Recent Fee Application Cases by Jurisdiction *
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United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit

1. In re Matney, No. 09-1170 (10th Cir. 2/11/2010) (10th Cir., 2010)
   The bankruptcy court then considered several of the broader objections the Trustee had raised in opposition to the fee application. The court agreed with several criticisms of the timeliness and competence of counsel's prosecution of the bankruptcy case. Id. The court also found that "the detail and description of the legal services set forth [in the fee application] to be woefully inadequate . . . to determine whether the amount of time for such legal services was reasonable," noting...


2. In re Johnson, 575 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir., 2009)
   pleading requesting the bankruptcy court to set a hearing regarding attorney fees. 3 See id. In response, M & M moved for dismissal, arguing that the dismissal of the Chapter 13 case divested the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to proceed with the § 362(k)(1) adversary proceeding. See id. The bankruptcy court denied M & M's motion and ordered the Johnsons to file a statement of their fees and costs. The Johnsons' attorney filed a supplement updating the fees and costs incurred since the...


3. In re Dewey, 1999 C10 43669 (USCA10, 1999)
   Georg Jensen ("Jensen"), former counsel to Curtis D. Dewey, the Chapter 13 debtor, appeals three orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Wyoming: (1) an order continuing a hearing on his fee application ("Continuation Order"); (2) an order denying his fee application without prejudice ("Fee Order"); and (3) an order denying his motion to alter or amend the Fee Order ("Reconsideration Order"). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy...


4. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275 (C.A.10 (Okla.), 1998)
   Even assuming, arguendo, this case was complex, the district court did not err in classifying plaintiffs' fee application as unreasonable. Defendants liken plaintiffs' litigation strategy to "using an atom bomb to kill a fly." Appellees' Br. at 9. I agree. Plaintiffs' attorney appears to have exercised no billing judgment in his fee application. See Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553 (court must distinguish "raw" time from "billable" time because "it does not follow that the amount of time actually...


5. Colorado Mountain Cellars, Inc., In re, 139 F.3d 911 (C.A.10 (Colo.), 1993)
   Mr. Flynn's fee application requested an increase of his fee from the agreed-upon ten percent contingency fee to a forty percent continency fee. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (allowing court to modify approved compensation "if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions"). Mr. Flynn argued the agreed-upon compensation was based on the assumption he would be merely...


6. Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197 (C.A.10 (N.M.), 1986)
   An award of reasonable attorneys' fees may include compensation for work performed in preparing and presenting the fee application. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1980); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d at 237. As explained in greater detail in our review of Mr. Rubin's fee application, not every hour expended on a fee request is necessarily reasonable or compensable. The same standards employed in evaluating time expended in trial and trial preparation apply, to the...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit

1. Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir., 2003)
   The fee application was unopposed. In the ordinary course, the application would have been approved by this Court, and fees would have been awarded as requested. See 11th Cir. R. 39-2 (permitting party opposing fees to file an objection and requiring such objections to be filed within ten days after service of the fee application); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir.1999) ("Those opposing fee applications have obligations, too."). The majority finds that this case...


2. McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir., 2002)
   MBM and McMahan contend the district court's award of any attorney's fees beyond the $152,268.71 incurred as of December 21, 1999 was in error because Toto's counsel voluntarily limited the fee application to those incurred by that date. Toto's attorney's affidavit, submitted as part of the fee application, stated that he "cut off the claimed time immediately following the entry of the summary judgment [on December 21, 1999], even though the client has incurred fees to pursue the issue of...


3. Glados, Inc., In re, 83 F.3d 1360 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1996)
   Following a hearing on the UST's objection, the bankruptcy court entered an order on September 30,1993. The bankruptcy court's order allowed administrative fees and expenses to the Trustee, the Trustee's counsel, and the Debtor's counsel. In addition, the order provided for the payment in full of all priority and unsecured claimants and allocated the remaining $77,711.82 of surplus funds as interest on the administrative fees and expenses. The bankruptcy court also concluded under §...


4. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Evergreen, Ala., 812 F.2d 1332 (C.A.11 (Ala.), 1987)
   Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the trial court in considering a fee application is reasonable compensation. King II, 707 F.2d at 468. For this reason, the district court is not required to accept uncontradicted evidence when there is a reason for rejecting it, see id, and, for this same reason, the district court should give the applicant an adequate opportunity to respond to the court's concerns regarding the fee application and to correct perceived inadequacies in that application...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit

1. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22 (1st Cir., 2004)
   As the parties now seem to agree, the first paragraph of Local Rule 54.2 does not apply to Crowley's fee application, as this is not a case in which fees were contracted for or in which no notice of appeal was filed. 4 Rather, the timeliness is governed by the second paragraph, which states, "An application for fees in all other cases shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the appellate mandate providing for final disposition of any appeal."


2. In re Narragansett Clothing Co., 1997 C01 42025 (USCA1, 1997)
   On June 20, 1996, the Trustee filed a "Post-Confirmation Trustee's Final Report and Account Before Distribution, Request for Compensation and Report on Claims/Proposed Distribution" (the "Final Fee Application") and an "Affidavit of Joseph B. Garb in Support of the Final Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Chapter 11 Trustee and Post-Confirmation Trustee" (the "Affidavit"), through which he sought total compensation of $555,175. The Trustee noted in his Affidavit that,...


3. Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (C.A.1 (Mass.), 1995)
   The United States nonetheless contends that Nowd is not entitled to an attorney fee award under the EAJA, since the fee application is deficient. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984) (noting potential adverse consequences of counsel's failure to maintain contemporaneous time records). As the district court has yet to decide whether to exercise its discretion in this case, it should be afforded an opportunity to consider the Nowd application in the first...


4. In re: P. Iannochino, 242 F.3d 36 (1st Cir., 2000)
   Of course, this substantial overlap between the proof required for each claim would not matter for the purposes of res judicata if the Iannochinos could not have brought their malpractice claim in opposition to Aframe's fee application. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1167 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that res judicata cannot bar a claim that could not have been raised in the first action). Though the Aframe fee application was a contested matter in bankruptcy, this does not...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit

1. In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d 422 (2nd Cir., 2009)
   The structure and context of section 502(d) suggests that Congress intended it to differentiate between claims and administrative expenses, and not to apply to the latter. Section 502, in conjunction with section 501, provides a procedure for the allowance of claims that is entirely separate from the procedure for allowance of administrative expenses under section 503. Section 501, which is titled "Filing of proofs of claims or interests," provides that a creditor may file a proof of...


2. Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2nd Cir., 2009)
   The federal Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., does not explicitly state whether an unsecured creditor can collect post-petition attorneys' fees based on a pre-petition indemnity agreement. In United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1982), this Court held, under the Bankruptcy Act then current, that such claims are allowable. In Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific...


3. In re Smart World Technologies, LLC, 552 F.3d 228 (2nd Cir., 2009)
   Section 327(a) of the Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees, with court approval, to "employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons ... to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties." 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Sections 328 and 330 establish a two-tiered system for judicial review and approval of the terms of the professional's retention. Section 330 authorizes the bankruptcy court to award the retained...


4. Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218 (2nd Cir., 2009)
   Steven F. Goldman appeals from the district court order denying his application for attorneys' fees. On appeal, Goldman argues that the record does not support the district court's conclusions that Goldman engaged in misconduct with respect to the fees and expenses in the case and that Goldman failed to represent his client adequately with respect to the post-settlement proceedings in the district court. Goldman also argues that Judge Korman's bias against him influenced the district court's...


5. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens v. County of Albany, 369 F.3d 91 (2nd Cir., 2004)
   rates is the `district in which the reviewing court sits.'" (Plaintiffs' Fee Application at 7; see also Reply in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that since their application for fees in connection with the appeal had to be filed with this Court, see Smith v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.1989), "and this Court sits in the Southern District of New York, the Southern District of New York is the relevant community...


6. Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 166 F.3d 456 (C.A.2 (Vt.), 1999)
   The district court denied Savoie's application for fees attributed to services rendered after Merchants announced its intention to make the $9.2 million payment. The district court did so on the sound principle that, because this is a common fund case, Savoie is not entitled to fees for the work his lawyers performed during the fee application process--sound, though in this case insufficient because Savoie maintained that certain of the work performed after November 28, 1994 was not performed...


