FeeApps.com



Sign Up

Download our new
iPad/iPhone app for free

Login to your account

Email/Username:
Password:
Owner?: Yes
Forgot Password?

Recent Fee Application Cases by Jurisdiction *
Powered by Fastcase.com
Fee Application

Court Listings

Choose from the list of courts below to view cases.

U.S. Supreme Court | BAP | Circuit Court of Appeals | District Court | Bankruptcy Courts



Bankruptcy Courts



U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the N.D. Alabama


  1. In re Davis, BK 00-73045-CMS-13 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 4/25/2007) (Bankr. N.D. Ala., 2007) April 25, 2007
    The fee application asked the court to approve a $150.00 hourly fee for Mrs. Dionne; and a $125.00-per-hour rate for Mr. Dionne; and paralegal services at $30.00 per hour. The Dionnes further requested the court's authorization of a payment schedule allowing Davis to pay them 75% of their hourly charges on a monthly basis, along with 100% of out-of-pocket expenses. They also proposed to file itemized fee applications each 90 days. Based on this proposed schedule, the Dionnes further agreed that...

  2. In re Shamburger, 189 B.R. 965 (Bankr. N.D. Ala., 1995) August 17, 1995
    a chapter 13 case is normal and customary. 3 Many questions surface. When an additional request for fees is filed, should all of the work performed then be recalculated through the lodestar formula ignoring the initial fee amount until it is simply subtracted from the lodestar result leaving the remaining lodestar amount as the additional fee? If certain attorney work is considered normal and customary for all chapter 13 cases, may any work of the type considered normal and customary be...

  3. In re Watkins, 189 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ala., 1995) August 16, 1995
    The problem that a lodestar analysis would create in trying to apply it to a chapter 13 system is having to determine what is compensable where the vast majority of work in a chapter 13 case is normal and customary. 3 Many questions surface. When an additional request for fees is filed, should all of the work performed then be recalculated through the lodestar formula ignoring the initial fee amount until it is simply subtracted from the lodestar result leaving the remaining lodestar amount as...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska


  1. In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419 (Bankr.Alaska, 1984) August 6, 1984
    Willner has objected to the travel expenses incurred by Rice contained in the second fee application as being unreasonable. No objection was made to the travel expenses requested on the first fee application, and Rice, Hoppner has had no opportunity to submit a breakdown of the expenses similar to that submitted with regard to the travel expenses requested on the second fee application. There has also been no opportunity for Rice, Hoppner to present evidence as to the necessity and...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona


  1. In re Shaffer, Case No. 07-6303 (Not for Publication-Electronic Docketing ONLY) (Bankr.Ariz. 10/29/2008) (Bankr.Ariz., 2008) October 29, 2008
    The Debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition on November 26, 2007. Pursuant to their Chapter 13 plan, filed on December 12, 2007, 6 the Debtors were required to pay $1,135.00 per month, for a period of 60 months, commencing on December 26, 2007. The Debtors agreed to provide adequate protection, under their Plan, to two secured creditors: $298.17 per month to Citifinancial, and $45.72 per month to Toyota Motor Credit. The Debtors commenced making payments, but ultimately were unable to make the...

  2. In re Kile, 345 B.R. 182 (Bankr.Ariz., 2004) November 8, 2004
    Before the court is a fee application filed by the Debtor's chapter 11 counsel, who seeks fees for such representation in the amount of $80,764, together with costs of...

  3. In re Circle K Corp., 294 B.R. 111 (Bankr.Ariz., 2003) May 15, 2003
    In its earlier opinion on the Houlihan fee application, this court indicted it was "personally familiar with the services provided by the applicant investment banking firm and has no difficulty in concluding such services benefited in some measure these jointly administered estates. Regardless, applicant's failure to keep time records and consequent inability to produce a fully detailed fee application prevent approval of the full fee requested." In re Circle K Corp. 191 B.R. 426, 427...

  4. In re Circle K Corp., 191 B.R. 426 (Bankr.Ariz., 1996) January 17, 1996
    Applicant's reliance on section 328 is misplaced, debtor argues. First, the original application in July, 1990 clearly states Houlihan will provide monthly invoices detailing services performed. All fees paid remain subject to Court approval in a final fee application. Applicant's final fee application of October, 1993 clearly states its request is made under sections 327 and 330. No mention is made of section 328 until debtor challenged the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas


  1. In re Bonds Lucky Foods, Inc., No. 1, 76 B.R. 664 (Bankr.E.D.Ark., 1986) May 13, 1986
    A review of the fee application in light of the fee standards of Johnson must be made. This case did not involve any novel or difficult questions of law, but it did require the skill of attorneys experienced in bankruptcy. The attorneys involved in this case are experienced bankruptcy practitioners. Hon. James E. Smith, Jr., and Hon. Susan Gunter account for most of the attorney time charged. The hourly rates charged were $100.00 for Mr. Smith and $90.00 for Ms. Gunter. Their rates are...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arkansas


  1. Garrett v. Goodwin, 588 F.Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark., 1984) May 23, 1984
    FEE APPLICATION AND...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas


  1. In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 54 B.R. 221 (Bankr.E.D.Ark., 1985) July 23, 1985
    A hearing was held on April 17, 1985, on Barnett & Alagia's second fee application and on June 3, 1985, a hearing was held on their final fee application. The total combined fee requests to date, including expenses are for $258,584.08. No creditor has objected to the second fee application of Barnett & Alagia. The Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, a creditor, objected to the final fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California


  1. In re Lotus Properties Lp, 200 B.R. 388 (Bankr.C.D.Cal., 1996) September 16, 1996
    The U.S. Trustee Guide to Applications for Employment of Professionals and Treatment of Retainers of the Central District of California ("Employment Guide") instructs professionals who have received a pre-petition or post petition retainer to submit a monthly Professional Fee Statement to the Trustee, including documentation supporting the charges in the form of a regular fee application, and served on appropriate parties. 5 This Statement allows the professional to withdraw funds from...

  2. In re Crown Orthodontic Dental Group, 159 B.R. 307 (Bankr.C.D.Cal., 1993) September 16, 1993
    On April 15, 1993, Barclay Law Corporation ("Movant"), appeared before this court for approval of Movant's third interim fee application of $28,882. I treated Movant's third interim fee application as a final fee application and set Movant's final fee award at $30,500. On May 12, 1993, Movant filed a motion for reconsideration of the final fee award. After a hearing on June 21, 1993, I took Movant's motion for reconsideration under submission to examine whether an estimate that an...

  3. In re Tom Carter Enterprises, Inc., 159 B.R. 557 (Bankr.C.D.Cal., 1993) September 16, 1993
    On February 15, 1989, 3 Plaintiffs filed an EAJA fee application in the D.C. District Court for the entirety of their work in the D.C. District Court proceeding and the Related Cases. On August 8, 1990, the D.C. District Court denied Plaintiffs' fee request, finding that the Plaintiff's had not prevailed and that the Director's position was substantially...

  4. In re Commercial Consortium of California, 135 B.R. 120 (Bankr.C.D.Cal., 1991) October 22, 1991
    In light of these considerations, the professional must evaluate whether an interim fee application is appropriate. Generally, the cost of the fee application process is compensable in this Circuit. In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., supra, 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985). But there is an inherent risk in filing an inappropriate interim application: the court may disallow as unreasonable and unnecessary any fees related to the fee application, if it determines that no interim payment is possible and...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California


  1. In re Johnson, Case No. 07-25104 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1/14/2009) (Bankr. E.D. Cal., 2009) January 14, 2009
    The United States trustee filed a limited opposition to the fee application. Based on Lamie , the opposition contended that debtors' counsel could not, with the exception of the expense of presenting a fee application for services rendered before the trustee was appointed, receive payment under § 330(a)(1) for services rendered after the chapter 11 trustee was appointed and their § 327(a) employment...

  2. In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., 2008) November 21, 2008
    The United States trustee filed a limited opposition to the fee application. Based on Lamie, the opposition contended that debtors' counsel could not, with the exception of the expense of presenting a fee application for services rendered before the trustee was appointed, receive payment under § 330(a)(1) for services rendered after the chapter 11 trustee was appointed and their § 327(a) employment...

  3. In re Johnson, Case No. 07-25104 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 11/21/2008) (Bankr. E.D. Cal., 2008) November 21, 2008
    The United States trustee filed a limited opposition to the fee application. Based on Lamie, the opposition contended that debtors' counsel could not, with the exception of the expense of presenting a fee application for services rendered before the trustee was appointed, receive payment under § 330(a)(1) for services rendered after the chapter 11 trustee was appointed and their § 327(a) employment...

  4. In re Pedersen, 229 B.R. 445 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., 1999) January 22, 1999
    The chapter 13 trustee and all creditors are given notice that an attorney is requesting fees pursuant to the chapter 13 fee guidelines by inclusion of the amount of the fees in the form chapter 13 plan made mandatory by General Order 97-02. The plan is served on all creditors with notice of the first meeting of creditors. Any objection to approval of fees as part of the confirmation process must be filed with the court and served on the debtor and the debtor's attorney no later than 14 days...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California


  1. In re Barbaria, Case No. 05-30164 TC (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 11/21/2008) (Bankr. N.D. Cal., 2008) November 21, 2008
    On October 8, 2008, counsel for the chapter 11 trustee (Trustee) filed an application for compensation and reimbursement of expenses (Fee Application). Debtors and Patco Trucking, Inc. have each filed an objection to the Fee...

  2. In re McKinney, 383 B.R. 490 (Bankr. N.D. Cal., 2008) February 29, 2008
    The quality of Trustee's services was poor with respect to her fee application. In the face of this court's Fee Guidelines, Collier, and the published decisions on point, Trustee failed to submit time records or a narrative statement with her fee application. This caused concrete harm to Debtor, who was required to file a written objection and attend a fee hearing to compel Trustee to submit a proper fee application. The harm to Debtor was unnecessary. Trustee could have submitted a fee...

  3. In re Dick Bruhn, Inc., Case No. 07-51338-RLE (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 12/12/2007) (Bankr. N.D. Cal., 2007) December 12, 2007
    M&M's First Interim Fee Application was filed on or about November 15, 2007 (the "Fee Application"). The Fee Application contains $18,337.50 in fees for services rendered by M&M prior to the date that it was chosen to represent the Committee ("Pre-Employment Entries"). The narrative portion of the Fee Application states that the Pre-Employment Entries include "fees relative to [M&M's] efforts to assist in the formation and organization of an ad hoc creditors' committee which...

  4. In re Qmect, Inc., No. 04-41044 T (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 9/5/2007) (Bankr. N.D. Cal., 2007) September 5, 2007
    Burlingame disputes that its original fee application was deficient. It notes that the Court had previously stated that it was not required to comply with the same standards applicable to fee applicants pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330. Moreover, it contends that, if it had prepared its original fee application in the format it was ultimately required to utilize, it would have incurred the same amount of fees and costs at that stage of the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California


  1. In re MII Liquidation, Inc., Case No. 05-6040-B11 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 8/19/2008) (Bankr.S.D.Cal., 2008) August 19, 2008
    Allen Matkins filed four interim fee applications, a final application covering the time through September 30, 2007, and a supplemental application for October 2007 (collectively the Fee Application). The Fee Application sought fees and costs totaling just more than $3,000,000.00. The Trustee filed an objection to the Application (as he did with the fee applications of virtually all of the...

  2. In re Kidwell, Case No. 07-01824-A13 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 4/28/2008) (Bankr.S.D.Cal., 2008) April 28, 2008
    At the outset it is noted that this district has for years utilized a presumptive or "no-look" fee system in Chapter 13 cases because of economies of such a system to debtors, creditors, and even court administration. However, attorneys have always been able to file a fee application instead, subject, of course, to the statutory standards of 11 U.S.C. § 330. Participation in this district's presumptive fee system is triggered by filing a "Rights and Responsibilities"...

  3. In re Atoe, Case No. 07-02209-B13 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 2/7/2008) (Bankr.S.D.Cal., 2008) February 7, 2008
    As noted, the Court asked for more specific information after the hearing on the fee application. Both Mr. Doan and Mr. Larkin filed supplemental declarations in which they stated they had "further reviewed" their "time in the aforementioned case and converted the same from our files and Bestcase Software to our new `Bankruptcy Pro/Doing Time' Software." They discovered that the time asserted in "Exhibit A" was misallocated between them, and that Mr. Doan had put 1.45...

  4. In re Moran, Case No. 07-02221-B13 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 2/6/2008) (Bankr.S.D.Cal., 2008) February 6, 2008
    After detailed review of both the original application and the Doan firm's supplemental information (insofar as it related to the time frame covered by the fee application), the Court finds that the fees sought are unreasonably high and do not reflect the sound billing judgment required in bankruptcy cases. The supplemental declarations have attorneys doing work that is sometimes ministerial and should be relegated to lower billing staff or paralegals. Mr. Doan's claimed hourly rate of $450 is...




