notice and hearing either before or after payment to the accountants. The U.S. Trustee sought reconsideration of the order, arguing that the accountants could only be paid after filing a fee application, notice to creditors, and a hearing by the...

  5. Petruzzi's, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 983 F.Supp. 595 (M.D. Pa., 1996) November 8, 1996
    Although percentage reductions are generally discouraged, "when faced with a massive fee application the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure `as a practical means of trimming the fat from the fee application.'" Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir.1983)); see also...

  6. In re Chambers Development Securities Litigation, 912 F.Supp. 852 (W.D. Pa., 1995) August 18, 1995
    Before the Court are the application for attorneys' fees filed by Co-lead Counsel ("CLC") in the main class action, Plaintiffs' Verified Joint Petition and Supporting Memorandum for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incentive Awards ("Main Fee Application") (Documents No. 283, Vol. I, and No. 284, Vol. II), and the application for attorneys' fees filed by derivative plaintiffs' counsel ("DPC"), Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for...

  7. Joy Mfg. Corp. v. Pullman-Peabody Co., 742 F.Supp. 911 (W.D. Pa., 1990) August 7, 1990
    In analyzing the petitioner's fee requests and making our determinations thereon, we will address first the fee application as it pertains to the time expended on the petition to intervene and related matters. This covers a time period from around December 9, 1986 to December 29, 1986, the day when Joy and Pullman settled and discontinued the case filed by Joy. Next, we will consider the fee application as it pertains to the time devoted by counsel to the fee application itself. This may be...



U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico


  1. In re C.P. Del Caribe, Inc., 143 B.R. 11 (Bankr.P.R., 1992) July 10, 1992
    This case is before the court upon the application for compensation by Deloitte and Touche (Deloitte), accountants for the examiner, for clerical work, training a co-worker on D-Base IV, preparation of the fee application and for reimbursement for meal expenses. Both the U.S. Trustee and the examiner have filed objections to the fees charged for these tasks and to the reimbursement for meals. The amounts in controversy total $12,228.50, that is, $5,062.50 for secretarial work, $4,400.00 for...

  2. Heredia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 783 F.Supp. 1550 (P.R., 1992) February 5, 1992
    We also decline to adopt the government's position that the EAJA fee application must be done in two stages until after the conclusion of the subsequent administrative proceedings and the award of benefits. Nor do we adopt the position of the court in Audette which reads Melkonyan as redefining the meaning of what constitutes a "prevailing party" in the sentence four...

  3. Rodriguez v. Muñoz, 617 F.Supp. 518 (P.R., 1985) August 23, 1985
    Rodriguez v. Muñoz, 617 F.Supp. 518 (P.R., 1985) August 23, 1985 Present before this Court is plaintiff's fee application under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, filed pursuant to Local Rule 332, Fed.Proc. Rules Service, District Court for the District of Puerto...



U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island


  1. In Re Pontarelli, C.A. No. 98-116T (D. R.I. 3/__/2000) (D.R.I., 2000) March 1, 2000
    United States Trustee's Objection to Fee Application of the Counsel to the Debtor, dated July 14,...



U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina


  1. Suggs v. Sullivan, 754 F.Supp. 79 (D.S.C., 1991) January 17, 1991
    Furthermore, this court agrees with petitioner that the time expended defending his fee application against defendant's objections is compensable under the EAJA. 8 Therefore, this court will award attorney's fees to petitioner for 57.2 hours, at the enhanced rate of one-hundred dollars per hour...



U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas


  1. In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 338 B.R. 703 (N.D. Tex., 2006) March 7, 2006
    At the time the bankruptcy court was considering the Trustee's fee application, Appellants were aware that Mims was not pursuing claims against Jackson Walker and that he was requesting the bankruptcy court's approval of final distributions so that he could close the estate. On March 13, 2000, the bankruptcy court gave notice that the Trustee's fee application had been filed and set a deadline for objections. (R. 859) The Appellants, however, failed to object to the Trustee's fee application,...

  2. Sandoval v. Apfel, 86 F.Supp.2d 601 (N.D. Tex., 2000) February 29, 2000
    As a threshold matter, the court rejects any suggestion that Weisbrod is seeking compensation like that condemned in Moore. 4 In Moore the court denied a fee request because the attorney sought inter alia a hidden profit by outsourcing legal work at a flat rate and then seeking fees at the EAJA hourly rate based on standardized time entries for services he did not actually perform. Moore, slip op. at 4-5. Unlike the applicant in Moore, Sandoval fully disclosed in his fee application...