7. In re Smart World Technologies, LLC, 552 F.3d 228 (2nd Cir., 2009)
   Section 327(a) of the Code authorizes bankruptcy trustees, with court approval, to "employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons ... to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties." 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Sections 328 and 330 establish a two-tiered system for judicial review and approval of the terms of the professional's retention. Section 330 authorizes the bankruptcy court to award the retained...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit

1. In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, No. 09-2074 (3rd Cir. 1/15/2010) (3rd Cir., 2010)
   After the Bankruptcy Court entered an order on June 9, 2008, approving the sale to Fortistar, Kelson appealed to the District Court from the order denying the payment of the $15 million break-up fee, arguing that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by denying Kelson's request for the fee. Kelson also argued that it was a stalking-horse bidder entitled to a break-up fee as a matter of fundamental fairness and contended that the Debtors were estopped from opposing its appeal because they...


2. Zucker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 265 F.3d 171 (3rd Cir., 2001)
   First, the fact that Rand did not object to the settlement does not mean that he cannot object to the fee application. The settlement of the derivative litigation was not dependent on the disposition of the fee application and the stipulation of settlement did not and probably could not provide that Mogell's attorney would be paid any fees without court approval. The settlement merely provided that Mogell's attorney could apply for fees to which CBS would not object if the application did not...


3. Welch & Forbes Inc. v. Cendant Corp., 243 F.3d 722 (3rd Cir., 2001)
   In reviewing the district court's fee award in Gunter, we stated that "[w]e give [a] great deal of deference to a district court's decision to set fees." 223 F.3d at 195. However, we noted, "[n]otwithstanding our deferential standard of review, it is incumbent upon a district court to make its reasoning and application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so that we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion." 223 F.3d at 196. Therefore,...


4. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir., 2000)
   Counsel's original fee application included all of the information necessary to do this crosschecking analysis and to determine how much time Counsel devoted to their clients' case. As is customary in these cases, Counsel submitted extensive briefing and affidavits detailing the hours they spent on the instant litigation, see App. at 91-150, listing the number of hours each lawyer, paralegal, and law clerk worked on the case, see id. at 134-35, 148, and providing documentation supporting the...


5. Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 253 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1995)
   On the other hand, we also noted that reliance on the market is tempered because "the court will, in practical terms, act as a surrogate for the estate, reviewing the fee application much as a sophisticated non-bankruptcy client would review a [professional] bill." Id. And we observed that "certainly a bankruptcy judge's experience with fee petitions and his or her expert judgment pertaining to appropriate billing practices, founded on an understanding of the legal profession, will be the...


6. Busy Beaver Bldg. Centers, Inc., In re, 19 F.3d 833 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1993)
   The evidentiary hearing persuaded the bankruptcy court that many of the disallowed services at issue require the exercise of professional judgment, but it nevertheless refused to grant K & L its requested fees for two reasons. First, the court concluded that K & L had not provided sufficient information in its fee application for the court to reach that conclusion earlier (before the evidentiary hearing). The court explained pointedly that it would require fee applicants to comply with the...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit

1. Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467 (4th Cir., 2003)
   We turn to the third element in the res judicata analysis, whether "the claim[] in the second matter," the malpractice action, is "based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier [fee]proceeding." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315. Our court recognizes that "[n]o simple test exists to determine whether [claims are based on the same cause of action] for claim preclusion purposes." Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir.1999). Generally, we say...


2. Grausz v. Englander, 2003 C04 537 (USCA4, 2003)
   We turn to the third element in the res judicata analysis, whether "the claim[] in the second matter," the malpractice action, is "based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier [fee] proceeding." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315. Our court recognizes that "[n]o simple test exists to determine whether [claims are based on the same cause of action] for claim preclusion purposes." Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999). Generally, we say that "claims are part of the...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit

1. Hall-Williams v. Law Office of Paul C. Miniclier, PLC, No. 09-30113 (5th. Cir. 1/13/2010) (5th. Cir., 2010)
   judge overseeing the matter entered an order requiring Miniclier to file a fee application by May 23 and Hall-Williams to respond to the fee...