U.S. District Court for the Central District of California


  1. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities, 438 F.Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal., 1977) September 29, 1977
    Based upon a careful review of the services rendered by this firm, as reflected in the fee application, and upon consideration of both the objections to 66 and the comments in support of their fee application, the Court finds it fair, just and reasonable to award fees to the law firm of Kreindler & Kreindler in the amount of $800,679.37. This composite amount is the result of multiplying partners' reasonable, historic hourly rates by a multiple of two 67 and multiplying associates'...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado


  1. In re Zamora, 251 B.R. 591 (D. Colo., 2000) August 11, 2000
    Even if the First Motion to Reconsider met the procedural requirements and the factors stated above, this appeal would still fail because Judge Cordova did not abuse his discretion in partially denying the fee request. No abuse of discretion occurred for the following reasons: (1) Carlson failed to explain adequately the necessity of many of the charges listed in the application; (2) these charges can reasonably be considered overhead expenses that should be built into an attorney's hourly...

  2. In re Ingersoll, 238 B.R. 202 (D. Colo., 1999) August 20, 1999
    Each of the bankruptcy judges has set a presumptively reasonable fee for all Chapter 13 cases which that judge will accept if no objections are filed by creditors. These amounts have varied from $1,000 to $1,200. Debtors' counsel limiting their fees to these amounts are excused from filing a formal fee application describing the services they have performed. Lawyers asking for any greater amount must file a "long form" fee application detailing time spent and services performed. After...

  3. In re Colorado Mountain Cellars, Inc., 226 B.R. 244 (D. Colo., 1998) October 21, 1998
    The trustee approved Mr. Flynn's original fee application and did not contest Mr. Flynn in this appeal. However, if Mr. Flynn's enhanced fee request were approved, it would eliminate funds to pay creditors. Those creditors should have the opportunity to protest the fee application. Therefore a new notice of fee application clearly stating that the fee is sought from the estate (and not from Mr. Finch's fee) is needed. The bankruptcy court may then decide what kind of hearing, if any, is...

  4. Thomas v. Sullivan, 804 F.Supp. 1363 (D. Colo., 1992) October 13, 1992
    This is such a case. I implicitly retained jurisdiction in my order of July 22, 1991. I remanded the case to the Secretary for a new hearing which would fill in the lacunae in the evidence I had earlier noticed. Thus, no final order entered until July 22, 1992. Plaintiff filed his fee application on August 17, 1992. Thus, the fee application was timely and I have jurisdiction to consider...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut


  1. In re Colonial Realty Co., 280 B.R. 299 (Bankr. Conn., 2002) June 27, 2002
    RULING ON FEE APPLICATION AND MOTION SEEKING DISGORGEMENT OF...

  2. In re Colonial Realty Company, Case No. 90-21980 (Bankr. Conn. 2002) (Bankr. Conn., 2002) June 1, 2002
    RULING ON FEE APPLICATION AND MOTION SEEKING DISGORGEMENT OF...

  3. In re Wonder Corp. of America, 109 B.R. 18 (Bankr. Conn., 1989) December 27, 1989
    The application signed and filed by R & C for § 506(b) fees, see category 6, supra at 26, is not sanctionable. While there may have been some misstatement in the fee application as to whether R & C had actually been paid by Chase, any such flaw was de minimis and does not subject R & C to sanctions. There was never any question that R & C worked the number of hours claimed in the application, so it cannot be said that the application had no basis in fact. It was not unreasonable for R...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia


  1. In re Fairfax, Case No. 07-00663 (Bankr. D.C. 8/26/2008) (Bankr. D.C., 2008) August 26, 2008
    Fees based on hourly rate of $300.00, Counsel will file fee...

  2. In re McCrea, Case No. 08-00078 (Bankr. D.C. 8/26/2008) (Bankr. D.C., 2008) August 26, 2008
    Fees based on hourly rate of $300.00, Counsel will file fee...

  3. In re Williams, Case No. 08-00116. (Bankr. D.C. 7/21/2008) (Bankr. D.C., 2008) July 21, 2008
    instead of an additional $1,000 being received later. In any event, because of the discrepancy with the Rule 2016(b) statement, I will deny the fee application without prejudice, with the issue of addressing any violation to await the filing of an amended fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut


  1. In re Capitol Hill Group, 313 B.R. 344 (Bankr. D.C., 2004) August 17, 2004
    The extrinsic evidence shows that at the time of the email exchange, CHG was aware that the bankruptcy court was scheduled to decide Shaw Pittman's First Fee Application (filed Nov. 14, 2003) requesting approximately $1.1 million immediately after the confirmation hearing. In fact the bankruptcy court did grant the first fee application by order dated December 16, 2003. See Joint Appendix at 38 (showing docket entry 449: "Order Granting Application for Compensation ... Granting Patrick J...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware


  1. In re Tribune Company, Case No. 08-13141 (KJC), (Bankr.Del. 2/19/2009) (Bankr.Del., 2009) February 19, 2009
    Within thirty (30) days after the date of the case professional's response to the preliminary report, the Fee Examiner shall file a final report with the Court regarding each quarterly interim or final fee application. This period may be extended by mutual consent of the Fee Examiner and the case professional. The Fee Examiner shall serve the final report upon the respective case professional and the Notice Parties (as defined in the Compensation Order). The final report shall be in a format...

  2. In re Klika, Case No. 05-10707 (MFW) (Bankr.Del. 2/29/2008) (Bankr.Del., 2008) February 29, 2008
    On October 25, 2007, Adelman Lavine filed the Fee Application which seeks fees in the amount of $58,273.40 and expenses in the amount of $2,682.93. On November 14, 2007, the Debtor filed an Objection to the Fee Application. At the hearing on the Fee Application held on December 5, 2007, the Court granted the Debtor's request for a continuance for the purposes of obtaining discovery related to the Fee Application. 2 On December 19, 2007, the Debtor filed the Written Motion and Request for...

  3. In re 14605, Incorporated, Case No.05-11910 (MFW) (Bankr.Del. 9/18/2007) (Bankr.Del., 2007) September 18, 2007
    The Objectors also argue that, as a matter of law, counsel is not entitled to recover any fees for preparation or defense of its fee applications. See, e.g. , In re Rothman , 206 B.R. 99, 111-12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that counsel's efforts in "pursuit of its own fee application are of no benefit to either the estate or the Debtor individually" and therefore "is generally not compensable from the debtor's estate") (citations omitted). Accord In re Courson , 138...

  4. In re APW Enclosure Systems, Inc., Cases No. 06-11378(MFW) (Bankr.Del. 8/2/2007) (Bankr.Del., 2007) August 2, 2007
    Before the Court is the Fourth and Final Application of Duane Morris LLP, Counsel to the Debtor, for Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period of December 4, 2006, through March 19, 2007 (the "Final Fee Application"). For the reasons stated below the Court will disallow in part the fees requested in the Final Fee Application, subject to the right of counsel to offer additional evidence to support payment of its...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida


  1. In re Debtor's Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374 B.R. 903 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 2007) August 31, 2007
    Establishment of the Presumptively Reasonable Fee and the additions noted above does not inalterably "fix" the reasonableness of the fee a chapter 13 debtor's lawyer may charge. The use of a Presumptively Reasonable Fee merely obviates the need for an attorney, in most cases, to keep contemporaneous time records, file a fee application, and attend a hearing on the fee application when requesting the Presumptively Reasonable Fee. However, the use of the Presumptively Reasonable Fee...

  2. In re Gurley, 379 B.R. 194 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 2007) June 6, 2007
    Several objections (collectively "Objections") were filed in response to the Adversary Fee Application 20 The Debtor, Betty Gurley, and Cheryl Followell object on several grounds, including: (1) the Adversary Fee Application fails to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. Section 330 because no time entries were submitted, (2) application of the Lodestar approach is the appropriate measure for determining reasonable compensation as opposed to the contingency fee sought by the Applicant,...

  3. In re Chc Industries, Inc., 381 B.R. 385 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 2007) March 30, 2007
    ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR CLARIFICATION OF FINAL ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDERS APPROVING INTERIM FEE APPLICATIONS AND SEVENTH INTERIM FEE APPLICATION OF GLENN RASMUSSEN FOGARTY & HOOKER,...

  4. In re Stout, 236 B.R. 851 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 1999) February 10, 1999
    Creditors have filed six claims in this case. There is a priority child support claim in the amount of $5,759.95 and five unsecured claims totaling $2,672.25. Given the economics of the case, therefore, only the priority child support creditor will receive any distribution in the case regardless of what the court does with counsel's fee application. No general unsecured creditors will receive anything. Were the court to grant counsel's fee application in the amount of $2,500 as the court...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Florida


  1. In re Cent. Florida Metal Fabrication, Inc., 207 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Fla., 1997) April 7, 1997
    Having concluded that confirmation of a plan was not possible, I ordered conversion of the case at the conclusion of the May 16, 1996 hearing. The chapter 7 trustee has liquidated all of the hard assets of the corporation and collected those receivables it could. A summary of assets in the estate as of the date of hearing on the attorney's fee application reflects total assets of $173,460, with Chapter 7 administrative claims and expenses totalling $49,981. The Alachua County Tax Collector has...

  2. In re Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc., 174 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Fla., 1994) October 12, 1994
    THIS CAUSE is before the Court for consideration of Pennington and Haben, P.A.'s fee application and the Debtors' objection to the fee application. The Court having heard argument of counsel, and having reviewed the pleadings and other documents in the file, finds that Pennington and Haben, P.A. is entitled to the full amount of compensation requested in the fee application, as...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida


  1. In re M.T.G. Limited, Inc., Case No. 04-34768-PGH. (Jointly Administered)(Bankr. S.D.Fla. 7/26/2007) (Bankr. S.D.Fla., 2007) July 26, 2007
    to be compensated must be necessary to the administration of the case. Professionals will not be paid for services which are not necessary to the administration of the estate." Id. Although the Post-Confirmation Committee requested the FPA to resign at its meeting on January 23, 2007, he refused to do so. Ultimately, the FPA resigned as the Plan Administrator on February 5, 2007. The FPA later filed his Fee Application seeking compensation from February 1, 2007 through April 11, 2007 in...

  2. In re Pan American Hosp. Corp., 373 B.R. 773 (Bankr. S.D.Fla., 2007) July 17, 2007
    The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' ("Committee") filed an Objection to the Final Fee Application of Saybrook on or about February 27, 2007 ("Objection")(C.P. # 2398). The Committee does not object to that portion of the Final Fee Application seeking the payment of the Paid Monthly Fees and the Outstanding Monthly Fees as defined in the Final Fee Application. Rather, the...

  3. In re Southeast Banking Corp., 314 B.R. 250 (Bankr. S.D.Fla., 2004) August 6, 2004
    The Court considered both the Brandt Fee Application and the Settlement Motion. The Settlement Motion resolves the Brandt Disputes including Mr. Brandt's fees. Because the proposed settlement is intertwined with the fee application, the Court first made an independent review of the Brandt Fee Application. The Court determined that Mr. Brandt was entitled to $9,249,955 in total fees including interim awards already paid, and final approval of $230,213 in expenses that have already been paid on...

  4. In re Pan American Hosp. Corp., 312 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D.Fla., 2004) July 29, 2004
    Also as part of their first day motions, the Debtors filed their Motion For Entry of An Administrative Order Under U.S.C. - 105(A) and 331 Establishing Procedure For Monthly and Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses For Professionals ("Shortened Fee Application Motion") (CP 10). The Shortened Fee Application Motion requested authority for Debtors' professionals to file monthly fee applications with this Court. The Shortened Fee Application Motion did not disclose...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia


  1. In re Murray, 348 B.R. 917 (Bankr.M.D.Ga., 2006) July 24, 2006
    Debtors filed their Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on November 15, 2005, after the October 17, 2005 effective date of most the provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (hereinafter, "BAPCPA"). On March 28, 2006, Debtors filed a Motion to Abrogate the January 3, 2005 Administrative Order Regarding Attorneys Fees (hereinafter, "Administrative Order" or "Order"). The Administrative Order establishes procedures for the payment of...

  2. Matter of Dalton, 101 B.R. 820 (Bankr.M.D.Ga., 1989) May 2, 1989
    Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The Appellant is Bill Parker & Associates, the law firm representing the Debtors in the bankruptcy action below. Appellant contends that the bankruptcy court erred in denying its fee application in the amount of $550.00. 95 B.R....