U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas


  1. Coble v. Texas Dept. of Corrections, 568 F.Supp. 410 (S.D. Tex., 1983) July 25, 1983
    1978. Her law practice is primarily in the field of family and juvenile law. She testified that she is not a civil rights attorney and that her usual fee ranges from $75-$100 per hour. The original fee application sought recovery for 326.55 hours of "traditional" legal work at $125 per hour and 3 hours of "other" legal work (defined as statistical work and fee application preparation) at $60 per hour. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3 at the May 24 hearing added 26¼ hours at $125 per...

  2. Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F.Supp. 1339 (S.D. Tex., 1976) August 31, 1976
    Moreover, this court will not assess against defendants any amount CSI is required to pay its attorneys for the preparation of the fee application and accompanying memoranda. Such services were not rendered in connection with the recovery of any damages and should be deducted. Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 378 F.Supp. 423 (N.D.Ill.1974); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 218 F.Supp. 490 (D.Mass.1963), vacated on other grounds, 333 F.2d 798 (1st Cir.1964), cert...



U.S. District Court of Utah


  1. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F.Supp. 1544 (D. Utah, 1993) June 29, 1993
    Reasonable hours expended in preparation of a fee application are at least partially compensable, "although hours not spent representing the client are at best on the borderline of what Congress intended to be compensable." Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir.1986). Plaintiffs' attorneys spent over 130 hours on their fee application and in opposing defendants' application. In the opinion of this court, these hours are excessive, and should be...

  2. Bee v. Greaves, 669 F.Supp. 372 (D. Utah, 1987) September 3, 1987
    expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104S.Ct. 1541, 1544, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939; Clayton v. Thurman, 775 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir.1985). In submitting a reasonable fee application it is the responsibility of plaintiff's counsel to exclude hours which are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such...



U.S. District Court For The Eastern District of Virginia


  1. Saleh v. Moore, 95 F.Supp.2d 555 (E.D. Va., 2000) May 12, 2000
    To begin, it must be noted that M & V has not included in its fee application all of the time that M & V concluded, after examining its billing records, was devoted exclusively or primarily to claims as to which the Defendants were awarded summary judgment. (Crockett Aff. 5). Nor does the fee application include time devoted exclusively or primarily to claims on which Saleh did not prevail at trial. ( Id. ) The excluded time amounts to $206,727.50. Although this exclusion may not have...

  2. E.E.O.C. v. Nutri/System, Inc., 685 F.Supp. 568 (E.D. Va., 1988) March 28, 1988
    Counsel's fee application is set forth in his Request for Payment of Attorney's Fees, dated February 18, 1988. It consists of an unsworn four page pleading to which is attached the thirteen undated statements for services rendered that were sent to the intervenor over a six year period from March, 1982 to February, 1988. The total fee claimed is $43,689.51. This amount is alleged to represent approximately 436.9 hours of legal work billed at the rate of $100 per...



U.S. District Court For The Western District of Washington


  1. Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 592 F.Supp.2d 1322 (W.D. Wash., 2009) January 9, 2009C
    This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Application For An Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Service Awards for the Named Plaintiffs (the "Fee Application") (Dkt. No. 121). The Court has carefully considered the Fee Application, all supporting declarations and exhibits, including the detailed fees and costs breakdowns submitted to the Court for in camera review, and all other materials relating to the Fee Application. In addition, the Court has considered the arguments of...



U.S. District Court For The Eastern District of Wisconsin


  1. F.V. Steel v. Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, 350 B.R. 835 (E.D. Wis., 2006) September 6, 2006
    I agree with the Ninth Circuit that a professional seeking to have her fees reviewed under § 328(a) should make sure that the engagement letter, the retention application and to the extent possible the retention order, specify that review under such section is intended. I also agree with the Ninth Circuit that even if the engagement letter and/or retention application expressly contemplate review under § 328(a), a bankruptcy court may in its retention order specify that it will review...

  2. Lee v. Sullivan, 723 F.Supp. 92 (E.D. Wis., 1989) October 16, 1989
    1. Although the government has not challenged the application for fees to prepare the petition for EAJA fees, the court notes that there is a split in the circuits over whether the reasonable attorney's fee that an attorney is entitled to recover under the EAJA should include the reasonable time spent by counsel preparing the EAJA fee application. Compare Trichilo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.1987) (allowing EAJA fees for preparation of EAJA fee...




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* Cases reported were found by using the term "Fee Application" in Boolean Search. This listing of cases is not meant to constitute the top cases within each jurisdiction but, the most recent cases in accordance with the search term. (5/17/09)

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