2. In Matter of Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell L.L.P., No. 09-30360 (5th. Cir. 12/29/2009) (5th. Cir., 2009)
   all of his attorneys' fees, which comprise more than half of the amount in controversy, stem from opposing the bankruptcy. However, nowhere in the relevant bankruptcy statutes does it state that a superseded custodian is authorized to oppose a bankruptcy petition or to employ the estate's resources in doing so. Indeed, as mentioned above, the statute governing a superseded custodian's post-petition duties states explicitly that unless the custodian is expressly authorized by the bankruptcy...


3. In the Matter Of McCloskey, No. 08-20147. Summary Calendar (5th. Cir. 9/30/2009) (5th. Cir., 2009)
   of the attorney's fee award as child support to be in error, we vacate the judgment and remand this cause to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the attorney's fee award is dischargeable in...


4. In the Matter of Mirant Corporation, No. 08-10064 (5th. Cir. 1/30/2009) (5th. Cir., 2009)
   Appellee Mirant Corporation ("Mirant") and certain of its subsidiaries filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellants are Frank Smith, Kent Koerper, Bart Engram, Mary Leight, and L. Matt Wilson ("Wilson"), each a common shareholder of Mirant during the corporation's bankruptcy proceedings. Mirant's reorganization plans, which were filed in early 2005, stated that its value was substantially less than its outstanding debt, which would leave existing...


5. In the Matter of Notre Dame Investors, Inc., No. 07-51164 (5th. Cir. 1/5/2009) (5th. Cir., 2009)
   On August 10, 2006, the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan of reorganization in NDI's Chapter 11 case. Wilson did not appeal the bankruptcy court's confirmation order. Article 2.04 of the confirmed plan, which defines Class Four to include general unsecured claims, states:"This class of creditors specifically includes the Allowed Claims of Wilson Refining, as finally approved by the court." Pursuant to Article 12.01 of the plan, the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to...


6. In the Matter of Texas Securities Inc., 218 F.3d 443 (5th Cir., 2000)
   The Modified Employment Order states that the employment agreement was being modified "to (i)affirm the contingency fee arrangement with regard to completed work; (ii) pay for work-in-progress on a contingency/hourly fee basis, plus expenses; and (iii) pay for future work performed on behalf of the estate utilizing the lodestar approach, plus expenses." (emphasis added). The lodestar approach refers to a formula involving the multiplication of the number of hours reasonably expended in...


7. Osherow v. Ernst & Young, 200 F.3d 382 (5th Cir., 2000)
   We begin by recognizing that a fee application hearing is a contested matter in the bankruptcy context; however, the nature of the proceeding does not automatically determine whether this action is barred by res judicata. See In re Howe, 913 F.2d at 1146 n.28. Although the fee hearing was a contested matter, Ernst & Young's fee application was a claim against IT. See 11 U.S.C. 101(5). Had IT objected to the fee application and included with its objection a claim for affirmative relief on...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit

1. In re Trailer Source, Inc., 555 F.3d 231 (6th Cir., 2009)
   been determined to be implicit: that creditors acting for the benefit of the estate were allowed to sue derivatively." Alan R. Lepene & Sean A. Gordon, The Case for Derivative Standing in Chapter 11: "It's the Plain Meaning, Stupid," 11 Am. Bankr.Inst. L.Rev. 313, 319 (2003). When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it continued the practice of § 64a(1) in what is now § 503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 355 (1977), as reprinted in...


2. Townsend v. Social Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 127 (6th Cir., 2007)
   The district court analyzed separately Townsend's application for attorney fees and expenses related to litigation in the district court and Townsend's application for attorney fees and expenses related to the first appeal in this case. The district court relied on different grounds in denying the two applications, rejecting Townsend's initial fee application because it was untimely and rejecting her fee application related to the first appeal because she was not a prevailing party in her...