  3. In re Davis, 91 B.R. 627 (Bankr.M.D.Ga., 1988) September 23, 1988
    There are other problems with the affidavits submitted by Mr. Loftiss and Mr. Ward. They have apparently included hours that were actually spent on other aspects of the debtor's case. With the general lack of detail, it is impossible for the Court to determine specifically which hours were spent on the litigation with FMHA. There are some entries on each application that specifically say that time was spent on other cases. Examples in Mr. Loftiss' affidavit include an entry on July 17, 1982 of...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia


  1. In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ga., 1994) April 13, 1994
    Friedman has acceded to the United States Trustee's objections to specific time entries and to the rate charged by Grosse. The Chapter 11 Trustee objected to the fee application on the grounds that Rivers did not belong in Chapter 11 in the first place and that the Autrey Adversary Proceeding was not worthy of pursuit. These objections were more vigorously defended than pursued. Friedman called Grosse to testify about the Autrey case and the tax problems facing Rivers at the time the case was...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia


  1. Matter of Concrete Products, Inc., 208 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Ga., 1996) July 2, 1996
    first application and thus rendered it a final application. The hearing to consider said application was sent by notice of this Court dated October 30, 1991, which provided that objections to the Trustee's application would be considered on December 4, 1991. On November 25, 1991, a response to the Trustee's application was jointly filed by three unsecured creditors objecting to the amounts sought. On November 26, 1991, the Debtor filed a Motion to Surcharge the Trustee and an Objection to the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii


  1. In re Wpmk, Inc., 42 B.R. 157 (Bankr.Hawaii, 1984) August 8, 1984
    DECISION AND ORDER RE: FEE APPLICATION OF JOHN A...

  2. In re Stahl, Asano, Shigetomi Associates, 36 B.R. 179 (Bankr.Hawaii, 1983) December 22, 1983
    In the instant case, Mr. Weisman had failed to give notice of the hearing on his fee application to Debtors and their attorney. The Debtors, out of whose estate the fees are to be paid, have an interest in Mr. Weisman's fee application and should have been given notice of such hearing. This Court finds failure to give notice to Debtors and their counsel of the hearing to be good cause to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding to have a rehearing on the fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho


  1. In re A.W. Logging, Inc., 356 B.R. 506 (Bankr.Idaho, 2006) November 29, 2006
    Rule 2002(a)(6) requires that interested parties be given at least twenty days notice of any hearing on a fee application if the request exceeds $1,000. However, neither Rule 2016, the Rule governing fee applications, the other Bankruptcy Rules, nor this District's Local Bankruptcy Rules specify a deadline for objecting to a fee application. It was apparently Beeman who determined that any objections to his fee application must be filed and served by August I. While the Court understands...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois


  1. In re Central Illinois Energy, L.L.C., No. 07-82817 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 12/18/2008) (Bankr. C.D. Ill., 2008) December 18, 2008
    The DEBTOR'S assets were sold under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to Order entered April 24, 2008. By Order entered August 4, 2008, the case was converted to Chapter 7. On July 10, 2008, B&E filed its Fee Application seeking an award of fees and costs in the amount of $93,323.51, with attached time records showing billings from November 27, 2007 through July 9, 2008. Specifically, the Fee Application identifies fees and costs incurred in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of...

  2. In re SVI Media, Inc., No. 07-82762 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 10/31/2008) (Bankr. C.D. Ill., 2008)October 31, 2008
    fees have been filed. The Fee Application asserts that attorney fees and costs have been incurred in the SVI case of $31,459.74, in the OXFORD case of $21,339.65 and in two adversary proceedings of $1,979.20, for a total of $54,778.59. The Fee Application shows a credit against this sum of $26,039.00 leaving a balance due of $28,739.59. B&E requests an order approving the total amount of fees and costs, approving the prior payment of one-third of the retainers, authorizing the transfer in the...

  3. In re Minich, In Bankruptcy Case No. 05-74003 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 4/21/2008)(Bankr. C.D. Ill., 2008) April 21, 2008
    Before the Court are seven Final Reports and Accounts filed by three different Chapter 7 trustees. In each case, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed an Application for Compensation for the Trustee's attorneys fees and costs for himself or his firm with his Final Report and Account and, in each case, he incorporated the anticipated payment of all of the requested attorney fees and costs in his proposed distribution. Having reviewed all of the Applications for Compensation, this Court finds that none of...

  4. In re Fry, 271 B.R. 596 (Bankr. C.D. Ill., 2001) December 27, 2001
    In the case of Deanna S. Karr, No. 99-73140, Debtor's attorney initially requested additional fees in the amount of $534. In response to the Trustee's objection to these fees, Debtor's attorney increased the fee request to $701.50, including time incurred in preparing the fee application, adding one hour of attorney time and one hour of staff time. At hearing, on December 14, 2001, Debtor's attorney agreed to withdraw this additional request for time in preparing the fee application, thus...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois


  1. In re Kaczmarek, Case No. 07 B 06273 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 4/8/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2009)
    April 8, 2009 As to the time devoted to the preparation of the fee application itself, the Court denies the allowance of compensation that is disproportionate to the total hours in the main case. In re Wildman, 7,2 B.R. 700 (Bankr. N.D. III. 19S7) ("In the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed by this Court for preparing and litigating the attorney fee application should not exceed three percent of the total hours in the main case."); In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 203 B.R. 85,93 (Bankr....

  2. In re Fawwaz, Case No. 07 B 04270 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 4/8/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2009) April 8, 2009
    As to the time devoted to the preparation of the fee application itself, the Court denies the allowance of compensation that is disproportionate to the total hours in the main case. In re Witdmart, 72 B.R, 700,711 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1987) ("In the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed by this Court for preparing and litigating the attorney fee application should not exceed three percent of the total hours in the main case."); In re Spanjer Bros.. Inc., 20,3 B.R. 85 (Bankr...

  3. In re ABC-NACO, Inc., Case No. 01 B 36484 (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 3/31/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2009) March 31, 2009
    As to the time devoted to the preparation of the fee application itself, the Court denies the allowance of compensation that is disproportionate to the total hours in the main case. In re Wildman, 7,2 B.R. 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("In the absence of unusual circumstances, the hours allowed by this Court for preparing and litigating the attorney fee application should not exceed three percent of the total hours in the main case."); In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 203 B.R. 85, 93 (Bankr....

  4. In re Polo Builders, Inc., 397 B.R. 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2008) July 23, 2008
    The Trustee has represented to the Court that his fee application only represents hours for work performed on Count I, and that his counsel has used "billing judgment" to eliminate work relating to the other counts on which he did not prevail Despite repeatedly being asked to comment on particular parts of the Trustee's fee application or particular time entries, Defendants never did so and it must be assumed that they found no entries relating to other counts. Therefore, the Trustee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana


  1. Matter of Hunt's Health Care, Inc., 161 B.R. 971 (Bankr.N.D.Ind., 1993) September 28, 1993
    The result of this approach is to recognize and give effect to the distinctly different roles played in the fee process by the applicant, the court and any objector. It does not change the requirements associated with a proper fee application or the legal standards which are to be applied. What it does do, however, is recognize that different responsibilities with regard to the law and the facts involved in any fee application are allocated between the various players. The applicant bears the...

  2. In re Spungen, 168 B.R. 373 (Bankr.N.D.Ind., 1993) August 30, 1993
    Trustee submitted to the United States a final report of the administration of the estate. Separately filed but also incorporated as Exhibit "A" to the Trustee's final report, was the Statement of Services and Application ("fee application") of Attorney Green. As part of his statutory duties, the United States' Trustee monitors applications for compensation filed under section 330 of Title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A). Pursuant to this duty, the United States filed its...

  3. Matter of Environmental Waste Control, 122 B.R. 341 (Bankr.N.D.Ind., 1990) December 7, 1990
    On May 16, 1990, PP & S applied for allowance of interim fees and expenses. For services rendered and expenses incurred during the period of time from the date of filing through March 31, 1990, PP & S requested $727,286.25 4 and $49,714.89, respectively. Objections were filed by Resources Unlimited, Inc., Supporters To Oppose Pollution, Inc. ("STOP"), the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Trustee. One of the main objections voiced by several creditors, including the U.S...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa


  1. Matter of Talandis, 95 B.R. 108 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, 1989) January 20, 1989
    In the case at bar, Childers did not request the Court to retain limited jurisdiction regarding his fee application in the event Debtor's case was dismissed. As a result, the Order on Dismissal did not contain any provision providing for the Court's retention of limited jurisdiction to consider said fee application. Therefore, the Court concludes it does not have jurisdiction to consider Childer's fee...

  2. Matter of Pothoven, 84 B.R. 579 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, 1988) March 29, 1988
    Upon re-examination of the fee application the court again finds that entries for travel on March 20, 1987 and June 17, 1987 were properly reduced to $60.00 per hour. As noted above the court will no longer automatically reduce compensation for phone conferences. This fee application is a good example of the proper documentation for such services. The documentation of services performed by paralegals, however, could use some improvement. While practitioners are encouraged to...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas


  1. In re Loy, Case No. 07-41333 (Bankr. Kan. 12/3/2007) (Bankr. Kan., 2007) December 3, 2007
    On October 25, 2007, GMAC Mortgage, LLC, through its counsel South & Associates, filed a Secured Creditor's Rule 2016 Fee Application. 1 That Fee Application generically described the work that had been done by counsel, but did not specifically itemize the time that had been incurred, or by whom and at what hourly rate. The creditor sought $275 plus $75 "for the preparation and filing of this Rule 2016 Application...." The firm sent notice of the application, and set it for an...

  2. In re Simmons, 286 B.R. 426 (Bankr. Kan., 2002) December 3, 2002
    Upon receiving the conversion motion, a case administrator in the Bankruptcy Clerk's office entered an order of conversion according to existing procedures for conversions from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Only after the conversion did the Simmonses' attorney file her fee application. The Chapter 7 trustee objects to the timeliness of the fee application because it was filed after the conversion. He also claims that the sale proceeds are property of the Chapter 7 estate that the Chapter 13 trustee...

  3. In re Krug, 174 B.R. 826 (Bankr. Kan., 1994) November 21, 1994
    Moreover, when considering the second interim fee application the Court is persuaded that the applicant did not generate excessive fees. In the application period, the applicant has accomplished many things in furtherance of the debtor's reorganization, including: completing an examination of the Bank's file; filing a Chapter 11 plan and negotiating with the Bank regarding its objections; filing an objection to the Bank's proof of claim; successfully removing state court actions to bankruptcy...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky


  1. In re Alma Energy, LLC, Case No. 07-70370 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. 4/30/2008) (Bankr.E.D.Ky., 2008) April 30, 2008
    This matter is before the court upon an application for fees by counsel for debtor in possession in the within proceeding. Debtor originally filed a First Interim Fee Application (Doc. #198) on January 25, 2008. An Amended First Fee Application (Doc. #200) was filed on January 31, 2008. The United States Trustee filed an Objection to the Amended First Interim Fee Application (Doc. #223) on February 15, 2008 and a Response to the United States Trustee's Objection to Amended First Interim Fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky


  1. The Cadle Company II, Inc. v. Fashion Shop of Kentucky, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:08CV-58-H (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 5/5/2008) (Bankr. W.D. Ky., 2008) May 5, 2008
    Appellant, Cadle Company II, Inc., has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's approval of a fee application presented by Retail Consulting Services, Inc. ("RCS"). Appellant argues that nothing in the record supports approval of the fees or the court's order granting pre-approved RCS's services under 11 U.S.C. § 328. Appellee has responded with a number of procedural objections as well as its principle argument that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the fees...

  2. In re Thermoview Industries, Inc., 341 B.R. 845 (Bankr. W.D. Ky., 2006) May 15, 2006
    For the above reasons, the fee application of Debtors' counsel is DENIED and must be resubmitted in accordance with the guidelines of this Memorandum. The fee application of UCC's counsel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. A separate Order incorporating the findings herein accompanies this Memorandum -...

  3. In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 252 B.R. 670 (Bankr. W.D. Ky., 2000) August 24, 2000
    On November 15, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order setting forth the procedure for payment of the Examiner and his professionals. [R. 1-111.] This procedure required the Examiner and his professionals to submit monthly bills to Big Rivers. After receiving these bills, Big Rivers was given a period of time to object or to pay the bills. Every 120 - 160 days, the Bankruptcy Court would review the bills submitted by the Examiner and his professionals. Payment continued under this...

  4. In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 258 B.R. 673 (Bankr. W.D. Ky., 1999) October 29, 1999
    In any event, we are convinced that if the bankruptcy court plans to disallow certain items of compensation, § 330(a) on its face first contemplates the applicants's right to a hearing. We understand that a court may simply wish to note its specific concerns, if any, and allow the fee applicant a reasonable opportunity to supplement his or her fee application in response thereto before holding an oral hearing, as hearings on a routine matter like compensation for services might overwhelm...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana


  1. In re Roy Frischhertz Construction Co., Case No. 05-21605. SECTION "B" (Bankr.E.D.La. 8/24/2007) (Bankr.E.D.La., 2007) August 24, 2007
    The fourth interim fee application requests $181,386.25 in fees and $11,737.58 in costs as well as nunc pro tunc approval of an additional $87,425.79; the total amount of fees and costs requested to date, including those requested in the fourth interim fee application is...

  2. In re Nrg Resources, Inc., 64 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D. La., 1986) August 15, 1986
    While appellees urge that this "has been an extremely complicated case," nowhere in the record does there appear to be any justification for the employment of four experienced bankruptcy attorneys to represent the same debtor and appear with one another at various conferences and proceedings. From the fee applications before the Court, it appears that the estate was needlessly represented by more than one attorney upon several occasions. This unnecessary duplication, triplication, and...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine


  1. In re Northeast Exp. Regional Airlines, Inc., 235 B.R. 695 (Bankr.Me., 1999) July 15, 1999
    Giving Mr. Morrell the benefit of many doubts, I will allow all time entries up to and including May 12, 1998, the last day of the mediation session. That sum amounts to $285,197. I will also allow all the time expended by the Applicant in compromising Adversary Proceeding Nos. 94-02032, 94-02033, and finalizing the instant fee application. That amounts to an additional $12,805. Accordingly, Morrell's final fee application is allowed in the amount of $298,002 for fees and $2,744.22 for...

  2. In re Oxford Homes, Inc., 204 B.R. 264 (Bankr.Me., 1997) January 6, 1997
    The fee application before me is entitled "First and Final Application by Cope and Cope, Attorneys for Peter N. Connell, for Allowance of Compensation for Legal Services and Reimbursement of Expenses." It straightforwardly invokes § 503(b)(4) as its statutory basis. The problem, however, is that by proceeding directly under § 503(b)(4), the application ignores a necessary precondition to a § 503(b)(4) fee..

  3. In re Larsen, 190 B.R. 713 (Bankr.Me., 1996) January 4, 1996
    In this Chapter 7 case, Burton Shiro and the firm of Shiro and Shiro (collectively "Shiro" or "Attorney Shiro") seek compensation for pre-conversion services rendered as debtors' Chapter 11 counsel. As was the Chapter 11 case itself, the fee application is shot through with disabling inadequacies. For the reasons set forth below, all compensation will be denied and only $800.00 of $1,165.32 in expense reimbursements sought will be approved. As a consequence, Attorney Shiro must...

  4. In re Dn Associates, 165 B.R. 344 (Bankr.Me., 1994) February 23, 1994
    We are presented with facts entirely different from those before the Nucorp court. Here, the fees incurred in preparing and presenting the final fee application were awarded to E & H by the Bankruptcy Court as Nucorp and Section 330(a) require. The fees at issue here are the additional fees incurred opposing Crake's objection to the fee application. Unlike the presentation and preparation of the fee application itself, there is no statutory or Bankruptcy Rule requirement that attorneys for...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland


  1. In re Greenbelt CT Imaging Center, LLC, Case No: 07-18958-PM (Bankr.Md. 2/19/2008) (Bankr.Md., 2008) February 19, 2008
    First Interim Application shall be subject to reconsideration, review and possible disgorgement by this Court upon the timely filing by GECC and/or the UST of an objection to any final fee application filed by Paley Rothman in this case. Any Objection filed by GECC and/or the UST, as to the interim fees requested by Paley Rothman in the First Interim Application, shall be considered timely if filed within twenty-three (23) days of the date on which Paley Rothman files its final fee...

  2. In re Camacho, Case No. 04-29888PM (Bankr.Md. 2/23/2007) (Bankr.Md., 2007) February 23, 2007
    This case is before the court on the First and Final Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of James M. Hoffman and Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A. as General Counsel to Scott D. Field, Chapter 7 Trustee ("the Fee Application"). There were no objections filed, and in light of the United States Trustee's endorsement of the Chapter 7 Trustee's Final Report and Proposed Distribution, the court will allow the fees and expenses requested subject to the...

  3. In re Bernard Hill, Inc., 133 B.R. 61 (Bankr.Md., 1991) June 28, 1991
    The Court will overrule the objection of First National Bank to the fee application of Rosen, Sapperstein & Fried-lander and allow the debtor's accountants a fee in the requested amount of $70,000, based upon the following analysis. First, this Court has never required that a fee application filed by an accountant comply with the same technical standards as an application filed by an attorney. In this regard, the Court holds that while an accountant's fee application must contain an..

  4. In re Leonard Jed Co., 118 B.R. 339 (Bankr.Md., 1990) August 31, 1990
    The burden of proof is always borne by the applicant regarding the award of fees in a bankruptcy case. A sufficiently detailed fee application containing a lodestar analysis which is supported by accurate, well-documented records is an absolute requirement. An itemized list of out-of-pocket expenses for which reimbursement is sought and the justification for charging the bankruptcy estate for them must be set forth in the fee application. The fee application must indicate the exercise of...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan


  1. In re CMC Telecom, Inc., Case No. 07-56001 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 4/6/2009) (Bankr. E.D. Mich., 2009)
    April 6, 2009 Before addressing the specific objections to McGuireWoods' Fee Application, the Court finds that the Fee Application as a whole demonstrates a lack of appropriate billing judgment. Counsel in this case was well aware of the fact that Debtor was administratively insolvent, yet, from the beginning, it billed an extraordinary number of hours given the size and complexity of the case. Counsel split its fee application into twelve separate billing categories, which allowed Counsel to bill for...

  2. In re Houle, Case No. 07-64514 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2/27/2009) (Bankr. E.D. Mich., 2009) February 27, 2009
    It was noted that Applicant filed the fee application somewhat (two days) late. Although this Court will not flatly deny the fee application solely due to its tardiness, it sees Weik's inability to timely file as reinforcing the negative aspects of, and inefficiencies in, Weik's...

  3. In re Zion, Case No. 07-58999-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2/27/2009) (Bankr. E.D. Mich., 2009) February 27, 2009
    The chapter 13 trustee filed an objection to the fee application, challenging the request for compensation for services rendered during the pendency of the chapter 7 case, from July 4, 2007 through April 8,...

  4. In re Reed Law Group, P.C., Case No. 08-58903 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1/23/2009) (Bankr. E.D. Mich., 2009) January 23, 2009
    The Fee Application before the Court is an interim fee application, not a final fee application. As such, it is not permitted under the Court's scheduling..




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan


  1. In re Engman, Case No. HG 01-13070 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 5/14/2008)(Bankr. W.D. Mich., 2008) May 14, 2008
    These disputes did not end with the commencement of this case. To the contrary, the Trustee's administration of the development has caused even more controversy. For example, Mr. Engman has objected to every motion by the trustee to liquidate the remaining Sun-Da-Go lots and every attempt by the trustee to resolve the ongoing disputes with his daughters 3 and the condominium association. He also objected to Day & Sawdey's prior fee...

  2. In re Copeland, 154 B.R. 693 (Bankr. W.D. Mich., 1993) May 26, 1993
    On April 1, 1993 the Firm filed a third fee application seeking an additional $370 in fees. No objections were filed to the April 1, 1993 application; therefore no hearing was scheduled. The fee application with attached itemization and the bankruptcy court file were examined by the court and the proposed fee order requesting additional fees was denied in the court's April 8, 1993 order. Accompanying that Order was the court's April 8, 1993 letter explaining the reason for the disallowance of...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Mississippi


  1. In re Viscount Furniture Corp., 133 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Miss., 1991) July 31, 1991
    A review of a fee application "begins with a determination of the accuracy of the arithmetic and proceeds to an evaluation of whether services are sufficiently identified and explained." In re First Software Corp., 79 B.R. 108, 111 (Bankr. D.Mass.1987). A fee application must...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri


  1. Matter of Interco Inc., 135 B.R. 363 (Bankr. E.D.Mo., 1991) November 13, 1991
    This Court also approved the retention of Husch, Eppenberger, Donohue, Cornfeld & Jenkins (Husch Eppenberger) as the Sub-debt Committee's local counsel. Husch Eppenberger's retention was approved as of February 21, 1991. On August 8, 1991, this Court approved Husch Eppenberger's fee application granting fees retroactively to January 24, 1991-the petition date. No parties filed objections to Husch Eppenberger's fee application and that application is not the subject of this...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri


  1. In re Redding, 251 B.R. 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mo., 2000) August 9, 2000
    On December 21, 1999, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in which it ordered David E. Schroeder, bankruptcy counsel for the Debtors, William Henry Redding and Alice Patricia Redding ("Debtors"), to disgorge the sum of $10,011.40 in attorney's fee payments which Schroeder had received from the Debtors. On April 28, 2000, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit ("BAP") reversed this Court's decision, holding that this Court had improperly reviewed...

  2. In re Meyer, 185 B.R. 571 (Bankr. W.D. Mo., 1995) August 23, 1995
    the amount of such award is within the discretion of the Court. In re Land, 138 B.R. 66 (D.Neb.1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.1993) (Table); 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Further, an attorney must apply to the Court for compensation or reimbursement of expenses as set forth in Rule 2016(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation to file an application "setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered,..

  3. In re Kroh Bros. Development Co., 105 B.R. 515 (Bankr. W.D. Mo., 1989) August 25, 1989
    This court found no authority within the Eighth Circuit requiring application of these factors to requests by an oversecured creditor for reimbursement of its attorneys' fees. However, the court notes that the first eight factors appear to be related to the moving creditor's burden of proving either that the fees are "reasonable" under § 506(b) or that the content and specificity requirements have been met. The ninth factor is relegated to the court's discretion. Thus, review of a...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana


  1. In re Davis, Case No. 07-60653-13 (Bankr.Mont. 1/28/2009)(Bankr.Mont., 2009) January 28, 2009
    The introductory sentence of Caughron's fee application does not set forth the correct amount of fees and costs, the approval of which is being sought. Caughron states he is seeking approval of fees in the amount of $939.02, and costs of $41.79. A review of the body of Caughron's application reveals that this is his fi

  2. In the Matter of Patton, Case No. BK05-84064-TJM (Bankr.Neb. 10/17/2008) (Bankr.Neb., 2008) October 17, 2008
    debtor's unemployment and inability to keep plan payments and mortgage payments current. He has now filed an itemized supplemental fee application specifying the services provided post-confirmation. The debtor has objected to the fee application and suggests that she was never told there was a possibility of additional fees for additional services, was never told that counsel's hourly fee could and did increase, and believes that the only reason the fee application was filed in August 2008 is...

  3. In the Matter of Carlson, Case No. BK04-41534-TJM (Bankr.Neb. 7/28/2008)(Bankr.Neb., 2008) July 28, 2008
    In Filing No. 851, the resistance to the attorney fee application, Mr. Carlson suggests that the trustee overstates or misstates services and the status of the bankruptcy case; that the trustee has employed himself as attorney for the trustee; that numerous services billed as attorney for the trustee are services Mr. Kelly should have performed as trustee; that there is a motion to remove the trustee pending, which could result in disallowance or return of payments for services performed by Mr...

  4. In the Matter of Penry, Case No. BK05-80123 (Bankr.Neb. 2/27/2008)(Bankr.Neb., 2008) February 27,2008
    Counsel for the Chapter 13 debtors has filed a supplemental fee application requesting the allowance of $4,795.00 in fees and $80.20 in expenses. Pursuant to the terms of the local rule in effect on the confirmation date, July 28, 2005, counsel was allowed fees in the amount of $1,800.00 and expenses in the amount of $200.00 without the need for itemization. The local rule anticipated that if counsel declined to itemize the services rendered by the confirmation date, $1,800.00 would cover all...

  5. In the matter of Drumheller, Case No. BK03-81043 (Bankr.Neb. 11/14/2007) (Bankr.Neb., 2007) November 14, 2007
    Almost all of the work in this case was performed in 2003 and 2004. Only 3.8 hours of attorney and legal assistant time is shown on the supplemental fee application after 2004. Had counsel filed a supplemental fee application following completion of the majority of the work in the middle of 2004, there probably would have been enough time left for payments on those fees to be made through the Chapter 13 plan, assuming they would have been allowed at that time. Filing a supplemental fee...

  6. In re Ransom, 361 B.R. 895 (Bankr.Mont., 2007) January 16, 2007
    Although the current local rule, 2016-1, provides that pre- and postpetition fees for an oversecured creditor must be submitted by fee application, the Court does belief given its further review of the requirements of the rule and the discussion contained in Atwood that a creditor may be able to disclose all prepetition fees and costs in the proof of claim without the need to file a fee application. Further a creditor may be able to disclose all postpetition fees and costs in a proof of claim...

  7. In re Berg, 268 B.R. 250 (Bankr.Mont., 2001) September 25, 2001
    Allen's fee application requests fees and costs through January 24, 2001, in the total amount of $15,227.00, including 5.0 hours on January 24, 2001, after the case was converted to Chapter 7, for meetings with the Chapter 7 Trustee and the U.S. Trustee. Luinstra's fee application requests fees through December 1, 2000, and costs through December 29, 2000, in the total amount of...

  8. In re Crown Oil, Inc., 257 B.R. 531 (Bankr.Mont., 2000) September 13, 2000
    After due notice, a hearing on both applications was held at Billings on June 19, 2000. Deschenes and Watts each appeared and testified. No appearance was made at the hearing in opposition. Exhibits 1 through 14 were admitted into evidence. The Chapter 7 Trustee Joseph V. Womack ("Womack") appeared and stated he had no




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada


  1. In re Virissimo, BK-S-05-13605-LBR (Bankr.Nev. 10/2/2006)(Bankr.Nev., 2006) October 2, 2006
    James Lisowski is the trustee in this chapter 7 case and his firm, Lisowski Law Firm, Chtd. Also serves as attorney for the trustee. The Lisowski firm has filed a fee application requesting $24,835 for attorney's fees and $419.43 as costs. The debtors have objected. 1 The court requested that Lisowski supplement the record by filing his trustee billing statements. 2 The court then issued a tentative ruling, denying the Lisowski firm compensation for certain services that the court determined...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire


  1. In re Robotic Vision Systems, Inc., 343 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.H., 2006) May 26, 2006
    The Court held a procedural status hearing on the fee applications and objections thereto on May 5, 2006. At the hearing, the Trustee indicated he would be filing a motion to approve a settlement agreement with Sheehan as well. To date, no such motion has been filed with the Court. At the hearing, the UST and Costa did not pursue any objection to the Houlihan application and the Court entered an order approving final fees and expenses for Houlihan (Doc. No. 1659). The UST and Costa also agreed...