3. Miltimore Sales v. International Rectifier, Inc., 412 F.3d 685 (Fed. 6th Cir., 2005)
   We write further to discuss the effect of the Federal Rules for those in practice. As the Advisory Committee Notes discuss, one of the reasons the fourteen-day limit was adopted, as opposed to no time limit was, theoretically, for increased efficiency in processing motions for fees. The practical effect, however, is decreased efficiency and increased uncertainty—not to mention more paperwork. In nearly every case where attorney fees are available, the prevailing party will now need to...


4. In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 355 F.3d 415 (6th Cir., 2004)
   On March 26, 1997, Schilling filed his first interim fee application. In making bankruptcy fee applications, Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) requires applicants, including examiners, to disclose "what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case." Fed. R. Bankr. P.2016(a). In his application Schilling included a "Rule 2016(a) Disclosure Statement," asserting that he was a...


5. In re Airspect Air, Inc., 2003 C06 43 (USCA6, 2003)
   CMC appealed that decision and this Panel found that the bankruptcy court had erred in determining that the contingency set out in the fee agreement had not been met. The Panel reversed and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions for it to review the fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 328 rather than § 330 and to award the appropriate contingent fee unless it determined that its initial approval of the fee arrangement was improvident in light of subsequent...


6. In re: Sami Yousif v. Yousif, Tanners Inc., 201 F.3d 774 (6th Cir., 1999)
   Here, the bankruptcy court denied Halbert's fee application in the Tanners' bankruptcy case because it determined that he had received undisclosed merchandise transfers during the ninety-day preference period and therefore did not qualify as a disinterested person within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The bankruptcy court also determined that Halbert had violated the disclosure requirements set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b). The district court affirmed...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit

1. Matter of Sheldon Bond, 254 F.3d 669 (7th Cir., 2001)
   However, in spite of Dempsey's failure to obtain the fees she requested, we note that she has set forth several reasonable arguments regarding the manner in which her fee requests were handled. For example, the bankruptcy court never provided her with an opportunity to address its concerns with her billing methods prior to ruling on her request, choosing instead to surprise her with these concerns in its final opinion (by which time Dempsey could no longer rebut the bankruptcy court). In its...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit

1. Kohl, In re, 95 F.3d 713 (C.A.8 (Minn.), 1996)
   Keate filed an application for compensation on August 24, 1994, seeking $14,041.32 in fees for services rendered in the Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 proceedings. On October 17, 1994, following a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying Keate's fee application except for the $500.00 retainer received by Keate prior to the commencement of the Chapter 7 proceeding. The court reasoned that most of Keate's services provided no benefit to the estate. The district court affirmed the...

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United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit

1. Sternberg v. Johnston, No. 07-16870 (9th Cir. 10/1/2009) (9th Cir., 2009)
   hearing, he advised the court for the first time of his bankruptcy proceedings, explaining that the proceedings would result in a plan to pay his debts, including the spousal support, and that his bankruptcy counsel had informed him that the filing of the bankruptcy petition stayed anything regarding the property settlement, attorney fees, and sanctions. He apologized for "not knowing exactly what's going on" and said, "I guess, I object in the abstract to anything that would...


2. In re Sntl Corp., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir., 2009)
   While there is intuitive appeal to the Electric Machinery court's concern that an overactive creditor could unfairly run up fees, several factors reduce the potential for trouble. First, the fee doctrines of many jurisdictions, including the general California attorney's fee doctrine that applies here, impose requirements in the nature of reasonableness. Second, the sections of the Bankruptcy Code that expressly focus on compensation for attorneys generally include limitations premised on...


3. In re Maple-Whitworth, 556 F.3d 742 (9th Cir., 2009)
   This appeal involves an award of $42,257 in attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1), after dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. The purported debtor, Maple-Whitworth, Inc., sought fees and costs against only one petitioner, appellant Michael N. Sofris. But the bankruptcy court entered the award against some of the other petitioners who were served with the motion, under a theory of joint and several liability. The bankruptcy court failed to rule on a...