  2. In re Pow Wow River Campground, Inc., 296 B.R. 81 (Bankr. N.H., 2003) April 25, 2003
    Debtors' counsel is seeking $50,000.00 in fees and $1,823.19 in expenses. The fee application by Debtors' counsel reflects 268.2 hours totaling $53,640.00 at an average hourly rate of $200.00. No objection has been raised to the reasonableness of the hours expended, the hourly rate charged or the expenses requested. The United States Trustee (the "Trustee") has questioned the work by Debtors' counsel in proposing a plan of reorganization which did not satisfy the absolute priority rule...

  3. In re Rancourt, 207 B.R. 338 (Bankr. N.H., 1997) February 7, 1997
    The final fee application in question by the debtors' attorneys provoked strenuous objections by the United States Trustee and objections by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the major unsecured creditor in these proceedings. (Ct. Docket Nos. 1029, 1024, 1073, and 1072). The final fee application by the referenced creditors' committee's counsel generated a "Response of United States Trustee" (Ct. Docket No. 1031), which requested that the Court defer allowance of any...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey


  1. In re Curriden, Case No. 05-38352 (Bankr.N.J. 11/5/2008) (Bankr.N.J., 2008) November 5, 2008
    Here, a minor adjustment will be made to the supplemental fee application of Mr. Neuner to account for the limited success of the fee litigation. The award received by Mr. Neuner on his initial fee application was 88.6% of the fee application sought. Approximately $4,000 of services were rendered by Mr. Neuner in connection with litigation involving attorneys fees. On that basis, I will adjust downward the supplemental fee application of $4,395.50 by 11.4% of $4,000, or $456, for an award on...

  2. In re Szymczak, 246 B.R. 774 (Bankr.N.J., 2000) March 3, 2000
    After reviewing the instant fee application, the court entered an order awarding Applicant $1,050.00 ($2,250.00 less the $1,200.00 retainer previously paid by Debtors) for attorney fees and $266.62 for reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs. Upon learning of the bankruptcy court's significant reduction to its fees, Applicant filed a motion for reconsideration of its fee application. Applicant's brief in support provided a background on the Applicant and its over twenty years of experience with...

  3. In re Landmark Distributors, Inc., 195 B.R. 837 (Bankr.N.J., 1996) April 2, 1996
    The court finds the rationale employed above with respect to the sufficiency of the Kaye, Scholer firm's representation of Landmark and the disallowance of the Frankel & Abrams' fee application equally applicable to the request for compensation submitted by the Richards & O'Neil firm as co-counsel. Therefore, the fee application of Richards & O'Neil is also denied in its...

  4. In re Engel, 190 B.R. 206 (Bankr.N.J., 1995) December 20, 1995
    First, even if counsel is successful in the superior court hearing, and Judge Harris grants debtor a new trial, the benefit to the estate by the employment of Ferrara & Hantman remains highly speculative. Assuming arguendo that debtor is granted a new trial, debtor still must win an acquittal in the criminal case and overturn the judgment in the civil case. Focusing exclusively on the granting of a new trial does not render the employ of Ferrara & Hantman any less speculative. Securing a new...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico


  1. In re Guzman, No. 7-02-10188 MA (Bankr. N.M. 3/5/2009) (Bankr. N.M., 2009) March 5, 2009
    THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Trustee's Final Application for Allowance of Fees for the Period of November 16, 2005 through December 16, 2008 ("Fee Application). (Docket No. 1052). The Fee Application seeks approval and allowance of compensation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 331 for work performed by Daniel J. Behles, attorney for the Chapter 7 Trustee. The Fee Application requests approval of attorneys' fees in the amount of $6,384.00, paralegal fees in the amount of...

  2. In re Hart, No. 13-07-11088 MA (Bankr. N.M. 11/7/2007) (Bankr. N.M., 2007) November 7, 2007
    THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Application for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses and Costs ("Fee Application") filed by counsel for the Debtors, Velarde & Pierce. The Fee Application seeks approval of $5,161.47 representing fees, expenses, costs and gross receipts taxes. 1 Upon review of the Fee Application, the Court finds that some of the requested fees and expenses must be disallowed. In reaching this determination, the Court...

  3. In re Maestas, No. 13-07-11522 MF (Bankr. N.M. 11/6/2007) (Bankr. N.M., 2007) November 6, 2007
    THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Application for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses and Costs ("Fee Application") filed by counsel for the Debtors, Velarde & Pierce. The Fee Application seeks approval of $7,237.24 representing fees, expenses, costs and gross receipts taxes. 1 The Court set a presentment hearing on the Fee Application and took the matter under advisement. Upon review of the Fee Application, the Court finds that some of the...

  4. In re Potter, No. 7-05-14071 MS (Bankr. N.M. 6/4/2006) (Bankr. N.M., 2006) June 4, 2006
    THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Second and Final Application by Former Attorneys for Debtor for Allowance and Payment of Compensation for the Period of May 25, 2005 Through May 18, 2006 ("Fee Application") 1 filed by Davis & Pierce, P.C. ("Davis & Pierce"). The following parties filed objections to the Fee Application: Creditor Los Alamos National Bank ("LANB") (Docket # 174 and #199); Creditor Valley National Bank ("VNB") (Docket # 177 and #200); the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York


  1. In re Crafts Retail Holding Corp., 378 B.R. 44 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 2007) November 16, 2007
    Ultimately, the Court entered an order on June 7, 2007, authorizing the employment of DPS with yet further wide-reaching modifications ("Retention Order") (ECF Docket No. 173). The employment of DPS was explicitly made subject to the provisions and limitations of the Retention Order. The Retention Order radically changed the compensation arrangement that was originally envisioned by DPS and the Debtors. The Retention Order included provisions, i() eliminating any reference to 11 U.S.C...

  2. In re Korea Chosun Daily Times, Inc., 337 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 2005) December 13, 2005
    procedural and substantive milestones in the Debtor's bankruptcy case. See Fee Application 2-14. The Fee Application also sets forth Mr. Aab's considerable expertise and credentials, which include over twenty-five years of bankruptcy experience. See Fee Application 8. Finally, the Fee Application includes both a narrative description of the hours spent and Mr. Aab's contemporaneous time records. See Fee Application 9 and Exhibit E. Based on the entire record,...

  3. In re Kent Funding Corp., 290 B.R. 471 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 2003) March 5, 2003
    Before the Court is an Order to Show Cause filed by Kent Funding Corp. (the "Debtor") seeking to reopen a closed Chapter 11 case which had been dismissed for cause, for the purposes of fixing the appropriate legal fees to be awarded its former bankruptcy counsel. The Court had granted the portion of the Order to Show Cause seeking to reopen the case and had directed Pashkin and Brady, the Debtor's former bankruptcy counsel, to file an appropriate fee application for the Court to...

  4. In re Kliegl Bros., 238 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 1999) September 9, 1999
    Everything about Davisson's involvement with the Debtor was calculated and carefully thought out to the end of benefitting only Davisson. During the reorganization, at a time that he was without authority to bind the Debtor, Davisson claims to have reached out to DLNI and negotiated a plan for the payment of DLNI's claim in exchange for Debtor's silence on DLNI's fee application. In so doing, he ignored the fiduciary obligation owed by an officer of a debtor corporation in a title 11 proceeding...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York


  1. In re Noeth Corp., Case No. 06-62251 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 4/24/2008) (Bankr. N.D.N.Y., 2008) April 24, 2008
    Before the Court for consideration is the Application for Final Compensation ("Fee Application") under § 330 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 ("Code"), filed by the Orseck Law Offices ("Orseck"), as counsel for Noeth Corporation ("Debtor"), on December 27, 2007. The Fee Application came on for a hearing before the Court on January 22, 2008. An Objection to the Fee Application was filed by the United States Trustee ("UST") on...

  2. In re Churco, Case No. 07-61442 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 4/10/2008) (Bankr. N.D.N.Y., 2008) April 10, 2008
    Before this Court is the Fee Application of Christian H. Dribusch ("Dribusch"), Special Counsel to the trustee appointed in this Chapter 7 case, Philip J. Danaher, Esq.("Trustee").The Fee Application came before the Court as a part of the Trustee's Application for Compensation and Notice of Final Meeting of Creditors on the Final Account and Report of the Trustee ("Final Account"). Opposition to the Final Account was interposed by Haselton Lumber Company...

  3. In re Hotel Syracuse, Inc., 275 B.R. 679 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y., 2002) February 13, 2002
    Before the Court is the First Interim Fee Application of Hodgson Russ LLP ("HR"), attorneys for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee in the within Chapter 11 case ("First Interim Application"). A hearing on the First Interim Application was held on December 20, 2001. An objection to the First Interim Application was filed by Titan Management, LP ("Titan"), the Debtor's primary secured creditor. A statement of No Objection was filed by the U.S. Trustee based upon...

  4. In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 213 B.R. 234 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y., 1997) February 5, 1997
    STB agreed to delay the hearing on its fee application until the Fee Auditor reviewed the application and issued a report ("Report"). At the hearing on October 10, 1996, however, the Court authorized a temporary award of $1,000,000 in fees and $100,000 in disbursements to STB while the Fee Auditor completed its Report. The Fee Auditor submitted its Report of STB's first fee application on December 23, 1996. STB was then given an opportunity to reply to the findings of the Fee Auditor...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York


  1. In re King, 392 B.R. 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2008) August 18, 2008
    Shortly after D & A was granted leave to withdraw as counsel, the firm filed its Fee Application seeking final compensation for all of the work performed on the case. (ECF Doc. # 58 at § 10.) The Fee Application sought payment of fees totaling $46,115.00, and expenses totaling $1,329.03. ( Id. ) In the Fee Application, D & A references the retainer received and states that the $15,000 had been maintained in D & A's client escrow...

  2. In re Image Innovations Holdings, Inc., 391 B.R. 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2008) July 23, 2008
    [7,8] The first element, finality of a judgment, is satisfied because the order on Great American's fee application was a final judgment on the merits. To be final, an order "must completely resolve all of the issues pertaining to a discrete claim, including issues as to the proper relief." Iannochino, 242 F.3d at 43, quoting In re Integrated Res., Inc., 3 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir.1993); see also Grausz, 321 F.3d at 472; D.A. Elia Constr., 389 B.R. at 318 (holding that an order on a...

  3. In re Image Innovations Holdings, Inc., Case No. 06-11540 (ALG) (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 7/23/2008) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2008) July 23, 2008
    At the February 13th hearing, after the Court had closed the record on the fee application and had returned from a recess and was prepared to deliver its decision, the Creditors announced for the first time that they intended to file the present motion seeking derivative standing to sue Great American for malpractice. The motion was filed on February 28, 2008, and the Court delayed entry of an order on Great American's fee application to give the Creditors an opportunity to be heard on the...

  4. In re Source Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 06-11707 (AJG) (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 3/27/2008) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2008) March 27, 2008
    1. The Amended Fee Application revises an initial fee application, dated March 28, 2007, wherein Windels sought fees of $511,825.50 and expenses of $30,613.14 (totaling $542,438.64) for the period July 27, 2006 through February 28, 2007 (the "Initial Fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York


  1. In re St. Rita's Associates Private Placement, 260 B.R. 650 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y., 2001) March 30, 2001
    The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 330, relative to compensation of professionals. In particular, the statute added a new subdivision (a)(6), which states that "[a]ny compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application." Implicitly recognized, therefore, is the appropriateness of compensation for the preparation of a fee application. The question now...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina


  1. In re Sak Development, Inc., Case No. 07-02215-8-JRL (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 2/12/2008) (Bankr.E.D.N.C., 2008) February 12, 2008
    methods, and preparing an amended plan of reorganization. Stubbs & Perdue seeks compensation and reimbursement in the following amounts: $6,1787.48 (compensation of $5,796.50 and reimbursement of $390.98) pursuant to § 503(b); $16,075.21 (compensation of $15,730.00 and reimbursement of $345.21) pursuant to § 506(c) for work related to Tara Phase II generally; $411.59 (compensation of $407.00 and reimbursement of $4.59) pursuant to § 506(c) for work related to Tara Phase I,...

  2. In re Boneau, Case No. 03-00943-8-JRL (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 3/27/2007) (Bankr.E.D.N.C., 2007)March 27, 2007
    The matter before the court is the fee application filed by the debtor's former attorney, Peter K. Gemborys, Sr. Mr. Gemborys is seeking an additional $500.00 for pre-confirmation services to be paid as an administrative expense through the debtor's plan. The trustee objects to the fee application, asserting that the motion for confirmation addressed Mr. Gemborys' requested attorneys fees and that Mr. Gemborys failed to contest the motion for confirmation or confirmation...

  3. In re Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., Inc., 40 B.R. 436 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.,1984) May 31, 1984
    It is essential that a fee application specifically itemize the time and nature of the services for which compensation is sought. In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 30 B.R. 938 (Bkrtcy. ED PA 1983); In re Idak Corporation, 26 B.R. 793 (Bkrtcy. MA 1982); In re Art Shirt, Ltd., Inc., 30 B.R. 318 (Bkrtcy. ED PA 1983); In re Doyles-Lunstra Sales Corporation, 19 B.R. 1003 (D.C. SD 1982). The fee application in this case frequently groups many items in a single description. In those instances...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina


  1. In re Ameritex Yarn, LLC, 378 B.R. 107 (Bankr.M.D.N.C., 2007) October 5, 2007
    The court will detail those entries on the fee application that give rise to...

  2. In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653 (Bankr.W.D.N.C., 2000) October 2, 2000
    Even in the context of conflict preemption, compliance with the Bankruptcy Code's professional fee application procedures and state statutes regulating debt collection and/or deceptive trade practices is not per se impossible. A creditor can obviously file a Rule 2016 fee application without committing the sort of false representations and unconscionable acts such state laws are designed to eliminate. Thus, the first subcategory of conflict preemption does not pose a problem for the...

  3. In re Gwyn, 150 B.R. 150 (Bankr.M.D.N.C., 1993) January 12, 1993
    On or about June 24, 1991, and subsequent to the confirmation of the Plan, UNUM filed its first Section 506(b) fee application seeking recovery of attorneys' fees in the amount of $31,587.75 and expenses in the amount of $1,841.88 (a total of $33,429.63). According to the June 24, 1991 application, UNUM's attorneys billed UNUM for 230.75 hours of services performed during the period covered by that application. The bulk of the services performed by UNUM's counsel did not involve the...

  4. Legal Aid Soc. of Northwest N.C., Inc. v. Burns, 80 B.R. 764 (Bankr.M.D.N.C., 1987) October 20, 1987
    Finally, the section 329(a) disclosure, in the context of assessing a fee application, is functionally superfluous, since Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) specifically delineates the requirements for filing a proper fee application. Rule 2016(a), entitled "Application for Compensation or Reimbursement", requires the applicant to file a "detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested." In addition, Rule 2016(a)...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio


  1. In re Tobis, Case No. 04-38603 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 4/1/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2009) April 1, 2009
    After bankruptcy court approval of the estate's settlement with MMO, Applicant filed its final fee application. [Doc. ## 166, 169]. Applicant's fee application seeks approval and authorization for payment of an attorney fee of $9,726.08 and expenses of $63.45. [Id.]. The fee was calculated as one third of the $29,178.24 gross settlement proceeds from the Trustee's compromise generally as set forth in the employment application...

  2. In re Powers, Case No. 07-63396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 3/13/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2009) March 13, 2009
    Attorney Anthony J. Costello submitted a fee application on May 22, 2008. No objection was filed. In accordance with the corresponding Memorandum of Decision, the court hereby ALLOWS the fee application IN PART. A total of $2,250.00, is hereby allowed. Attorney Costello received $ 126.00 prior to filing, resulting in a total fee of $2,124.00 to be paid through the chapter 13 plan in accordance with the standard fee disbursement...

  3. In re Bray, Case No. 08-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1/28/2009) (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2009) January 28, 2009
    On October 7, 2008, Freeman filed a detailed fee application. Freeman requested an attorney's fee of $15,802.50, plus expenses in the amount of $106.39. Freeman's application also sought authorization to apply the retainer of $7,500 toward the allowed final compensation, plus payment of the balance due as...

  4. In re Wilson, Case No. 04-65540 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 11/30/2007)(Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2007) November 30, 2007
    references an "above-disclosed fee" which the court interprets this to mean the $1,250.00 fee coupled with the right to file a supplemental fee application. The fee agreement, which is signed by Debtors, reserves the right to file a fee application. Consequently, the court finds that the $1,250.00 fee was the base fee, not the total fee, and the disclosure provides that the total fee for this case was the base fee of $1,250.00 plus any additional amounts approved under a fee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio


  1. In re Newman, 270 B.R. 845 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, 2001) October 30, 2001
    This timeliness is short enough to afford the Court the opportunity to review a fee application close in time to the underlying substantive legal work. It is long enough to prevent the filing of a "premature" fee application. It allows the Court, as well as the debtor's attorney and the debtor, to gauge the reasonableness of the amount of the fee in relation to the outcome of the legal services rendered. It also reduces the "lumping" of work done on several discrete matters into...

  2. Matter of Liberal Market, Inc., 24 B.R. 653 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, 1982) October 18, 1982
    Based upon Smith and Schnacke's fee application and billing itemization, it is the determination of the Court that Smith and Schnacke's services to date were actual, necessary and reasonable. The Court again notes the considerable quantum meruit value of Smith and Schnacke's efforts, particularly in completion of the Plan and conciliation evidenced therein of numerous adversarial matters which would otherwise have delayed or defeated a reorganization and depleted estate assets. It is the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma


  1. In re Yates, 217 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Okl., 1998) February 12, 1998
    § 330(a)(4)(B). Under the guise of this section, and often out of necessity borne of a voluminous Chapter 13 docket, bankruptcy courts have allowed fees in Chapter 13 cases without requiring the detailed fee application contemplated by Bankruptcy Rule 2016. See, e.g., In re Shamburger, 189 B.R. 965, 970 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995) ("A lodestar analysis in every case simply will not work in a district where about 90% of cases pending at any given time are chapter 13 cases."). Many...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon


  1. In re Smith, Case No. 97-62183-aer7 (Bankr.Or. 7/22/2008) (Bankr.Or.,2008) July 22, 2008
    First, the applicant has the burden of proof to show his fees and expenses are reasonable. Caplin & Drvsdale Chartered v. Babcock and Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock and Wilcox Co. , 526 F.3d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 2008); Roderick v. Lew On re Roderick) , 185 B.R. 601, 606 (9th Cir., BAP 1995). Unlike a proof of claim for pre-petition debt, a fee application, as an administrative claim, enjoys no presumption of validity or accuracy, at least as to those aspects which are challenged. In re Allen Care...

  2. In re Columbia Aircraft Manufacturing Corp., Case No. 07-33850-elp11 (Bankr.Or. 4/10/2008) (Bankr.Or., 2008) April 10, 2008
    Finally, the committee argues that ING cannot be reimbursed for the fees it paid its counsel to prepare the fee application. ING argues that it is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of preparing the fee application under § 330(a)(6). That subsection provides that "[a]ny compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application." ING argues that the fees should be allowed because, Wits own...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania


  1. In re All Cases of Musher, 387 B.R. 669 (Bankr. W.D. Pa., 2008) May 28, 2008
    On December 20, 2007, the Court held a hearing on the Fee Application and Objections at which time it raised the issue of whether Musher had any basis for objecting to payment of further fees from the Musher Trust in light of her failure to comply with the notice requirements set forth in In re Berg, 356 B.R. 378 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.2006). With the consent of Musher at that hearing and by Order dated December 21, 2007 at Document No. 165, the Court directed the payment of $10,000.00 to Rishor...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania


  1. In re Waltenberg, Case No. 05-25084EF (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 6/15/2007) (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 2007) June 15, 2007
    The Third Circuit did not leave the review of fee applications in a procedural vacuum, but explained in some detail the protections, including a right to a hearing, that must be accorded to counsel whose fee application has been rejected or reduced. Busy Beaver , 19 F.3d at 845-48. Busy Beaver reviewed differing approaches to ensuring that counsel have their due process rights protected. First, a court may note (presumably through some order) its specific concerns and allow counsel to...

  2. In re Bechtold, Case No. 06-20586REF (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 5/15/2007) (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 2007)May 15, 2007
    The Third Circuit did not leave the review of fee applications in a procedural vacuum, but explained in some detail the protections, including a right to a hearing, that must be accorded to counsel whose fee application has been rejected or reduced. Busy Beaver , 19 F.3d at 845-48. Busy Beaver reviewed differing approaches to ensuring that counsel have their due process rights protected. First, a court may note (presumably through some order) its specific concerns and allow counsel to...

  3. In re Heffner, Case No. 05-26495REF (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 4/9/2007) (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 2007) April 9, 2007
    The Third Circuit did not leave the review of fee applications in a procedural vacuum, but explained in some detail the protections, including a right to a hearing, that must be accorded to counsel whose fee application has been rejected or reduced. Busy Beaver , 19 F.3d at 845-48. Busy Beaver reviewed differing approaches to ensuring that counsel have their due process rights protected. First, a court may note (presumably through some order) its specific concerns and allow counsel to...

  4. In re Wise, 365 B.R. 516 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 2007) April 3, 2007
    After my review of the Third Fee Application, I set it for a hearing on March 1, 2007. At the March 1, 2007 hearing, I informed Mr. Leinbach that the issue I had with the Wise Third Fee Application was the charge of 3.0 hours for a hearing 22 that he did not attend. I told him that no Entry of Appearance had his name on it and that the official recording of the matters heard that day had convinced me that he was not present. Mr. Leinbach said he had no information with him that would show he...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania


  1. In re Reeder, Case No.: 1-05-bk-08565MDF (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2/21/2007) (Bankr. M.D. Pa., 2007) February 21, 2007
    Before me is the Second Application for Approval of Fees ("Second Application") filed by Burkholder & Company ("Burkholder"), the court-appointed accountant for the estate of Richard and Doris Reeder ("Debtors") and the objection to the Second Application filed by the United States Trustee ("UST"). The Court entered an Order on December 16, 2005 approving the retention of Burkholder as Debtors' accountant. Burkholder filed its first fee application ("First...

  2. In re Smith, 331 B.R. 622 (Bankr. M.D. Pa., 2005) August 29, 2005
    Mott's application consists of a cover sheet and seven pages of time entries. The time entries for each application provide information under columns labeled "Date," "Timekeeper," "Hours," "Rate" and "Charge." The first 31 time entries cover the period from January 7, 2004 to June 8, 2004, which coincides with the time during which the case was being administered under Chapter 7. The January 31, 2005 fee application, which Mott withdrew, stated that Mott...

  3. In re Mackay, 323 B.R. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Pa., 2005) January 27, 2005
    Document number 64 is the first fee application. Document number 70 is the objection of the Chapter 13 Trustee to that fee application. At a hearing on March 11, 2003, the Chapter 13 Trustee argued, inter alia, that he could not determine the impact the fees would have on the estate and the services rendered were personal to the Debtor only and did not confer any benefit on the Debtor's estate. Following oral argument, I deferred ruling on this fee application pending the filing of a Chapter 13...

  4. In re Lackawanna Medical Group, P.C., 323 B.R. 626 (Bankr. M.D. Pa., 2004) July 29, 2004
    With this clear mandate from the Third Circuit, and the subsequent guidance provided by the court in the In re Busy Beaver case, this Court, sua sponte, reviewed the final fee application of Doran & Nowalis in the above-captioned case and by Order dated August 8, 2003, noted that certain amounts of time in the application requested fees and costs for services rendered prior to the petition date. The Court allowed the request for all other fees and costs rendered and represented in the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico


  1. In re El Comandante Management Company, LLC, Case No. 04-10938 (ESL). (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. P.R. 8/2/2007) (Bankr.P.R., 2007) August 2, 2007
    Claims, shall receive on the Distribution Date or, if later, on the 10th (tenth) Business Day after such claim become Allowed, Cash in an amount equal to such Allowed Administrative Expense Claim ...". Consequently, the Plan Administrator's failure to pay LBRG's Fee Application constitutes a breach of the terms of the confirmed plan. LBRG admits that the Fee Application fails to list the fees incurred during the case, as well as payments received by the firm for approved fee applications in...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island


  1. In re Pavlis, 264 B.R. 57 (Bankr.R.I., 2001) June 4, 2001
    In this District, R.I. Local Bankr.R.2017-1(a) and Appendix IV require a petition preparer to file a fee application whenever the fee exceeds $100. While not specifically stated in our Local Rules, since March 10, 2000, it has been this Court's practice to treat $100 as a reasonable threshold for fees of petition preparers, subject to higher awards through the fee application process. 1 Considering the passage of time since the promulgation of our Local Rules and current practice, I took this...

  2. In re Almacs, Inc., 181 B.R. 143 (Bankr.R.I., 1995) April 25, 1995
    [a]mong the issues raised by the Court in the Decision regarding the Cohen Shapiro Fee Application was whether the services rendered ... were available locally. In addition ... the Court disallowed certain portions of the Fee Application based upon a finding that insufficient detail had been provided. Neither the issue of insufficient detail nor the issue of availability of local counsel to provide the services rendered by Cohen Shapiro was raised in the Objection filed by the United States...