4. In re Wind N' Wave, 509 F.3d 938 (9th Cir., 2007)
   The Petitioning Creditors appealed to the Ninth Circuit BAP. The BAP, reversing the Bankruptcy Court's decision, held that Sedona was controlling and that "an independent allowable expense claim under [§ 503](b)(3) is not a prerequisite to an award of reasonable fees under § 503(b)(4)." In re Wind N' Wave, 328 B.R. at 183 (quoting Sedona, 220 B.R. at 81). The BAP remanded to the lower court to determine appropriate fees. Id. at 180-83. In a motion decided a month...


5. In re Veritas Software Corp. Securities Litigation, 496 F.3d 962 (9th Cir., 2007)
   In the end, this is a decision committed to the discretion of the district court. While the district court would not have abused its discretion in granting Malone's fee application, it did not abuse its discretion in denying it. The district court's decision denying Malone's fee application on the grounds of untimeliness is affirmed. Because the application was untimely we need not reach the question of whether it was proper for the district court to decline consideration of the time Malone's...


6. In re Eliapo, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir., 2006)
   This appeal concerns the appropriate standards and procedures for awarding attorney's fees in connection with Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California has established three means by which a debtor's attorney may obtain a fee award in a Chapter 13 case. The attorney may (1) submit a fee application under "no-look" guidelines that establish presumptive fees for a "basic case" and specified variations thereon, (2) submit a...


7. Schwarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 73 F.3d 895 (C.A.9 (Or.), 1995)
   In any event, Hensley 's requirement that the district court "provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award," id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, merely obliges the court "to give at least some indication of how it arrived at the amount of compensable hours for which fees were awarded to allow for meaningful appellate review." Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398. The court is not "required to set forth an hour-by-hour analysis of the fee request[,] ... [and] when faced with a...


8. In Re: The Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, 272 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir., 2001)
   Houlihan Lokey submitted its first Final Fee Application "pursuant to Sections 327 and 330," rather than pursuant to § 328. In its First Amended Final Fee Application, Houlihan Lokey stated that the applicable legal standard of review was that of § 328. Circle K contends that, because Houlihan Lokey cited § 330 in its first Final Fee Application, it should be judicially estopped from now arguing that § 328 applies. We need not resolve this issue in light of the ruling...


9. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc, 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir., 2000)
   The Inn's final argument is that the district court was justified in denying Fischer's fee application because his request (1) was not based on contemporaneous records, (2) was poorly documented, and (3) was excessive. Although each one of these allegations may ultimately provide the district court with a reason to reduce the fee, we do not believe that they provide the court with a valid basis for denying the fee application in its...


10. Roderick Timber Co., In re, 129 F.3d 127 (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1997)
    The fees at issue here are the additional fees incurred opposing Crake's objection to the fee application. Unlike the presentation and preparation of the fee application itself, there is no statutory or Bankruptcy Rule requirement that attorneys for the debtor oppose objections to the fee application. We agree with the BAP that: "Nucorp does not provide a blanket allowance of fees for any and all services related to the fee...


11. Gottschalk, In re, 78 F.3d 593 (C.A.9, 1996)
    Although Tron & White did not file a formal motion to enlarge the time required for filing their fee application, the late filed application itself should have been treated as a motion for extension of time under Rule 9006. See In re Williamette Timber Systems, Inc., 54 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr.D.Or.1985) (treating late-filed fee application as motion for enlargement of time). In its reply brief in support of its fee application, Tron & White expressly requested the court to consider its fee...


12. In re Smith, 317 F.3d 918 (9th Cir., 2002)
    While Nucorp suggests that time and expenses spent litigating a fee application may be compensated, in Boldt v. Crake (In re Riverside-Linden Investment Co.), 945 F.2d 320, 323 (9th Cir.1991), we rejected the per se award of administrative fees arising from litigation of a fee application. We distinguished Nucorp on the basis that "[u]nlike the presentation and preparation of the fee application itself, there is no statutory or Bankruptcy Rule requirement that attorneys for the...

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* Cases reported were found by using the term "Fee Application" in Boolean Search. This listing of cases is not meant to constitute the top cases within each jurisdiction but, the most recent cases in accordance with the search term. (5/17/09)