  3. In re Kalian, 178 B.R. 308 (Bankr.R.I., 1995) February 1, 1995
    After reviewing the fee application independently, my job is to determine a reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours counsel reasonably expended within the scope of the creditor's contractual fee entitlement, employing the lodestar model to determine a reasonable fee. See Boston & Maine Corp. v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A. (In re Boston & Maine Corp.), 778 F.2d 890, 895-96 (1st Cir.1985); In re Casco Bay Lines, 25 B.R. 747 (Bankr. 1st Cir.1982); In re Saturley, 131 B.R. at...

  4. In re Alcon Corp., 168 B.R. 822 (Bankr.R.I., 1994) June 14, 1994
    Mr. Pitts spent approximately 65 hours producing a plan and disclosure statement that were eventually withdrawn, in a case that was voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. The United States Trustee stated in his original objection to Mr. Pitts' fee application that he "found the disclosure statement very incomplete and difficult to understand, which led to a long and detailed objection, and eventually counsel withdrew its disclosure statement and plan." (U.S. Trustee Obj. Applc...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina


  1. In re Fowler, C/A No. 05-10053-HB (Bankr. S.C. 9/7/2008) (Bankr. S.C., 2008)September 7, 2008
    statement and a one-page Proof of Claim form. 9 Facing a challenge to the sufficiency of the information in the fee request, he thereafter had to justify his billings. Had Cantrell prepared a proper fee application with sufficient information, he likely could have avoided some or all of the additional charges incurred in the objection process. Further, the Code provides that reasonable charges for preparing the fee application can be compensated from estate funds...

  2. In re Tjn, Inc., 194 B.R. 400 (Bankr. S.C., 1996) February 23, 1996
    The Law Firm's second argument asserts that even if Rule 2016(b) applies, the Law Firm complied with it through disclosure in its First Application of the total of payments received from Tom New. The Law Firm further asserts that the disclosure in the fee application was superior to the disclosure which would have been given in a supplemental Rule 2016(b) disclosure. The Court has two concerns with this position. First, the Court notes that the First Application was filed 35 days after the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Dakota


  1. In re Tri-State Ethanol Company LLC, Bankr. No. 03-10194 (Bankr.S.D. 7/10/2007) (Bankr.S.D., 2007) July 10, 2007
    conference on Tri-State Financial's December 14, 2006 Objection to Claim of Woods, Fuller, Schultz and Smith, P.C. During the status conference, a date for the rescheduled hearing on Woods Fuller's second interim fee application will be set. The parties should note the Court hopes to schedule the evidentiary hearing on Woods Fuller's second interim fee application and Tri-State Financial's December 14, 2006 Objection to Claim of Woods, Fuller, Schultz and Smith, P.C. for August 9, 2007. The...

  2. In re Tri-State Ethanol Company LLC, Bankr. No. 03-10194 (Bankr.S.D. 5/2/2007) (Bankr.S.D., 2007) May 2, 2007
    On January 26, 2007, Woods Fuller filed its second fee application for services rendered and expenses incurred from December 5, 2005 through December 7, 2006. The total sought was $160,887.87, which includes $147,534.00 for professional services, expenses of $4,619.86, and sales tax of $8,734.01. The only objector to this fee application was Tri-State Financial. Tri-State Financial...

  3. In re Aguirre, Bankr. No. 01-40161 (S.D. 10/06/2003) (Bankr.S.D.,2003) October 6, 2003
    Finally, it appears that Harmelink & Fox has been overpaid for the personal, post-conversion services they rendered for Debtors. The initial proposed order that Harmelink & Fox submitted for the July 23, 2003, fee application stated that the firm had received $1,861.37 toward the fee order that was entered July 3, 2001. Since that sum was much larger than the payments reported by Trustee Wein following conversion of the case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the Court asked the law firm to...

  4. In re Black Hills Greyhound Racing Ass'n, 154 B.R. 285 (Bankr.S.D., 1993) March 25, 1993
    Attorney Stuck filed an Application for Approval and Payment of Interim Debtor's Attorney Fees on June 24, 1992 and served notice of that application. The interim fee application sought $50,088.91 in compensation and reimbursement for services and costs incurred from June 28, 1991 through May 15, 1992. Objections to the interim fee application on several grounds were filed by South Dakota Cable, Inc., on July 21, 1992, Chapter 7 Trustee Dennis C. Whetzal on July 27, 1992, and the United States...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee


  1. In re Nashville Senior Living, Case No. 08-07254. (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1/21/2009) (Bankr. M.D. Tenn., 2009) January 21, 2009
    Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP ("PSZJ" or "The Firm"), filed its First Interim Application for Allowance of compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Through October 31, 2008 ("First Interim Fee Application"), in accordance with the provisions of the Order Granting Expedited Motion Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 331 Establishing Procedures For Interim Compensation And Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals entered September 16, 2008. The United States Trustee...

  2. In re Barnhill's Buffett Inc., Case No. 07-8948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 12/9/2008) (Bankr. M.D. Tenn., 2008) December 9, 2008
    Michael Gigandet was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee on April 30, 2008. On June 3, 2008, Mr. Hancock filed his first fee application requesting interim compensation in the amount of $355,975.00 and $1,071.55 for expenses from December 3, 2007 through February 29, 2008. On July 7, 2008, following the UST's objection to the Interim Fee Application, Mr. Hancock filed his First and Final Application for Allowance of Compensation requesting compensation in the amount of $356,554.50 and $1,071.55 for...

  3. In re Innovative Entertainment Concepts, Inc., Case No. 304-01633 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 7/3/2007) (Bankr. M.D. Tenn., 2007) July 3, 2007
    On July 3, 2006, Hancock filed a Motion to Alter or Amend or Set Aside Order Denying Final Fee Application of Debtor's Counsel. This motion blamed miscalendaring for the failure to appear at the fee application hearing. In the motion, Hancock...

  4. In re McCrary & Dunlap Const. Co., LLC, 263 B.R. 574 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn., 2001) January 10, 2001
    The first time this payment was disclosed to either the bankruptcy court or the United States Trustee was in Mendes & Gonzales's fee application, but there is no information concerning when the payment was received or the nature of it. The fee application stated that it included payments made by January 31, 2000, and the fee application was not filed with the court until February 25, 2000. (Designation of Record No. 17) As a result, the payment must have been received more than fifteen days...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee


  1. In re Microwave Products of America, Inc., 102 B.R. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn., 1989) July 20, 1989
    allowance of attorney's fees and reimbursement of expenses". This is the second interim fee application filed by debtor's counsel, and covers fees and expenses for the period November 8, 1988, through April 30,...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas


  1. In re Guidry, 366 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Tex., 2007) March 12, 2007
    This matter is before the Court to consider confirmation of the Debtor's Motion to Modify Chapter 13 After Confirmation proposed by the Debtor, Stella R. Guidry ("Debtor"), the Debtor in the above referenced case. All objections to the merits of the modification motion were resolved prior to hearing. However, Ronald E. Stadtmueller, Chapter 13 Trustee, objected to the proposal contained in the modification motion whereby the Debtor's attorneys, Barron & Barron, L.L.P. (the...

  2. In re Guidry, Case No. 06-10199 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 3/12/2007) (Bankr. E.D. Tex., 2007) March 12, 2007
    This matter is before the Court to consider confirmation of the Debtor's Motion to Modify Chapter 13 After Confirmation proposed by the Debtor, Stella R. Guidry ("Debtor"), the Debtor in the above referenced case. All objections to the merits of the modification motion were resolved prior to hearing. However, Ronald E. Stadtmueller, Chapter 13 Trustee, objected to the proposal contained in the modification motion whereby the Debtor's attorneys, Barron & Barron, L.L.P. (the...

  3. In re Unger & Associates, Inc., 277 B.R. 694 (Bankr. E.D. Tex., 2001) December 20, 2001
    Applicant's Final Application seeks the balance unpaid from the First Fee Application ($49,698.78) and has attached as exhibits to the Final Fee Application itemizations of the time spent for the periods covered under both applications. This Court has scrutinized both Applications together with the supporting documentation appended to each as exhibits, the Application of Joann Swaty, assistant to Mr. Eschrich (which Application was denied following hearing), and the record in this case. The...

  4. In re Howard Love Pipeline Supply Co., 253 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D. Tex., 2000) October 19, 2000
    In his "Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 330," the Trustee requests attorney compensation in the amount of $16,192.50, together with expense reimbursement in the amount of $850.19, for a total award of $17,042.69. The UST filed an objection to the full allowance of the compensation request, asserting that certain services enumerated in the attorney fee application, constituting $2,350.00 of the request, actually constituted trustee...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Eastern District of Virginia


  1. In re United Refuse LLC, Case No. 04-11503-RGM (Bankr. E.D.Va. 6/7/2007) (Bankr. E.D.Va., 2007) June 7, 2007
    The law is clear that for recusal purposes, participation in prior hearings or in other proceedings involving the same parties is not itself grounds for recusal. This was discussed above together with the limitations on the rule. The limitations do not apply here. No ruling in the Frank & Company final fee application hearing called into question a ruling in a prior proceeding or was pre-determined by a prior ruling as discussed in Frates v. Weisshienk. Neither approval nor disapproval, in...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas


  1. In re Frazin, Case No. 02-32351-bjh-13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 9/23/2008) (Bankr. N.D. Tex., 2008) September 23, 2008
    In further compliance with the Litigation Proceeds Order, Haynes and Boone and G&N filed their respective applications requesting approval of fees pursuant to their contingency fee arrangement with the Debtor. Pre-Trial Order, 78. The Haynes and Boone fee application was filed on November 30,2007. Id. The certificate of service in the fee application and the service list attached to the application reflect that the fee application, with exhibits, was served on Zyne on November 30,...

  2. In re International Galleries, Inc., Case No. 06-30306-BJH7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 8/25/2008) (Bankr. N.D. Tex., 2008) August 25, 2008
    were necessary. While DuBois contends that some of Lain Faulkner's services were not necessary, he does not contend that an accountant was unnecessary in the Chapter 7 case. Rather, he contends that a less expensive accounting firm should have been retained by the Chapter 7 Trustee upon conversion. Thus, the Court concludes that the Chapter 7 Trustee needed to retain an accounting firm to assist him in the administration of the estate. The Court can, and will, address the reasonableness of Lain...

  3. In re Paige, Case No. 04-20147-RLJ-7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 7/23/2008) (Bankr. N.D. Tex., 2008) July 23, 2008
    [t]he central transaction involved in both Ernst & Young's fee application and the Trustee's present claim was the provision of accounting services during the Chapter 11 reorganization. . .. By granting Ernst & Young's fee application, the bankruptcy court implied a finding of quality and value in Ernst & Young's services. Similarly, the Trustee's claims in the present suit arise from Ernst &Young's alleged omissions in rendering the very same services considered by the bankruptcy court in the...

  4. In re Reese, Case No. 06-50133-RLJ-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 12/12/2007) (Bankr. N.D. Tex., 2007) December 12, 2007
    For attorney's fees and expenses incurred during the bankruptcy case, Mullin Hoard has, as of this date, been paid the sum of $78,375.48, which represents fees and expenses approved by this Court's order of October 30, 2006 on Mullin Hoard's first fee application. There is still $329.29 owing under the first fee application. The application before the Court seeks approval of fees and expenses of $99,508.83 for time expended from September 26, 2006 to July 31, 2007. This represents fees incurred...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas


  1. In re Hight, 393 B.R. 484 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 2008) August 13, 2008
    current bankruptcy case. In the Amended Proof of Claim, Wells Fargo asserts a total claim of $164,473.30, including amounts for delinquent monthly payments, an escrow shortage, property preservation/inspection fees, uncollected late charges, pre-petition attorney's fees, and post-petition attorney's fees. Wells Fargo also filed a fee application (the Fee Application) seeking approval to recover $600.00 in post-petition attorney's fees. Hight filed objections to both the Amended Proof of Claim...

  2. In re King, 350 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 2006) August 25, 2006
    This contested matter concerns Reese W. Baker's Motion to Reconsider Denial of Fee Application (Motion to reconsider) [Docket No. 139] seeking reconsideration of this Court's Order Denying Chapter 13 Post-Confirmation Fee Application for Reese W. Baker [Docket No. 136] and an award of $3,891.50 in accordance with his Chapter 13 Fee Application Post-Confirmation (Fee Application). [Docket 121]. Raynelle King (the Debtor) contends that Baker should not receive fees for post-confirmation work on...

  3. In re Phillips, 291 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 2003) March 5, 2003
    Two weeks after the Trustee filed his motion to dismiss, Counsel filed a motion for allowance of attorneys fees as an administrative expense (the "Initial Fee Application") 6 . Because the request sought consideration prior to the plan confirmation hearing, the court denied the application, referring counsel to the September 4, 2002, order of this court establishing a uniform procedure for consideration of fee applications at the hearing on plan confirmation. 7 Five days after the...

  4. In re McKenzie Energy Corp., 228 B.R. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 1998) December 4, 1998
    Reimbursement of Expenses for Services Rendered by Counsel for the Trustee for the Period February 23, 1997 through January 3, 1998 and Supporting Brief (the "Third Fee Application"). The Third Fee Application covers 2,136.10 hours and requests approval of $412,038.80 for services rendered by counsel for the trustee, as well as the sum of $37,447.78 for reimbursement of expenses, and the sum of...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas


  1. In re Weaver, 336 B.R. 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex., 2005) December 22, 2005
    The Court held hearings on the Amended Final Fee Application for Eric R. Borsheim, General Counsel for the Debtor-in-Possession, on September 26, 2005 and upon the Final Fee Application of E. Lee Parsley, P.C., Special Counsel for the Debtor-in-Possession, on November 1, 2005. The Court has jurisdiction to enter final orders in these core matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334(a) and (b), 28 U.S.C. §157(a) and (b)(1), 28 U.S.C. 151, and the Standing Order of Reference of all bankruptcy...

  2. In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 226 B.R. 382 (Bankr. W.D. Tex., 1998) October 13, 1998
    The trustee argues that the claims in question could not have been effectively litigated in conjunction with the fee application proceeding. He states that these claims concern negligence and malpractice, which, under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 7001, must be heard in an adversary proceeding. Although it is true that these claims must be heard in an adversary proceeding, the trustee misses the bankruptcy judge's point. With regard to whether the fee application hearing afforded an adequate...

  3. In re T.A.B. Const., 197 B.R. 821 (Bankr. W.D. Tex., 1996) January 24, 1996
    The Court held a hearing on January 18, 1996 upon the Debtor-in-possession's counsel's First Interim Fee Application. The only objection was filed by the Office of the United States Trustee. That objection was that the Application was filed prematurely since § 331 of the Bankruptcy Code precludes the filing of a fee application for any professional fees within 120 days after the order for...

  4. In re Mflex Corp., 172 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tex., 1994) May 3, 1994
    7. In Matter of Evangeline Refining Co., the trustee and attorney for the trustee filed fee applications which had been reconstructed after a lapse of time. Some of the time entries seemed unreasonable to the court, especially those in which counsel billed in excess of twenty four hours a day. Other evidence presented to the court led the judge to believe that the applicants were not candid in their fee applications. The bankruptcy judge held back a portion of the fees. On appeal, the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court of Utah


  1. In re Geneva Steel Co., 258 B.R. 799 (Bankr.Utah, 2001) February 7, 2001
    The fourth fee application of The Blackstone Group ("Blackstone"), financial advisor to the Debtor, came before the Court on December 15, 2000. Mark J. Thompson of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett appeared in behalf of Blackstone; Steven J. McCardell of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., and Mark C. Ellenberg of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft appeared in behalf of Geneva Steel Company...

  2. In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr.Utah, 1996) May 22, 1996
    While the fee application of Mayer, Brown & Platt is not being considered today for approval and has been continued, the Court has reviewed it and I discern from a review of that fee application that Mayer, Brown & Platt is advising the debtor in more areas than the appointment allows. I recognize that the initial applications of Mayer, Brown & Platt for approval as general counsel is now on appeal, but they are not now general...

  3. In re Cf & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 131 B.R. 474 (Bankr.Utah, 1991) September 18, 1991
    The case management procedure significantly streamlined the fee application process. The applications currently under advisement, however, raise issues regarding the amount that should be paid by these estates for fee application preparation, 3 paraprofessional fees and telecopier...

  4. In re Ts Industries, Inc., 125 B.R. 638 (Bankr.Utah, 1991) April 9, 1991
    On the basis of previous fee applications that have been before the court, N & S has been awarded, as administrative expenses, fees and costs in the amount of $72,791.17 (First Interim Fee Application; Order docket # 376) and $94,912.64 (Second Interim Fee Application; Order docket # 759), for a total amount of $167,703.81. In those applications, N & S represented that it had spent the majority of its time initiating the case, dealing with claim analysis and litigation, in particular, the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The District of Vermont


  1. In re Westover, Case # 06-10611 (Bankr.Vt. 12/7/2007) (Bankr.Vt., 2007) December 7, 2007
    The Court must now consider whether to award $112.50 in legal fees that the Applicant seeks for the preparation of the fee application. This amount is distinct from the fees incurred in the relief from stay motion because, generally speaking, a separate fee application is not included in a lift stay motion. The Court declines to award this amount primarily on equitable...

  2. In re Fibermark, Inc., 349 B.R. 385 (Bankr.Vt., 2006) September 6, 2006
    Reasonable time spent preparing a fee application is compensable. S.T.N., 70 B.R. at 835. Section 330 mandates, "[a]ny compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and skill reasonably required to prepare the application." § 330(a)(6). Accordingly, more junior level associates, where available, or administrative staff should be utilized to assist in the preparation of fee applications where appropriate. In addition to an analysis of...

  3. In re S.T.N. Enterprises, Inc., 70 B.R. 823 (Bankr.Vt., 1987) March 3, 1987
    Certain Courts that have allowed compensation for the time spent on a fee application have required that the time be billed at a lower rate than time for "truly legal services." See, e.g., In the Matter of Union Cartage Company, 56 B.R. 174, 178 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1986); In re United Rockwool, Inc., 32 B.R. 558, 561 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1983) (citing In re International Coins & Currency, 22 B.R. at 131). As we discuss later in this opinion, we do not think it appropriate or workable to...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The District of The Virgin Islands


  1. In re Prosser, Bankruptcy No. 06-30009. (Bankr. V.I. 8/19/2008) (Bankr. V.I., 2008) August 19, 2008
    WHEREAS the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issues of the reviewability of a fee application and the standards that a fee application must meet in the case of In re Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). In In re Busy Beaver, the Chapter 11 debtor's counsel submitted a fee application that was reviewed sua sponte by the bankruptcy court. Id. At 838. The bankruptcy court denied compensation for certain services for two reasons: (1) certain...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Eastern District of Virginia


  1. In re Vernon-Williams, Case No.: 04-37223-DOT (Bankr. E.D.Va. 9/21/2007) (Bankr. E.D.Va., 2007) September 21, 2007
    Leffler discussed the Boleman Firm's Exhibit 20-R with relation to the Vernon-Williams case. According to Leffler, he reviewed the Supplemental Fee Application and verified that the numbers contained on Exhibit 20-R matched those contained in the Supplemental Fee Application. Id. At 53. Leffler explained that the third section of the document reflected the total amount that was requested in the application; the voluntary reduction by the Boleman Firm attributable to their "good billing...

  2. In re Robinson, 368 B.R. 492 (Bankr. E.D.Va., 2007) May 17, 2007
    amount, and provided the amount requested is set forth in the plan and is consistent with the disclosure of compensation that the attorney is required to file under Rule 2016(b), a formal fee application is not required. Effectively, the plan and the Rule 2016 statement are treated as a fee application, and "the order confirming the plan is treated as also approving the...

  3. In re Vernon-Williams, 343 B.R. 766 (Bankr. E.D.Va., 2006) April 27, 2006
    For example, the United States Trustee questioned Boleman at the hearing regarding the Barakhyahu case (Pl.Exh. 82); however, this Court is unable to reconcile the testimony of Boleman with the direct evidence on the supplemental fee application. Tr. at 223-36. The supplemental fee application in the Barakhyahu case provides that total costs incurred prior to incurring the costs requested in the supplemental fee application were $330.27. Pl. Exh. 82, line 136. The Boleman Firm allegedly...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Western District of Virginia


  1. In re Skinner, 240 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Va., 1999) August 13, 1999
    The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 on December 6, 1995. Gary M. Bowman was approved as counsel for the Debtor on January 10, 1996. The case was subsequently converted to Chapter 7 on March 8, 1998 upon motion of the United States Trustee and due to the Debtor's inability to obtain adequate insurance on real property of the bankruptcy estate. On November 19, 1998, Mr. Bowman filed his fee application seeking fees of $15,677.75 and expenses of $541.00 for work done...

  2. In re C & J Oil Co., Inc., 81 B.R. 398 (Bankr. W.D. Va., 1987) October 27, 1987
    This court also finds that the applicant has requested a fee allowance for what appears to be largely legal secretarial work or administrative work not directly related to the delivery of legal services which can be compensated under 11 U.S.C. § 330. Clerical or routine services are not compensable as necessary legal services. Wabash, 69 B.R. at 478. To a greater extent, not all time expended by counsel is necessarily compensable at the normal hourly rate charged for legal services. For...

  3. In re Jessee, 77 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Va., 1987) August 26, 1987
    In view of the fact that the services rendered in the prosecution or defense of the fee application after its preparation and presentation to the Bankruptcy Court provides no services of value to the debtor's estate and does not add to the purpose of requiring detailed fee applications for use by the Bankruptcy Court, this Court declines to extend the holding in Nucorp to require that defense of fee applications on the appellate level is compensable. This Court is of the opinion that to...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Western District of Washington


  1. In re Nath, Bankruptcy No. 08-10491 (Bankr. W.D.Wash. 3/14/2008) (Bankr. W.D.Wash., 2008) March 14, 2008
    As in Joe and Mangini, the Original Fee Application in this case merely projects services and charges based on the applicant's experience with other chapter 13 cases; it does not detail the services actually rendered to these particular debtors, nor does it detail any specific contact with creditors, the trustee's office, etc. The Original Fee Application is not sworn under penalty of perjury nor does it state whether there is an agreement or understanding to share compensation as required...

  2. In re Columbia Plastics, Inc., 251 B.R. 580 (Bankr. W.D.Wash., 2000) July 12, 2000
    in determining reasonable compensation. In re Financial Corp. of America, 114 B.R. 221, 224 (9th Cir. BAP 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.1991). The court must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence provided by the trustee in support of the fee application and take into consideration whether the overall fee is reasonable under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). Due to the nature of the trustee's responsibilities, the court may determine that the trustee need not keep time records as detailed as...

  3. In re Marine Power & Equipment Co., Inc., 67 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D.Wash., 1986) November 4, 1986
    Attorneys may not accept compensation from any other party without the client's consent. Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(f). See also ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(f). The Code requires disclosure to the court of the receipt of such compensation. 11 U.S.C. § 327. Here, no disclosure was made of the retainer of $25,000 received from Mr. Woeck on June 2 and the terms of the fee agreement until Mr. Dubitzky's fee application was filed and it was...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Northern District of West Virginia


  1. In re Tackley Mill, LLC, Case No. 06-820 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. 2/8/2008) (Bankr.N.D.W.Va., 2008) February 8, 2008
    The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Tackley Mill, LLC (the "Committee"),requests entry of three orders. First, the Committee asks that the court approve its final fee application. Second, it seeks authorization to distribute $400,000 to pay: (a) the administrative claims of the Committee's professionals, (b) $25,000 to General Capital Partners, LLC, and (c) unsecured claims, pro rata, as defined by the Committee. Third, after entry of the above two orders, it asks that the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Southern District of West Virginia


  1. In re Heck's Properties, Inc., 151 B.R. 739 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va., 1992) March 26, 1992
    In this appeal, BI & L contends that the bankruptcy court committed reversible error in denying substantial portions of the legal fees sought for work which BI & L performed on behalf of the Equity Committee, arguing that the bankruptcy court denied it due process in connection with its final fee application, failed to apply the proper legal standards in resolving the propriety of its fees, and based the subject fee denials upon faulty legal conclusions and findings of fact. BI & L further...

  2. In re Heck's, Inc., 112 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va., 1990) February 21, 1990
    The Court attempted, by entry of administrative orders, to set out uniform procedures by which the professionals employed by the four related debtors and the Committees could request compensation for work performed and for reimbursement of expenses and to establish guidelines for the allowance of same. The administrative orders pertaining to fee and expense reimbursement are designated as Administrative Order III, the first of which was entered March 12, 1987. This Order was amended on April...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Eastern District of Wisconsin


  1. Matter of Hutter Const. Co., Inc., 126 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. E.D. Wis., 1991) May 13, 1991
    through the Fourth Fee Application. A portion of the out-of-pocket expenses in the Fourth Fee Application, and all out-of-pocket expenses after the Fourth Fee Application, dealt only with the defense of the MB & F Fee Applications. MB & F does not appear to be able to ascertain how much was spent in each case. The Court, following a review of the files in all three cases, is allocating 71.157% of that sum to HCCI, specifically, $10,369.11. MB & F is awarded the...




U.S. Bankruptcy Court For The Western District of Wisconsin


  1. In re Tak Communications, Inc., 154 B.R. 514 (Bankr.W.D.Wis., 1993) April 30, 1993
    WGM has its principal office in New York City, and it was from that office that its representation in this case was undertaken. It may be suggested, therefore, that WGM was proceeding as it might in its "home" court. So, although not directly implicated in this case, 19 the Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals ("Guidelines") generated by the Southern District of New York provide an interesting foil against which to examine WGM's fee application. Representing...





back to top

* Cases reported were found by using the term "Fee Application" in Boolean Search. This listing of cases is not meant to constitute the top cases within each jurisdiction but, the most recent cases in accordance with the search term. (5/17/09)